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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
VULNERABILITY OF MANNED SPACECRAFT TO CREW LOSS
FROM ORBITAL DEBRIS PENETRATION
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
For much of its history, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has
employed a qualitative approach utilizing failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) as the principal
building block of their risk analysis program. One area of exception has been the design of spacecraft
meteoroid protection systems. Since the 1960's, NASA managers have established a strong struc-
tural design requirement for preventing meteoroid penetration into inhabited spacecraft. Since the
meteoroid environment was considered to be well understood, this requirement was probabilistic in
nature. For example, the structural design requirement for space shuttle cabin walls and windows
was a 0.95 probability of no penetration by a meteoroid in 500 "typical" missions.
Inherent to the establishment of this type of requirement was the conservative assumption
that any penetration of these small manned volumes would cause a loss of the spacecraft and its
crew. Thus, the probability of crew loss from meteoroid impact was considered roughly equal to the
probability of spacecraft penetration, and a meteoroid "safety" analysis amounted to a structural and
statistical analysis of the probability of no penetration. In general, these "probabilistic" meteoroid
protection requirements were easy to meet, since the probability of impact by meteoroids on a small,
short-lived spacecraft was very low.
In the late 1970's, NASA began to detect a new threat to manned space operations in the
form of impact with orbital debris--small particles from the breakup of satellites in low Earth orbit
(LEO). Recognizing this threat, NASA space station managers included orbital debris when formu-
lating meteoroid penetration protection requirements for initial space station elements. However,
because of the proliferation of orbital debris (space junk) in LEO, danger of spacecraft collision with
orbital debris particles now far surpasses the danger from meteoroids. It is a serious, growing threat
to the survivability of human operations in an Earth-orbiting space station over its long (as much as
30 years) design life.
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B. Research Statement
The sudden and dramatic growth of orbital debris in LEO places many spacecraft designers in
a difficult position. Resource (time, cost, and weight) constraints on the design and placement of
manned spacecraft in orbit are often critical. There is an obvious limit to the amount of initial orbital
debris shielding that can be offered to human inhabitants of a space station module. The preliminary
(conservative) assumption that loss of a spacecraft "always" occurs following a meteoroid/orbital
debris penetration drives the Spacecraft designer to choose shielding designs that may be over-
designed for preventing actual catastrophic failure (crew or spacecraft loss).
However, today's large mannedspacecraft,suchasSpaceStationFreedom (S.S. Freedom),
are being designed as compartmented vehicles consisting of separated manned modules, with heavy
internal structure, connected by independent hatches. This construction challenges the assumption of
"automatic" spacecraft (or crew) loss given a penetration. In reality, the probability of spacecraft or
crew loss from meteoroid/debris (M/D) penetration is not only due to the probability of penetration,
but also depends upon the magnitude and internal effects of that penetration. It can be thought of as
the product of (1) the probability of penetration and (2) the conditional probability that this penetra-
tion causes a loss of the spacecraft or crew, as suggested by the second term of the following equa-
tion:
P [spacecraft or crew loss due to M/D penetration] = P [penetration] x P [loss/penetration] ,
or,
PM/D loss = Ppen × Ploss/pen • (1)
One can further define station or crew "safety" as:
"Safety" = 1-PM/D loss • (2)
To restate, the second term on the right side of equation (1), Ploss/pen, was conservatively assumed
to be equal to unity for small spacecraft. However, this term can be quantified through additional
analyses of actual penetration effects on spacecraft survivability. A lower "second term" indicates a
lower probability of overall crew or spacecraft loss, and a higher overall spacecraft "safety" for a
particular shield design.
To the spacecraft designer, quantifying the Ploss/pen allows a lower expenditure of resources
for orbital debris shielding to provide required safety levels to the spacecraft and crew. This
expanded probabilistic analysis can also be used to identify internal design configurations that fur-
ther increase spacecraft and crew safety from the damaging effects of M/D impacts. Further, quanti-
fying this "second term" opens the option of improving orbital debris safety for existing spacecraft
through adding internal (rather than external) shielding. Because internal shielding may often be
placed on existing spacecraft without costly extravehicular activity (EVA), quantifying the probabil-
ity of spacecraft loss following an orbital debris penetration may be used to lengthen the orbital
"life" of existing spacecraft at lower cost than augmenting external orbital debris shields.
Thus, quantifying actual crew safety from meteoroid and orbital debris penetration is impor-
tant not only to determine whether existing spacecraft shielding is sufficient, but also to determine
the extent to which future shielding should be added, and where. For these reasons, it is the general
objective of this report to quantify crew safety from "significant" orbital debris penetration effects
into large manned spacecraft, and discuss how this procedure could be extended to other penetration
effects and spacecraft types. The next sections detail the objectives and approach of this report.
_ i _ _
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C. Research Objectives and Novelty of the Approach
The objectives of this report are to:
(1) Conduct research into methods for estimating quantitative risk that are applicable to the
manned spacecraft orbital debris impact problem.
..... .......... i.¸• • :i/i:,! ¸ ._-_ , ..... :. . ..... _::!
(2) Identify penetration-induced failure modes that induce spacecraft or crew loss and those
internal design and/or operational factors that most affect these failure modes (hazard
sensitivity factors).
(3) Summarize baseline assumptions from above studies and develop a detailed probabilistic
model and simulation tool for computing loss of crew from "significant" orbital debris
penetration failure modes considering a significant number of operational/design vari-
ables.
(4) Perform baseline and sensitivity studies on probability of crew loss from orbital debris
penetration for spacecraft manned modules. Perform validation and verification of devel-
oped simulation tool. Identify operational modes and design alternatives that increase
crew safety and possible roadblocks to their implementation.
(5) Outline how this detailed model for spacecraft manned modules might be expanded to a
general probabilistic model for loss of spacecraft or crew from orbital debris impacts,
considering all failure modes and operational factors described in (2).
This report is the first application of a quantitative, "military-style" survivability/vulnerabil-
ity analysis technique to the civil space program. It differs from other past/proposed analyses by its
use of the orbital debris environment as the primary random variable for Monte Carlo "probability of
crew loss" analyses, using S.S. Freedom program inputs of expected crew position as secondary
random input variables where necessary. It develops a model for oblique hole size and initial crack
size based on limited penetration data. It quantifies baseline input values for operational factors
(crew escape time, sleep position, etc.) and phenomenological factors (depressurization through a
hole, internal equipment resistance, etc.) that affect the probability of crew loss, quoting values
where available, and generating them where information is unavailable. It includes a sensitivity
analysis for the effects of alternative input assumptions where baseline input assumptions are
uncertain. Finally, it identifies quantitative increases in crew safety possible through implementing
design changes and operational protocols.
II. QUANTITATIVE RISK ESTIMATION METHODS
This section of the report reviews how quantitative "probability of penetration" analyses are
performed at NASA, and gives a short summary of quantitative meteoroid/orbital debris performance
requirements for various space projects. It also describes quantitative risk analysis procedures used
within government and industry for estimating system safety. This discussion concentrates primarily
on military system survivability analysis procedures as outlined by the Joint Technical Coordinating
Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) that are applicable to this problem.
A. Orbital Debris Environment
In the late 1970's, NASA began to detect a new threat to manned space operations in the
form of potential impact with orbital debris small particles from the breakup of satellites in Earth
orbit. The first models of the orbital debris population were developed by Donald Kessler of NASA'S
Johnson Space Center, still one of the world's foremost experts in the study of the orbital debris
population. In 1978,KesslerandCour-Palaispublishedtheir first article on orbital debrisentitled
"Collision Frequencyof Artificial Satellites:TheCreationof a Debris Belt.''1 Sincethat time,
Kesslerhasproducedincreasinglymoredetaileddescriptionsof the orbital debrisenvironmentusing
sophisticatedoptical andradar systemsto gathersupportingdata.23
The orbital debrisenvironmentis similar to the meteoroidenvironmentin that the probability
densityfunctions for particlevelocity andpanicle diameterareindependentof oneanother.Both
modelscontainequationsdescribingtheflux (number)of particlesof a particulardiameteror larger
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Figure 1. Comparison of meteoroid and orbital debris flux.
However, orbital debris particles have far surpassed meteoroids in number of large panicles
"'dangerous" to manned spacecraft. Figure 1 shows that the orbital debris flux exceeds the mete-
oroid flux above 1 mm and is significantly higher than the meteoroid flux above 1 cm. Because
spacecraft shielding can generally defeat particles up to 1 cm in diameter, the probability of orbital
debris penetration is far greater than meteoroid penetration; so much so, in fact, that meteoroid/
orbital debris protection analyses for large, long-lived spacecraft can usually omit meteoroid




Orbital debris also differs from meteoroids in their density distribution. According to "Space
Station Program Natural Environment Definition for Design, ''3 orbital debris consists largely of
aluminum (65 percent), with the remaining volume fraction consisting largely of epoxy-glass, rubber,
titanium, copper, and steel. Because of the preponderance of aluminum and its comparatively
"median" density, the density of orbital debris is usually equated to that of aluminum (2.8 gr/cmZ).
Conversely, meteoroids generally consist of either ice or stony or ferritic materials bound loosely
together with ice. As such, the average density of meteoroids is placed as approximately 0.5 gr/cm 2.
Another major difference between meteoroids and orbital debris is the directionality and
velocity of the particles. Because of their interplanetary origin, meteoric particles travel at speeds up
to 72 km/s. Orbital debris moves in roughly circular orbits around the Earth, and generally impacts at
speeds less than 20 km/s (relative to spacecraft velocity). Whereas the meteoroid environment is
roughly "omnidirectional" relative to spacecraft surfaces, orbital debris impacts are highly directional
in nature (due to their circular orbits), approaching the spacecraft from its "front," "port," and
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Figure 2. Orbital debris velocity distribution.
The expected orbital debris particle flux varies with altitude, solar flux, and year of operation.
As shown in figure 2, the relative velocity and direction of debris impacts are directly related to one
another (i.e., particles •"coming" from one relative direction always travel at the same velocity rela-
tive to the spacecraft), and are themselves determined by the altitude and inclination of spacecraft
orbit.
Using theKesslermodel for flux, theprobabilityof thespacecraftcolliding with anorbital
debrisparticle of a diametergreaterthana critical valuecanbedetermined.This "probability of
impact" function hasbeendescribedby Horn and Avans4 (amongothers)as:
P[d>Dcrit] = 1-e-f at , (3)
where
f = debris flux, number of particles per square meter-year of diameter d or larger
a = effective area of spacecraft (spacecraft incremental area multiplied by incremental
probability of orbital debris approaching from this direction), square meters
t = time in space, years.
Alternative models for the orbital debris population have also been formed. In particular, the
European Space Agency 5 and Nicolas Johnson of KAMAN 6 have each proposed independent models
for the number of debris particles expected to impact spacecraft as a function of similar orbital
parameters. One area of strong difference between these models is the projected increase in debris
population with time. While Kessler projects a 2- to 5-percent increase in the number of debris
particles per year, Johnson predicts a constant (or decreasing) number of debris particles with time.
Stochastic models of space particle impingements on the surfaces of spacecraft as a function
of time have also been developed. Howell describes the time-dependent impact of meteoroids on the
Hubble space telescope (HST) in a 1986 paper entitled "A Stochastic Model for Particle Impinge-
ments on Orbiting Spacecraft. ''7 Recently, Mog 8 used this work as a springboard for the simulation
of orbital debris impacts on the exterior of the S.S. Freedom manned modules. In this work, Mog
generates probability distributions of expected debris particle sizes and directions from the Kessler
flux equations. Using these, he draws random numbers to simulate the inter arrival time, size, and
direction of orbital debris particles emanating from a large "cylinder" surrounding a computer model
of the S.S. Freedom module cluster. He then uses an existing target description code (FASTGEN)
to calculate the relative angle of impact between the generated particle and the surface of the S.S.
Freedom modules. This relative impact angle can then be used to calculate the probability of pene-
tration. This report approach uses a strategy similar to Mog's for simulating orbital debris particle
velocities, directions, and sizes, but a somewhat different approach for computing impact placement
on spacecraft surfaces and relative orbital debris impact angles with these surfaces.
B. Spacecraft Orbital Debris Penetration Protection
Beginning with the Mercury program in the 1960's, NASA managers have established a
structural design requirement for preventing meteoroid penetration into inhabited spacecraft. Since
the meteoroid population was considered to be well understood, this requirement was probabilistic in
nature. Table 1 summarizes the structural "probability of no meteoroid penetration" (PNP)
requirements for a number of past NASA programs. 9 In general, these "probabilistic" meteoroid
protection requirements were easy to meet, since the probability of meteoroid impact on a small,
short-lived spacecraft was very low.





















0.996 PNP per Module 8.3-Day Mission
0.995 PNP per 8 Months
0.95 PNP per 500 Missions
0.9990 PNP per Mission (Approx.
7 Days)
0.95 Probability of No Mission Failure in
2 Years (15-Year Life)
0.9955 Probability of No Critical Failure
per Critical Element in 10 Years
However, with the growing threat of orbital debris impact, NASA space station managers
included orbital debris when formulating meteoroid penetration protection requirements for initial
space station elements (fig. 3). According to the "Space Station Freedom Preliminary Design
Requirements Document, ''1o all pressurized volumes (including the nodes, habitation, laboratory,
and logistics modules) are considered as "critical space station core elements." As such, they shall
"have a minimum probability value of 0.9955 of experiencing no failure due to meteoroid impact that
would endanger the crew or space station survivability for the [10 year] life of the station." Further,
the "penetration of a pressure vessel shall be deemed a critical failure" that would endanger the
crew. Thus, the practical design requirement for space station module walls became a 0.9955 mini-
mum probability of no meteoroid/orbital debris penetration for 10 years.
The S.S. Freedom manned modules have a dual wall design for preventing meteoroid/orbital
debris penetration, shown in figure 4. During an impact, the outer wall (bumper) breaks the debris
particle into a fine cloud of particles. The inner, pressure-bearing wall (hopefully) stops the cloud of
particles from penetrating into the crew cabin area.
Meteoroids impact at velocities above 20 km/s, and usually vaporize upon impact with the
bumper. Lower, testable velocities often create more damaging liquid or solid cloud fragments. Thus,
previous programs responsible for exceeding a "worst-case" probability of no penetration usually
amounted to finding the single particle size that just penetrated the final wall at a "worst-case" test
velocity, from 3 to 7 km/s. The probability of no penetration was then equated to the probability of
being impacted by a particle of this size or smaller.
Today, orbital debris is at least 10 times more likely to penetrate a spacecraft than a mete-
oroid, and can impact at velocities ranging from 2 to 15 km/s. Thus, the precise effect of debris impact
parameters on penetration are more important than on previous programs. The effect of debris
diameter, velocity, and obliquity in determining the performance of this type of dual wall shield is
7
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Figure 4. "Typical" Whipple shield configuration.
often described through the use of a ballistic limit curve, shown in figure 5.12 In a ballistic limit curve,
all diameter/obliquity/velocity (dov) combinations "above" the curve are those that would penetrate
into the interior of the spacecraft; all those dov combinations "below" the curve would not penetrate.
i) '
The computation of the probability of spacecraft penetration from orbital debris computation is
thus a significantly more complex task than meteoroid penetration of small spacecraft. In 1987,
NASA and Boeing developed a computer program, BUMPERa_, 13 that performs this calculation
given a specific protection design (ballistic limit curve) and spacecraft geometry (in the form of a































Figure 5. Ballistic limit curve for "typical" Whipple shield.
impact obliquity possible from the debris environment to the "pass/fail" criteria of the shield
design's ballistic limit curve, and sums up the "no failure" cases for each discrete area of the finite
element model. The result is the total probability of no penetration for the spacecraft, or for each
module, as shown in table 214 for S.S. Freedom. Figure 615 is another type of graphical BUMPER rM
output showing the probability of penetration per square meter of area for the existing S.S. Freedom
manned module configuration. This output confirms that a higher number of penetrations are expected
on the "sides" of the module facing the orbital debris relative velocity vector.
The ballistic limit curve relating penetration damage to environmental parameters is the
linchpin of NASA's current probabilistic meteoroid/debris impact safety analysis technique. This
curve is typically formulated around test data performed with spherical aluminum particles to repre-
sent orbital debris of specified environmental diameters into unpressurized wall samples. These
assumptions have facilitated easier testing, limited the number of tests required to formulate curves,
9
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Table 2. PNP table--space station manned modules.
Probability of No Pene-
Module Exposed Area (m 2) tration
U.S. Lab 21.226 0.9980
U.S. Hab 21.226 0.9980
Japanese Module 14.889 0.9976
Columbus Module 18.356 0.9973
Node 2 5.197 0.9995
Node 1 5.197 0.9995
Logistics Module 25.340 0.9975
Airlock 9.095 0.9991
Year 2000, solar flux = 70, altitude 398 km, zero pitch










Figure 6. Graphical BUMPER _ output, probability of penetration.
and are thought to reasonably simulate the "typical" particle and wall interaction process. Boeing 12
has performed the majority of ballistic limit testing and regression in the 3- to 7-km/s regime. Addi-
tional testing (Piekutowski 16) and analysis (Jolly/Williamsen 17) have also been performed.
Although Boeing ballistic limit curves are based upon test data in the 3- to 7-km/s regime,
these relationships rely on a modification of the Wilkinson equation to model impact in the 7- to
10
:51"
15-km/s regime. 12 Penetration data are difficult to gather for this regime, but may be collected via
velocity scaling 16 or hydrocode analysis.18 Actual penetration data in this regime have recently been
collected by Sandia National Laboratory. 19
Finally, limited data on the hole size and crack size resulting from penetration of the pressure
wall have been gathered by Boeing. 12 20 The configuration of the wall and the multilayer insulation
(MLI) between the bumper and wall appears to be important to the resulting hole and crack sizes
reported. Norman Elfer of Martin Marietta performed initial research into the critical length of crack
that would cause "unzipping" (unstopped crack growth) in the pressurized module wall. 21 Unzipping
is expected to cause explosive decompression and loss of all crew exposed to its effects. Further
discussion of this important failure mode is detailed in following sections.
C. Military System Survivability/Vulnerability Assessment
Methods for determining the quantitative risk associated with the survival of systems from
external threats (system survivability) have been in use since the mid-1960's within military circles.
In "Aircraft Combat Survivability, ''22 Ball summarizes Army, Navy, and Air Force requirements to
assess and increase system survivability. In this work, Ball describes aircraft vulnerability as the
"inability (of the aircraft) to withstand one or more hits by damage mechanisms." Further, "the
systematic description, delineation, and quantification of the vulnerability of... the total aircraft is
known as a vulnerability assessment." This quantitative vulnerability assessment concept is central
to military system design from external threats, and forms a natural extension to space station
"probability of loss given a penetration" (Ploss/pen) analyses described herein.
Because of the need for coordination (and sometimes competition) between service branches,
a tri-service organization was formed in 1971 for disseminating information on "accepted" methods
for assessing military system survivability/vulnerability. Specifically, the Joint Technical Coordinat-
ing Groups on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) and on Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) have
published a number of reports on "acceptable" methods for vulnerability assessment. 23-25 A major
contributor to this group is the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) of Aberdeen, MD.
Dietz26 27 summarizes the current BRL methods used in military systems vulnerability assessment.
Taken as a whole, these references describe over 20 separate, lengthy, and sophisticated
computer tools developed over the last 25 years for use in computing the vulnerability of Army,
Navy, and Air Force weapon systems to external threats (munitions). Among these codes, VAREA
and MAGIC are the oldest (dating to 1965), while the state-of-the-art is well-represented by the
FASTGEN II and COVART II family. 26 In general, these codes consist of:
(1) A geometry section that generates a three-dimensional model of the external skin and
critical internal components on aircraft or ground targets
(2) A Monte Carlo threat simulation section that generates projectiles from a variety of
threat approach angles
(3) A shotline generator that computes all possible shotlines from each external component




(4) An endgame program that computes whether a critical component is "killed" given a
particular shotline and munitions type, and sums up the final probability of kill.
These previously derived codes are incompatible with the computation of spacecraft vulner-
ability to orbital debris impacts because the external threats described within these codes utilize
penetration mechanisms that operate at velocities far below orbital impact velocities. As such, these
codes contain deeply embedded assumptions concerning penetration effects that are fundamentally
incorrect for application to the space debris impact problem. Given time, it might have been possible
to alter one or more of these existing codes to perform the desired task. However, the computing
resources required far exceeded those accessible by this researcher, and the "learning curve" for
proper application of even the simplest of these tools is extreme. It was anticipated that the time
investment required to remove erroneous assumptions from the codes and implace "reasonable"
ones would rival the time needed to develop an "application-specific" simulation tool.
Despite their shortcomings, the vulnerability assessment methods surveyed contain a num-
ber of common and important methodologies that can be applied to the problem of assessing crew
loss due to orbital debris penetration:
(1) Damage Modes and Effects Analysis--identifies and documents all possible damage
modes of a component or subsystem and determines the effects of each damage mode
upon the capability of the system (spacecraft) or subsystem (crew) to perform its
essential functions.
(2) Threat Description--summarizes the direction of origin and magnitudes of external
threats and their relative likelihoods of occurrence.
(3) Relation Between Threat and Damage Mode--relates expected system and subsystem
damage to threat characteristics.
(4) Description of the System Geometry--must be provided to determine the likelihood of
impact of external threats on critical external and internal system components.
(5) Simulation of External Impact and Internal Shotlines---computes the likelihood of critical
damage modes occurring as individual external impacts are simulated.
Thus, although existing JTCG and BRL derived codes were not used per se, many of their
underlying assumptions and methodologies were applied and extended within this report approach.
III. PENETRATION EFFECTS
i:
_ .i _ ,
This section discusses orbital debris impact phenomenology. Specifically, it describes short-
term failure modes which can lead to immediate loss of spacecraft or crew from orbital debris pene-
tration. These failure modes include rapid decompression, fragment, overpressure, temperature,
flash, and critical crack propagation hazards. A discussion of the hazard levels expected to cause
crew loss follows, along with a brief summary of the hazard levels measured within orbital debris






This task also includes a summary of space station design factors and operational modes that
are anticipated to mitigate crew hazards. These factors and modes include shield design, crew pres-
ence in each module, crew escape rate, module air volume, and internal equipment layout.
A. Meteoroid Penetration Effects Into Spacecraft Cabins
Since the 1960's, NASA has supported a number of studies into the general effects of mete-
oroid penetration on small space vehicle interiors. In his technical proposal of 1966, Ray 28 summa-
rizes the energy release processes associated with hypervelocity penetration into spacecraft cabins
as shown in figure 7. The damage effects from these combustion processes are depressurization,
fragments, overpressure, blast heat, and light flash.
Burch's 1967 report 29 details the results from 13 tests at velocities up to 7 km/s into
"typical" capsule wall configurations and pressurized oxygen and oxygen/nitrogen atmospheres.
Measurements were taken of the intense light flash, shock waves, and heat fluxes formed by the
penetration process. Long and Hammitt 3o reported on the results from 10 similar tests conducted in
1969. One important conclusion was that the observed magnitude of fragment, overpressure, light
flash, and temperature effects was especially sensitive to the pressure wall design in the test con-
figuration. These reports represent the first attempts to quantify the effect of small spacecraft cabin
design on interior penetration effects. However, no attempt was made to model the variation of these
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Figure 7. Hypervelocity penetration effects.
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Of all these effects, decompression appears to have garnered the greatest attention.
Bancroft's 31 1969 study indicates that an astronaut cannot be expected to survive more than 10 s
when subjected to instantaneous decompression. For larger capsules where the likelihood of rapid
decompression is slight, Von Beckh 32 reports that the decompression rate and atmospheric compo-
sition of the capsule just prior to decompression may be related to the length of time that an astro-
naut can be expected to survive.
During the 1980's, a number of papers on the general interior effects of meteoroid and orbital
debris penetration were released in anticipation of the U.S. space station design effort. At a 1984
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) sponsored "Space Debris and Meteoroid Technology Work-
shop," Engler 33 summarized the "Physiological and Safety Aspects of Penetration," including
limited data gathered in the 1960's by GM and Lockheed. Bauer 34 also discussed general internal
penetration effects in his 1987 paper "Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Protection Concepts," including
the variation of depressurization rates from manned modules with hole size. "Orbital Debris Risk
Analysis and Survivability Enhancement for Freedom Station Manned Modules ''35 also summarizes
the results of many of these studies.
The development of S.S. Freedom and the growing threat of orbital debris encouraged NASA
to conduct a limited study on penetration effects into space station manned modules. In a 1987 study,
Boeingl? reported limited success in 20 tests to measure the flash and overpressure associated with
the penetration of the space station module wall design.
B. Military Data on Hypervelocity Penetration Effects
The available literature on hypervelocity penetration effects is broad, dating from prior to
World War II to the present. "Hypervelocity" penetration may be loosely defined as a penetration
event occurring near or above the speed of sound within the penetrator or target material. Consider-
able penetration data are available from military sources, such as the "Penetrations Equation Hand-
book for Kinetic Energy Penetrators" published by the JTCG/ME. 36 This reference describes the
depth of penetration and fragment sizes to be expected from rods, fragments, and spheres impacting
into thin-walled targets (such as the manned spacecraft walls). Considerable classified data on
depth of penetration into specific military targets also exist, but are unavailable to this researcher.
Of primary concern to the survivability analyst is the effect of fragments on crewmen. The
JTCG/ME has developed extensive criteria for the probability of "incapacitation" based upon the
speed and mass of fragments projected at prone and standing soldiers. According to "Evaluation of
Wound Data and Effectiveness of Munitions, ''37 this term refers to the ability of the soldier to carry
out commands within a specified tactical situation. The tactical situation most comparable to space-
craft crew appears to be the "assault <30 s" scenario. In this case, the soldier is expected to be
able to "engage in the maximum type of physical activity" within 30 s of being hit by fragments of
the described energy level.
Additional data on the effect of fragments on crew have been compiled in Zaker's "Frag-
mentation Hazard Study ''38 and in "Criteria for Incapacitating Soldiers With Fragments and Frag-
ments and Fletchettes ''39 and "Ballistic Limits of Tissue and Clothing. ''4° Table 3 summarizes some
commonly used values for fragment energy require for fatality levels of 10, 50, and 90 percent. In
general, these energy levels are quite low compared to typical orbital debris impact energies.
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Injury level Momentum (ft-lb/s)
Threshold 100
The effectsof depressurizationon air crewshavealsobeenstudiedextensivelyby military
sources.In 1961,Bryan 41 found that rapid depressurization beyond 35,000 ft (4 lb/in 2) in oxygen/
nitrogen atmospheres led to immediate dizziness and probable unconsciousness in human subjects.
Ernsting 42 reported similar effects, but noted the importance of rate of depressurization and atmo-
spheric makeup in his results.
Blast effects on humans have also been the subject of numerous studies since the 1940's. A
classic work on the subject was published by the Defense Atomic Support Agency in 1968. 43 In
"'Estimate of Man's Tolerance to the Direct Effect of Air Blast," Bowen outlined the probability of
human survival as a function of overpressure and human body position. Specifically, overpressures
above 10 lb/in 2 are predicted to cause lung damage and decreasing probability of human survival;
overpressures below this level might cause hearing loss, but not loss of life. Severin reported the
effects of light flash on humans in his 1962 work, "A Study of Photostress and Flash Blindness. ''44
C. S.S. Freedom Orbital Debris Survivability
As outlined in the introduction, the tremendous growth of orbital debris is causing NASA to
reevaluate its orbital debris protection design for the S.S. Freedom. A 1992 Government Accounting
Office (GAO) study states that there is a 36-percent probability of penetrating a critical element of
the space station (including a manned module) over the 30-year life of the station. 45 This probability
of penetration is often equated to "crew safety" within the GAO report, but NASA has responded
that "a pinprick in the module could go unnoticed for some time, and not cause problems."
For some time, NASA has been studying the consequences of module depressurization
without quantifying the probability of its occurrence. In 1985, Boeing produced a memo entitled
"Space Station Module Blowdown from Debris Puncture "46 in which both isentropic and isothermal
blowdown models for module pressure loss through circular holes are discussed. Subsequent refer-
ences47 48 have concentrated on the isentropic blowdown model as the most reliable. In NASA's
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"SpaceStation Freedom Contingency Operations Scenarios, ''49 a relation between time available for
crew egress and hole size for the space station module cluster is developed. Within this report, 8.3
lb/in 2 absolute is established as the minimum limit for cabin pressure, below which the crew's
physical impairment is "severe."
Given the increase in program weight and cost to be expected from increasing penetration
protection, the study of quantitative crew safety following a meteoroid or debris strike has recently
become the subject of intensive study at NASA. At a recent American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) Space Programs and Technologies Symposium held in March of 1992,
Christiansen 35 discusses how the probability of penetration of external elements and manned
modules may be computed, and how the survivability of these elements may be qualitatively
enhanced through internal spall liners (fragment-stopping blanket materials).
At the same symposium, Williamsen presented the paper "Orbital Debris Risk Analysis and
Survivability Enhancement for Freedom Station Manned Modules. ''14 This paper summarized the
failure modes and hazard mitigating factors associated with orbital debris penetration of manned
modules, as shown in table 4, and listed thrust loading from spacecraft decompression as a new
mode of possible spacecraft loss from orbital debris penetration. It was the first published work to
define and derive quantitative crew "safety" values from space particle impact. In an example prob-
lem, it computed a preliminary value for probability of crew survival from slow decompression and its
sensitivity to the single operating mode of individual module hatch status (open or closed), as shown
in figure 8.
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Figure 8. Probability of crew loss from decompression. 14
On May 22, 1992, NASA directed the Space Station Engineering Integration Contractor
(SSEIC) to develop and implement a Meteoroid/Orbital Debris Forward Action Plan (FAP). The
objective of this FAP was to "determine which S.S. Freedom critical elements are in compliance
with program requirements and to identify those items which may need additional protection. ''5o An
integral part of this identification process is the development and implementation of an "integrated,
probabilistic station-level test and analysis program to determine the likelihood that S.S. Freedom
could experience a catastrophic failure. ''5° This term is defined within the body of the SSEIC forward
action plan as "any event which endangers (not "could" endanger, as in the case of critical failure,
previously defined) crew or station safety. ''51
Thus, the S.S. Freedom program has initiated an assessment of the actual probability of crew
or station loss (catastrophic failure) from meteoroid/space debris impact. Their main objective behind
this is similar to that outlined herein: to identify which elements should receive augmented shielding
from orbital debris penetration, and to minimize the amount of that shielding in meeting stated safety
levels. Task 4.1.2 of the FAP 51 is to perform an integrated risk assessment of the manned module.
17
<Many of the stated objectives within the FAP have been achieved. The FAP has been
instrumental in identifying preliminary decompression levels and critical crack lengths in the module
skins that produce crew or station loss through slow or explosive decompression. The October 1992
SSEIC FAP Task One Report 52 and "Interim Report ''53 give preliminary evidence to support a 7.5-
lb/in 2 decompression limit prior to onset of hypoxia if no oxygen masks are available to spacecraft
crew, or a 3-1b/in 2 decompression limit if oxygen masks are donned prior to reaching a 7.5-1b/in 2 level
of cabin atmosphere (both from a 14.7-1b/in 2 original cabin level).
Citing preliminary evidence gathered from a special NASA formed panel of U.S. fracture
experts (including Elfer 23) called the Fracture Control Working Group, SSEIC states that a critical
tip-to-tip crack length of 7 in must be created in a 0.125-in 2219-T87 A1 manned module pressure
wall by the penetration process prior to "unzipping" (unstopped crack propagation) of the module
structure. "Unzipping" is the most catastrophic of orbital debris-induced failure modes, and is
assumed to cause explosive decompression of the module structure and subsequent loss of the
entire crew and station complex. Though it may be possible to stop critical crack propagation through
integral ribs and stiffeners in the wall, SSEIC outlines a more effective possible countermeasure to
be a uniform thickening of the rear wall. This design alternative delays the onset of "unzipping" by
requiring a larger impact-induced critical crack length prior to critical crack propagation. For example,
uniformly thickening the 2219-T87 A1 module wall to 0.188 in would raise the critical tip-to-tip crack
length from 7 to 12 in.
The FAP utilizes a BASIC computer simulation entitled CREW TM to compute the probability
of crew loss for manned modules. The random variables within this simulation are selected from
"lookup tables" that assume values for the individual probabilities of module impact, hole size, num-
ber of crew within each module, impact proximity to crew members, interior blockage, and crew
injury. Because CREW TM lacks a geometric model and the orbital debris environment as a primary
input variable, it cannot calculate internal penetration effects as a function of internal equipment
location or crew proximity to each penetration location. Further, CREW TM is limited to calculating
the magnitude of the internal effects within the FAP based on the magnitude of the hole size asso-
ciated with each "penetration" instead of impact parameters of particle diameter, velocity, and
obliquity. Unfortunately, large holes do not necessarily result in significant internal penetration
hazard levels; likewise, small holes can often result in significant internal penetration depths and
associated hazard levels. Given these observations, the accuracy of the SSEIC model results for
injury-related crew loss is somewhat suspect.
Obviously, with a valuable national project such as the space station, cooperation to achieve
a realistic value for the probability of spacecraft or crew loss following orbital debris penetration was
important to NASA. A good deal of technical interaction continues to take place between the SSEIC
team and this researcher on the "correct" orbital debris-induced hazard levels causing loss of the
station or crew. Many of the previously baselined SSEIC/FAP values for expected hole size distri-
butions, crack size distributions, and crew injury/decompression levels have improved due in part to
this interaction. Throughout the FAP, the simulation tools, inputs, and outputs from this report
approach have served the important dual purposes'of (1) providing important input parameters to the
larger SSEIC effort and (2) providing an independent "top-to-bottom" check on the validity of the
SSEIC outputs for the probability of station or crew loss from orbital debris.
Table 5 summarizes important, near-term crew penetration hazards discussed within this
report that are included within its associated simulation, Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability





long-term crack growth, air-borne contamination, etc.) that could also cause crew loss. These failure
modes were omitted from this discussion due to the assumed existence of assured crew rescue
vehicles on large spacecraft (such as the S.S. Freedom) and their capability to remove crew prior to
experiencing the damaging effects of these hazards.
Table 5. Penetration hazards, critical levels, and sensitivities modeled within MSCSurv TM.




7-in critical crack for a
0.125-in 2219-T87 A1 wall
12-in critical crack for a
0.188-in 2219-T87 A1 wall
Injury •
(Due to fragments and blast)
Critical Hazard Level:
58 ft-lb impact energy
Decompression
(from 14.7 lb/in 2)
Critical Hazard Level:
7.5 lb/in 2 (baseline)
3.0 lb/in 2 (w/oxygen masks)
9.5 lb/in 2 (equipment failure)
• Hole size following penetration
(Hole size and energy models)
• Critical crack uncertainties (1- to 24-in
lengths)
Spread of internal debris cloud (1 to 3 racks
wide)
"Equivalent" density of internal equipment
(0 to 0.7 gr/cm 2)
Lethality of crew exposure to debris cloud
(0 to 100 percent)
• Crew distribution among modules (asleep and
awake) *
• Crew distribution within modules (uniform and
triangular) *
• Crew escape time (1 to 3 min)
Hatch position (open, closed, mixed models)
• Ratio of free air to total module volume (70 to
95 percent)
• Hole size model (Oblique and Burch models)
• Hole shape (C d, isentropic depressurization
discharge coefficient, varies from 0.7 to 0.9)
* This mitigating parameter also affects crew injury.
IV. MODEL FORMULATION
! , In this section, a Monte Carlo simulation model is developed that generates random debris
particles (from the NASA environment model) and models the space debris particle arrival process,
the impact placement on spacecraft manned modules, the amount of damage (hole size and internal
penetration) from each impact, the presence of crew in the module, and the final probability of crew
loss given a penetration (Ploss/pen) averaged over thousands of simulated penetrations. This model
will be referred to as MSCSurv TM. Figure 9 shows an outline of the basic flowchart for MSCSurv TM.
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Figure 9. Flowchart for MSCSurv TM simulation.
Microsoft FORTRAN was used to generate and execute the algorithms described. The MSCSurv TM
program is listed in its entirety in appendix A.
The first section of the MSCSurv TM computer program draws random numbers to simulate
orbital debris impact parameters of diameter, velocity, approach angle, spacecraft impact location, and
relative obliquity of impact with spacecraft. It then passes this information along to the second section of
the program to determine how many of these particles actually penetrate the spacecraft. For those
particles that penetrate the spacecraft, MSCSurv TM computes the number of penetrations that produce at
least one crew loss. The expected probability of crew loss then is the total number of penetrations
resulting in one or more crew losses divided by the total number of penetrations simulated.
Notice that this "probability of loss" parameter does not differentiate between losing one, two,
three, or four crew members. Defining the loss parameter in such a way as to disregard the actual num-
ber of crew lost is consistent with current NASA safety philosophy, where the loss of even one crew
member is considered to be as severe as the loss of the entire crew.
MSCSurv TM is used to derive the second and third terms of equation (4):
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of Equation (3)
As shown above, the first term of equation (4) is calculated from the standard "probability of
impact" relation described in equation (3). Note that this is the only term in which the element of time
need be addressed (the second and third terms are time independent). Equation (3) shows that this term
requires knowledge of the duration of spacecraft time in orbit (t), the flux impinging on the spacecraft
(f), and the "exposed area" of the spacecraft to orbital debris (a). The next section will discuss how the
"exposed area" of the spacecraft can be derived from the geometry of the spacecraft and the distribution
of orbital debris approach angles.
The "second term" in equation (4), the probability of penetration given an impact, Ppen/impact, is
computed by dividing the total number of penetrations observed by the total number of impacts simu-
lated. By the law of large numbers, 54 "the relative frequency of the event is almost sure to be close to the
(actual) probability of the event when the number of trials is large." Thus, as the total number of pene-
trations is increased, the second term computed by MSCSurv TM should converge to a central value repre-
senting the "mean" epen/impact- In a similar fashion the third term in equation (4), the probability of loss
given a penetration, Ploss/pen, is computed by dividing the total number of penetrations where one or
more crew is lost by the total number of penetrations observed. Over a sufficiently large sample size, its
value should also converge to a mean Ploss/pen. Unless there is something inherently unstable in the
model, the overall probability of crew or spacecraft loss should also converge to a central value.
As stated earlier, the primary objective of this report is a discussion of the probability of crew or
spacecraft loss following a penetration by orbital debris; given this, the term of real interest to this
investigator is the Ploss/pen. However, the first two terms in equation (4) can be verified through use of
other NASA computer models (such as BUMPERTM), and are expected to influence the absolute value
for Ploss/pen. Verification of the correct absolute values for the Pimpact and the Ppen/impact from
MSCSurv TM will lend confidence to the overall value for Ploss/p_n. Thus, the first and second terms of
equation (4) will be computed using MSCSurv TM as a separate exercise and discussed under the






A. The MSCSurv TM Impact Model
The first section of the MSCSurv TM computer program (appendix A) draws random numbers to
simulate orbital debris impact parameters of diameter, velocity, approach angle, spacecraft impact loca-
tion, and relative obliquity of impact with spacecraft. This is accomplished by comparing the drawn ran-
dom numbers with cumulative distributions for debris sizes between 0.3 and 3 cm, 37 approach angles,
and exposed (line-of-sight) areas of the spacecraft to each approach angle.
1. Pr0b_tbility Distribution for Debris Diameter
The relative probability distribution of orbital debris diameters impinging on a spacecraft can be
determined directly from the Kessler equations (equation (4) and (5)). Since the distribution of debris
sizes is dependent upon spacecraft altitude, orbital inclination, and solar flux, some assumption for these
parameters is required prior to assembly of the diameter distribution function. For this problem, the
spacecraft altitude is assumed to be 398 km, the orbital inclination is assumed as 28.5 °, year of operation
as 2000, and the solar flux as 70 Janskys ("standard" U.S. LEO values).
Figure 1 shows that a spacecraft is far likelier to be hit by a "small" (less than 1-mm diameter)
orbital debris particle than a "large" particle. Experience with the design and reaction of typical space-
craft structures indicates that there is a lower limit on the size of debris particle that can (at worst case)
penetrate the spacecraft interior. In order to limit the total number of random numbers drawn to simulate
"dangerous" debris to a reasonable value, it is advantageous to limit the program's cumulative distribu-
tion for debris to those debris sizes that could possibly penetrate the spacecraft. In a similar fashion,
there is an upper limit to the size of large debris that can be "reasonably" expected to impact the space-
craft during its lifetime. An upper limit on debris diameter of less than around 0.01-percent probability
of impact during the spacecraft lifetime appears to be a reasonable value on which to base a cumulative
distribution function range.
The shield performance for this study example is assumed to be equal to the ballistic limit curve
shown in figure 5. This results in a lower debris limit of 0.3-cm diameter. An upper debris diameter limit
of 3.0 cm is assumed based on the low probability of this sized particle (or larger) impacting a large,
long-lived spacecraft.
Based on these assumptions, a cumulative probability distribution for debris diameters between
0.3 and 3.0 cm has been formulated from the Kessler debris equations as data file "PROBDIA.DAT,"
shown in appendix B. The first column in PROBDIA.DAT represents the diameter of the impacting par-
ticle in centimeters; the second is its cumulative probability of occurrence. This data file is read into the
simulation program in lines 11 through 20 of MSCSurv TM (appendix A).
2. Forming the Geometric Model
The spacecraft geometry chosen for this study is based on NASA's (1992) S.S. Freedom manned
module configuration (fig. 10). This eight module cluster is expected to begin operation as a "Perma-
nently Manned Configuration" (PMC) in the year 2000. For this study, the modules are assumed to be
flying in a stable, 0 ° pitch, roll, and yaw flight mode with respect to the velocity vector (close to the
expected S.S. Freedom flight mode). Based on NASA's orbital debris environment model, orbital debris
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will approach the modules in a roughly 180 ° arc stretching from the +X to the -X axis within the "X-Y"
plane. That is, the orbital debris will appear to approach the manned module cluster from the "front,"
"port," and "starboard" sides only, not the "back" or the "top" of the cluster. The spacecraft velocity
vector is parallel to the +Y axis (long axis of the U.S. Lab, Hab, JEM, and ESA modules).
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Figure 10. Spacecraft geometry for study example: eight module cluster.
Although the spacecraft modules are (in reality) cylinders with truncated endcones, the construc-
tion of a particle impingement model necessitates a simplification of this geometry. The smooth cylinder
sides are modeled by a series of 12 joined fiat plates, and 5 to 9 flat plates form the endcones. Each of
these flat plates is called an element, and is given an associated number within each module; each
module has no more than 100 associated elements. Figures 11 through 15 show the numbering scheme
for these elements. Note that each element contains roughly the same surface area; they are identically
the same on the cylinder sides. Note also that the width of the cylindrical elements are all 42 in (along
the axis of the cylinder). This is an important consideration, because all of the manned modules are lined
with internal equipment racks, usually of 42-in individual lengths.
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Thus, by choosing the exterior geometry with care, it is possible to associate not only individual
external shield configurations, but also discrete individual internal equipment "thicknesses" with each
element area. This model feature is attractive in the large degree of flexibility it allows in examining the
effects of alternate internal equipment configurations on Ploss/pen.
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Note from figures 11 through 15 that certain module areas are not numbered by elements. Specif-
ically, the endcones and the "inboard" sides of the JEM (module 3) and ESA (module 4) and the end-
cones of the PLM (module 7) and Airlock (module 8) are not numbered. This is because these areas are
completely "shadowed" (or nearly so) from direct impact due to adjoining modules or by their individual
orientation to the highly directional debris flux.
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Element numbering scheme for each module (isotropic view).
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Figure 13. Element numbering scheme for each module (front view).
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Figure 14. Element numbering scheme for each module (starboard view).
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Figure 15. Element numbering scheme for each module (top view).
3. Exposed Areas and Orbital Debris Velocity Distribution
Having established a physical geometry for each of the spacecraft manned modules, the next step
is to compute the exposed area of each element "visible" to orbital debris coming from individual
(discrete) directions over a 180 ° arc. The average exposed area for each module is the product of the
exposed area of each element times the relative probability of orbital debris coming from that direction,
summed over all of the possible approach directions and elements, as described in equation (4):
j=A i=N




Area(ij) = exposed area of element i "visible" to orbital debris approaching from directionj
Prob(j) = relative probability of orbital debris approaching from direction j
N = number of elements for each module
A = Number of directions from which orbital debris can arrive (37, in this case).
Of course, many elements within each module present "zero" exposed area to certain incoming
debris directions. For example, figure 15 shows that only elements 1 through 48 of the U.S. Lab (module
1) show exposed area to orbital debris arriving from the +X (port) direction; elements 49 through 100 do
not show exposed area to debris approaching from this direction.
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For this study, the 180 ° arc over which orbital debris may approach the spacecraft is divided into
37 discrete angular increments of 5 ° each (0 °, 5 °, 10 °, etc. to 180°). Each discrete approach direction is
assigned a relative probability of orbital debris "occurrence" based upon the Kessler flux equations
described in references 2 and 3. As discussed in section II, a constant orbital debris approach velocity
(relative to the spacecraft) is associated with each discrete approach angle. Table 6 lists the relative
probability, cumulative probability, and constant relative velocity associated with each of the approach
directions for the orbital altitude and inclination associated with this example problem.








































































































































































































A spreadsheet program was utilized to calculate the individual exposed areas for each module
and element by approach direction. Table 7 shows an example of this spreadsheet input for calculating
exposed areas for the airlock module and approach direction 1.
Table 7. Example of "angles and areas" spreadsheet program for calculating exposed
areas and obliquities.
Angles and Areas Approach angle from X axis 5 ° Rad = 0.0873
Approach angle from Y axis 85 ° Rad = 1.4835
Approach angle from Z axis 90 ° Rad = 1.5708
FULL CYLINDRICAL ELEMENT AREA=I. 178768









































































































































































































































































An integral part of calculating the exposed area of each element is to determine the relative angle
between its normal surface vector and the approach vector of the incoming debris. This relative angle of
impact is commonly referred to as the obliquity. It is computed by the following formula (equation (5)):














and angle 1 (approach vector)
and angle 2 (surface normal)
and angle 1 (approach vector)
and angle 2 (surface normal)
and angle 1 (approach vector)
and angle 2 (surface normal).
The exposed element area for each approach direction is computed through multiplying the full
element surface area by the cosine of the obliquity. The obliquity value is itself of great importance in
the later computation of whether or not individually generated particles penetrate the modules, as will be
discussed later.
Table 8 lists the exposed areas calculated for each of the eight modules by approach direction
and in total. This incremental module area (by approach direction) may be divided by the total eight
module area (for this approach direction) to determine the relative probability of each module being
impacted by a debris particle approaching from this direction. In the same way, the relative exposed area
of each element can be divided by the total exposed area for each module to calculate the relative prob-
ability of element impact by a debris particle approaching from a particular direction.
The probability of debris impact on the overall module cluster by approach direction is not
simply a function of the distribution of debris particles by approach direction i (this would only be true if
the module cluster had the same exposed area to every individual approach angle). Rather, it is a func-
tion of the product of the exposed area of the module cluster for each approach direction and the relative
probability of debris approaching from this angle, as shown in equation (6):
[Areal] × [Papproach i] (7)Pimpacti = t i=37 'l '
_SUM Areai/37_'=
where
Pimpacti = probability that debris impacts from approach direction i
Area/= module cluster exposed area for approach direction i
Papproachi = probability that debris approaches from direction i
i=37
SUM Areail 37 = module cluster exposed area averaged over all 37 approach directions.
i=l
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Table 8. Exposed areas for eight module cluster by approach direction.
Exposed area of eight modules (m 2)
Approach
Direction LAB HAB JEM ESA
1 36.4 0.0 36.4 18.2
2 37.2 2.1 36.2 15.4
3 37.7 4.2 35.8 13.4
4 37.9 6.1 35.1 10.1
5 37.8 8.4 34.2 7.7
6 37.5 10.1 33.0 4.5
7 36.8 11.9 31.5 1.5
8 35.9 14.2 29.8 0.0
9 34.7 15.9 27.9 0.0
10 33.2 17.3 25.7 0.0
11 31.5 18.7 23.4 0.0
12 29.5 20.5 20.8 0.0
13 27.4 21.0 18.2 0.0
14 25.0 21.2 15.3 0.0
15 22.4 21.0 12.4 0.0
16 19.6 19.6 9.4 0.0
17 16.7 16.7 6.3 0.0
18 13.7 13.7 3.1 0.0
19 10.6 10.6 0.0 0.0
20 13.7 13.7 0.0 4.7
21 16.7 16.7 0.0 9.4
22 19.6 19.6 0.0 14.1
23 21.0 22.4 0.0 18.6
24 21.2 25.0 0.0 23.0
25 21.0 27.4 0.0 27.3
26 20.5 29.5 0.0 31.3
27 18.7 31.5 0.0 35.1
28 17.3 33.2 0.0 38.6
29 15.9 34.7 0.0 41.8
30 14.2 35.9 0.0 44.7
31 11.9 36.8 0.0 47.3
32 10.1 37.5 0.0 49.5
33 8.4 37.8 0.0 51.3
34 6.1 37.9 0.0 52.7
35 4.2 37.7 0.0 53.8
36 2.1 37.2 0.0 54.4
37 0.0 36.4 0.0 54.6



















































































Average eight module exposed area = 126.0 m 2
From theserelationships,onecandevelopastrategyfor simulatingrandomparticleimpactson
themodulecluster:
(1) Draw arandomnumberto simulateparticleapproachangle(andassociatedparticlevelocity)
(2) Draw anothernumberto simulatewhichmoduleis impacted
(3) Draw anothernumberto simulatewhichelementis impacted.
This strategyfor drawingrandomnumbersto simulateindividualmoduleimpactsis reflectedin
the"MSCSurvru'' programasshownin appendixA. AppendixC showsthecontentsfrom adatafile
entitled"VELSTA.DAT," describingthecumulativeprobabilityof particleimpacton theeight module
clusterby approachdirectionandthecorrespondingrelativevelocity of debrisparticlesassociatedwith
eachdirection.This distributionis basedonequation(6) giventheenvironmentdistribution shownin
table6 andthetotalexposedareafor themoduleclustershownin table8. Lines6 to 10of MSCSurv_
readVELSTA.DAT, andgoon to usethesedatain lines220through225to selecttheparticleapproach
directionandvelocity for eachsimulatedimpact.
AppendixD showsthecontentsfrom adatafile entitled"PROBMOD.DAT" that describesthe
cumulativeprobability of eachmodulebeingimpactedfor eachof 37approachdirections.MSCSurvru
readsPROBMOD.DAT (lines181to 186),andusesthesedatain lines250through265to selectthe
modulefor eachsimulatedorbitaldebrisimpact.Note thatthemodulewill only beselectedif themini-
mumpossiblediameterfor penetratingthemoduleshieldsis exceeded.In this way,computerrun timeis
conservedthroughavoidingunnecessarycalculations.
AppendicesE throughL showeightdatafilesentitledLAB.DAT, HAB.DAT, ESA.DAT,
JEM.DAT, NODE2.DAT, NODE1.DAT,PLOG.DAT,andALOCK.DAT. Thefirst columnof eachof
thesedatafiles lists thecumulativeprobabilityof individualelementimpactfor eachof 37approach
directionswithin eachof theeightmodulesin theexampleproblem.In thesecondcolumn,thesefiles
list thecorrespondingrelativeobliquity thatimpactingdebrisparticlesmakewith the individual element
for eachdirection.MSCSurva_readsthesefiles in lines22 through180,andusesthesedatain lines260
through265to selectthe impactedelementwithin themoduleandthecorrespondingrelativeobliquity
betweenelementandincomingdebrisparticlefor eachsimulatedimpact.Note thatall of thedatafiles
makeuseof acumulative(notrelative)probabilitydistribution.Thisallowsoneto employaconven-
iently shortalgorithmfor associationof randomnumberswith theseorbital debrisimpactparameters.
/
B. The MSCSurv _ Penetration and Damage Model
The second section of MSCSurv _ determines whether or not the simulated particles impacting
on the module cluster penetrate, and if so, it calculates the hole sizes made and depth of penetration into
the module interior. This information is then passed along to section 3.F MSCSurv _ (crew loss model)
to determine the likelihood of crew loss given a penetration.
As stated earlier, a ballistic limit curve describes the combinations of impact parameters (particle
diameter, obliquity, velocity) that penetrate the module. Each shield typically has a unique ballistic limit
curve. For this study case, all of the spacecraft surfaces are assumed to be covered with shields identical
to that shown in figure 4. This Whipple shield has the general ballistic limit curve performance
described in figure 5. This curve uses the Boeing interpolation ballistic limit curve for debris velocities
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below7 km/s andthe"Modified Wilkinson" ballistic limit relationabove7 km/s.Thebasisfor these
baselineballistic limit relationsis describedin detail in reference12.An importantassumptionwithin
bothof theseballistic limit relationsis thatall impactobliquitiesgreaterthan60° actasif theobliquity
wereidenticalto 60°. Without this assumption, the form of the relations would allow the critical diame-
ter to approach infinity as the obliquity approached 90° from the target normal.
In lines 266 through 289, MSCSurv r_ uses the impact parameters of velocity and obliquity for
each simulated particle to calculate the critical diameter that would just penetrate the module pressure
wall using the ballistic limit relations described above. If the simulated impact particle has a larger
diameter than this critical diameter, the number of penetrations is incremented by one. If the selected
diameter is less than the critical diameter for its associated velocity and obliquity, the program begins
the selection process for a new impact particle.
Immediately following a "penetration," MSCSurv a_ calculates the hole size resulting in the pres-
sure wall. In doing this, MSCSurv a_ uses a preliminary relation for oblique hole size given impact
properties of particle diameter, velocity, and obliquity that appears in appendix M and in lines 290
through 305 of the program in appendix A. This oblique hole size relation was derived through
collaboration between SSEIC and MSFC scientists, and is based in part on empirical data and in part on
an expectation of Whipple shield penetration phenomenology in the nontestable (greater than 7 km/s)
regime. The baselined oblique hole size relation listed in lines 290 through 305 of MSCSurv a_ computes
both a "major" (long axis) hole diameter and an "equivalent" hole diameter. This equivalent hole
diameter may be thought of as the "circular average" of the major and minor hole diameters, and is used
to find the equivalent hole area.
Figure 16 shows the "equivalent" hole diameters resulting from a variety of debris diameters and
velocities impacting simple Whipple shields at 0 ° and 60 ° obliquity. MSCSurv a_ uses independent
regressions based on figure 16 for each of 14 possible discrete velocities in order to increase the
precision of the hole size predictor (R 2 greater than 0.98 for each regression detailed in lines 290 through
305).
Because of the lack of hole size data, this oblique hole size relation is extremely preliminary in
nature, and is used here primarily because of the lack of other comprehensive hole size models suitable
for use throughout the wide velocity range (2 to 15 km/s), diameter range (0.3 to 3 cm), and obliquity
range (0 ° to 90 °) associated with orbital debris impacts. It is likely that the hole size (and crack size)
resulting in a test sample is somewhat different than that resulting in an actual pressurized module wall
(where wall curvature, stress, and other local structure may affect the resulting wall damage). However,
it may be argued that the high energy nature of the penetration phenomena "dwarfs" these local effects
to the extent that it is reasonable to ignore them.
To determine the sensitivity of the Ploss/pen term to the hole size model chosen, an alternative
hole size relation (the Burch D9o model 11) was also used to compute hole size following a penetration.
Note that the Burch hole size predictor, located in lines 305 through 310 of MSCSurv ru, has no term to
account for particle obliquity. While his "Multiplate Damage Study" noted that the obliquity of the
impact did indeed affect the hole size, he made no attempt to incorporate the complex phenomena
associated with oblique impacts into his empirical hole size model. A more comprehensive test program
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Figure 16. Oblique hole size as a function of debris diameter and
velocity at 0° and 60 ° obliquity.
MSCSurv TM follows the calculation of hole size with a calculation of maximum crack size
following a penetration. This calculation is integral to determining whether unstopped crack propagation
occurs in the module wall. Data for crack size following a module wall penetration are also extremely
limited. Crack size data from a variety of tests made at MSFC, at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville, and by Boeing Aerospace at the University of Dayton Research Facility are summarized in
figure 17 as a function of observed hole diameter. Note that the crack size can vary significantly for a
given hole size.
A comprehensive, independent (and accurate) model for the maximum tip-to-tip crack size that
results from a penetration is of equal importance to an accurate hole size model for determining the like-
lihood of crew loss given a penetration. This relation should ideally use the parameters of debris diame-
ter, velocity, and obliquity as direct inputs. However, because figure 17 shows that maximum crack size
generally increases with hole size, a preliminary dependent model for crack size could be generated
using the independent hole size model as its direct input. Given the sparsity of data required to form an
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Figure 17. Crack size as a function of hole size.
Between lines 211 and 220, MSCSurv m queries the user for a hole size crack "multiplier"--a
constant factor (based on data shown in fig. 17) that is multiplied by hole size to obtain crack size for
each simulated impact. If the user selects the unique input of "0.3," MSCSurv rM randomly selects a
constant multiplier between the maximum and minimum observed crack size (fig. 17) for each
individual hole size generated. For example, if a 2-in hole is randomly generated, MSCSurv _ may
select a corresponding tip-to-tip crack size anywhere between 2 to 9 in.
In order to check the sensitivity of the Ploss/pen result due to this important hazard, MSCSurv rM
offers an alternative crack formation model based on the total impact energy impinging on the module
exterior. Figure 18 shows that a 7-in critical crack may be formed with total impact energies varying
from 28,000 to 70,000 ft-lb; a 12-in crack could be formed with energies varying from 60,000 to
100,000 ft-lb.
This "energy" model was based largely on limited data from a modified, "advanced" Whipple
shield design employing a Nextel/Kevlar blanket between the bumper and pressure wall. Because this
design is so closely associated with the formation of the energy model, it is probably more properly
applied to this advanced shield design than the "baseline" Whipple bumper. Despite the somewhat low
confidence in this model's fidelity, it should be useful in estimating the sensitivity of Ploss/pen to the
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Figure 18. Crack length versus total impact energy.
By the law of large numbers 54 if a "sufficient" number of impacts are generated, a converging
hole size and crack size distribution for each module will result. A hole size distribution for each of the
eight modules is shown in table 9. Following its formation, this distribution was adopted by the space
station engineering integration contractor as its baseline for its independent calculation of probability of
crew loss following a S.S. Freedom manned module perforation in April 1993. As mentioned in section
In, SSEIC uses these hole size distributions for determining the number of unzipping cases, the
depressurization rate, and internal hazard levels following individually simulated penetrations.
Finally, MSCSurv rM computes the penetration depth of the randomly simulated particles into the
interior of the eight spacecraft manned modules. To accomplish this, a simple method to describe the
amount of and penetration resistance of interior equipment located behind each of the individual module
exterior elements was required. Hypervelocity test experience tells one that the interior resistance to
penetration following wall perforation is dependent upon the medium through which the fragments
travel as well as the energy and composition of the fragment debris cloud. Figure 19 55 shows an artist's
sketch for a possible interior equipment layout for the U.S. Laboratory module within S.S. Freedom.
Figure 20 56 shows just one of the many proposed layouts of the individual equipment racks within the
S.S. Freedom. As of the date of this study, the interior layout of the S.S. Freedom manned modules has








Table 9. Distribution of "effective" and "major" hole diameters for eight module cluster.
Oblique Hole Size Distribution (Williamsen, 3/25/93)





















ESA JEM N2 N1 PLM
0.19 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.16
0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11
0.10 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.12
0.11 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12
0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12
0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.26
0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.07
0.15 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.04











Distribution of Major Diameters for Oblique Holes
Basis for Crack Size Distribution (Williamsen, 3/25/93)




























































Unfortunately, penetration equations have simply not been derived to cover even a portion of the
probable combinations of material types, thicknesses, and distributions of equipment expected to exist
within these complex spacecraft walls. Figure 19 indicates that these materials can include wiring, elec-
tronic components, utility lines (cabin air, water, etc.), graphite and/or aluminum support structure, food,
uniforms, and other stores.
However, a number of penetration equations have been derived that predict with some confi-
dence the number of equally spaced, equally thick aluminum plates that are penetrated by aluminum
impact particles. One empirical model that appears to give good results in this area is the Burch equa-
tion. 11 Given the input parameters of particle velocity and diameter, target bumper thickness, standoff,
and rear wall thickness, the Burch equation predicts the number of spaced aluminum plates equal in
thickness to the rear wall that are expected to be penetrated by the impacting particle.
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Figure 20. Example of proposed equipment rack layout within S.S. Freedom laboratory module. 56
For this exercise, the measure of local interior resistance to penetration following wall perfora-
tion will be stated in terms of an "equivalent areal density" of spaced aluminum plates. As with many
other portions of this exercise, this simplifying assumption obviously requires some "judgment" as it is
applied to individual equipment locations along the spacecraft's interior walls. A precise description of
individual equipment locations along S.S. Freedom walls does not yet exist, and makes a model based
upon this configuration impossible to create at this time. Additionally, an overestimate of the amount of
interior equipment will add to the optimistic nature of what must already be an incomplete analysis of
Ploss/pen.
Because of these uncertainties, the baseline model includes no interior equipment resistance.
However, the sensitivity analyses will include a model for interior penetration resistance using an areal
equivalent of two 0.125-in plates behind each external element. This alternative assumption is largely
based upon the existing design of the interior equipment for the S.S. Freedom, shown in figure 21. 57 58 A
secondary reason for choosing the 0.125-in equivalent plate thickness was to be consistent with the
Burch interior penetration equation, which describes the number of interior plates penetrated in terms of
the pressure wall thickness (0.125-in aluminum, in this study case).
MSCSurv_'s capability to correlate an individual internal equipment "thickness" with each of
its external geometric elements opens up the possibility of placing "thicker" internal equipment racks in
positions that will increase shielding of spacecraft occupants from internal fragment hazards. It also
offers the capability to compute the improvement in crew safety offered by such military innovations as
internal spall liners. By carefully positioning equipment racks and/or spall liners where debris is more
likely to penetrate the spacecraft, spacecraft designers should be capable of identifying large reductions
in crew injury through the use of MSCSurv TM.
Figure 21. "Typical" space station internal equipment. 57 58
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This interior equipmentassumptioncanbeeasilymodifiedby changingtheinput file describing
thenumberof interior "equivalentplates"behindeachexteriorelement,if desired.Thedescriptionof
the individual equipmentbehindeachexteriorelementis givenin thedatafile SHIELD.DAT, foundin
appendixN. Thefirst andsecondcolumnsof this file list themoduleandexteriorelementnumber.The
third columnlists the interior"stationnumber"correspondingto thiselement(discussedin thefollowing
section).Thefourth columnlists thetypeof shieldthatis locatedon the"exterior" of thespacecraftele-
ment(all thesamefor this studycase).Thefifth columnof this datafile lists thenumberof "equivalent"
0.125-inplateslocatedbehindthemoduleexteriorelements.Thesedataarereadinto MSCSurv_ lines
187through193.Theactualdepthof penetrationfor eachsimulateddebrisperforationis computedin
lines361through365.
C. The MSCSurv _ Crew Loss Model
The remainder of MSCSurv _ is devoted to calculating the probability of crew loss following a
simulated orbital debris penetration. For each penetration, this is accomplished through (1) determining
which of the simulated hazards in the spacecraft (wall crack size, hole size, and internal penetration
depth) exceed established critical levels, and if so, (2) seeing which of the crew members are physically
near enough to the penetration for these hazards to cause their loss. Accurate assumptions for critical
hazard levels, crew position, and escape time are essential.
Previous sections have detailed how the levels of three hazards associated with each penetration
(wall crack size, hole size, and internal penetration depth) are derived from individual orbital debris par-
ticle and spacecraft impact characteristics. Each hazard can cause a unique mode of crew loss if it
exceeds a critical level:
(1) Pressure wall cracking causes loss of the entire crew (and spacecraft) by explosive decom-
pression if the crack exceeds a critical level and propagates unstopped.
(2) Internal penetration causes crew loss due to direct injury by fragments if the internal equip-
ment is penetrated and the crew is near the penetrated area.
(3) Pressure wall hole size causes slow decompression and eventual crew loss of one or more
crew members if the hole size causes hazardous loss of air prior to the crew's ability to
escape and close the hatch on the depressurizing module. Note that crew members can be
lost in modules other than the penetrated module if they fall to close the hatch on their own
module in time.
The critical levels causing crew loss for each hazard were derived in earlier sections and are
summarized in table 9.
MSCSurv a_ operates in a "cascading" mode in determining overall Ploss/pen, as shown in figure
9. It first determines whether the initial crack created by impact is sufficient in size to propagate
unstopped. If it is, then the loss of the entire crew is assumed for this penetration, and MSCSurv ru goes
on to simulate a new debris impact. If the critical crack size is not exceeded, then MSCSurv _ checks to
see if (and how many) crewmen are lost due to injury. For those crew not lost due to injury, MSCSurv _
checks to see if (and how many) crewmen are lost due to slow decompression. MSCSurv _ then sums
the number of crew lost for each simulated penetration (if any) from these two sources and goes on to
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simulate a new debris impact. The Ploss/pen is then taken as the total number of penetrations where one or
more crew is lost divided by the total number of penetrations.
The critical crack hazard level is assumed to be 7 in for a 0.125-in wall and a 12-in crack for a
0.188-in wall. 5253 Figure 18 shows that a 7-in critical crack may be formed with total impact energies
varying from 28,000 to 70,000 ft-lb, and a 12-in crack could be formed with total impact energies vary-
ing from 60,000 to 100,000 ft-lb. In lines 351 through 360, MSCSurv _ compares the user-defined crack
size or energy-based critical hazard level to either of these simulated penetration hazards, and sums
those cases where a critical crack length or energy is exceeded.
The two remaining crew loss modes of "injury" and "slow decompression" (henceforth referred
to as "decompression") both require a model for crew position versus time to be generated. MSCSurv _
randomly generates crew position versus time for each simulated penetration using two data files,
PCREWMOD.DAT and POSITION.DAT, located in appendices O and P. Columns 2 through 5 of
PCREWMOD.DAT list the module that each of the four crew members inhabits for each of the 24 h of
the crew day. Column 1 lists the cumulative probability that the debris strike will happen during each of
the 24 h (equal probability each hour). PCREWMOD.DAT is read into MSCSurv _ in lines 199 through
203 of MSCSurv _.
Column 3 of POSITION.DAT lists the cumulative probability that a crew member is at a particu-
lar station number (column 2) when he is located in a particular module (column 1). Each station number
is a discrete 42-in increment of distance from the exit hatch of the module closest to the center of gravity
of the eight module cluster, and corresponds to a cylindrical "segment" of the module. Columns 1
through 3 of SHIELD.DAT in appendix N relate module station numbers to element numbers for each of
the eight modules in this study. POSITION.DAT is read into MSCSurv m in lines 194 through 198.
The baseline crew distribution among modules given in PCREWMOD.DAT was formulated by
SSEIC 52 through brief discussions with the NASA Johnson Space Center Operations Integration Office,
and, as such, should be considered as the best available today (superior to that used by this author14).
Because the factor of crew sleep position was identified as a large driver of overall crew safety, an alter-
nate sleep position model (where all the crew members sleep in Node 1) will be studied to obtain the
sensitivity of Ploss/pen to this factor. This alternative data file, PCREWMO2.DAT, is located in appen-
dix Q.
H
The position of each crew member within each module is assumed to be uniformly distributed
among all of the module's stations over time for the baseline model (described within the data file
POSITION.DAT). During sleep, the crew may be located in any of the stations within modules 1 and 2
(Lab and Hab modules). Two alternative models are offered here for sensitivity studies. The first uses a
triangular distribution for crew station location over time, with each crew member being more likely to
be close to the hatch (where inter-module travel would be most likely to "concentrate"). The second
sensitivity model assumes that a crewman's position is uniformly distributed among module stations as
in POSITION.DAT except when sleeping, when the crewman is located next to a hatch (for quick







Once the positions of each of the four crew members is selected for each impact, MSCSurv _
goes on to compute whether any crew are injured through exposure to the debris fragment spray. Note
from table 9 that the critical level of fragment energy that is assumed to cause serious crew injury is
quite low (58 ft-lb) 38 compared to the energy magnitudes of impacting debris particles (on the order of
thousands of ft-lb, fig. 18). For this reason, MSCSurv rM assumes that any fragment cloud penetrating the
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internalequipmentwill havesufficientenergypresento seriouslyinjure thecrew.MSCSurvTM also
assumes that the internal module debris spray will spread laterally into equipment one station either side
of the penetrated station (three stations, total). This assumption was derived from limited observations of
the debris cloud spray angle (angle between edge of debris cloud and debris approach vector) following
bumper penetration. This means that any crew member located at or next to a station number where the
internal equipment is penetrated is automatically assumed to be injured. However, it is possible that the
crew may survive the initial exposure to the debris spray, depending on the spread of the debris cloud,
the level of energy remaining in the cloud and the severity of the crew's injuries. Additional test data is
needed to determine these energy levels, spread angles, and the crew's exposure.
Given these uncertainties, several alternatives are examined within the sensitivity analyses:
(1) The internal debris cloud is contained within the penetrated crew station number (i.e., the
internal debris spread is only one equipment rack wide).
(2) The crew is injured less than 100 percent of the time when exposed to the initial debris
spray, and escape at an slower rate than uninjured crew. However, a percentage of these
injuries later prove to be serious, causing loss of the crew.
In order to determine the probability of individual crew loss due to (slow) depressurization,
several additional pieces of information must be input into MSCSurv TM by the user. The volume of air
available prior to penetration for each crewman to breathe is a function of the total volume available to
the individual crew member (i.e., hatch position) and the amount of spacecraft interior volume that is not
occupied already by equipment (free air ratio).
The baseline model assumes that all hatches are open except those to modules 7 and 8 (the air-
lock and P-Log), so the total module volume of air available to the crew is the sum of the volume of
modules one through six (22,469 ft 3) times the free air volume. An alternative assumption is that all of
the hatches operate closed (and must be opened prior to crew escape from penetrated hatches. Each
module's volume is listed in table 10. A second alternative assumption examined within this study was a
"mixed" mode of hatch operation with hatches open during the crew members' "day" cycle and hatches
closed during their sleep cycle (8 h). This operating mode was shown to increase crew safety con-
siderably in reference 14 (fig. 8). The "free air ratio" is baselined as 70 percent, but may be as high as 95
percent. Both cases are examined in following sections.
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When a module is penetrated, a "race" is begun between the slow depressurization of the module
(and any connecting modules) and the crew's ability to "escape" the depressurizing area. In this case, the
term "escape" refers to either the action of physically leaving the damaged module and closing the hatch




module and closing the hatch on it (if the crew member is in an undamaged module). In the latter case,
the trapped crew would be safe for only a limited time, requiring rescue or an alternate method of escape
prior to losing the remaining oxygen in their separated module. MSCSurv TM does not include this
possibility of "late" loss in its simulation.
The time required for the crew to escape is comprised of several discrete elements, including a
delay time for discovering the leak and initiating movement, time to move to the hatch, and time to
operate the hatch. Of course, these actions will be performed by weightless crew members that are likely
to be in a state of confusion (at the very least). As such, the specific time values associated with each of
these actions are difficult to obtain without an accurate crew simulation in the absence of gravity. Future
studies to determine these values have been proposed by the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance
Office using the NASA KC-135 aircraft. For the present, however, these values must be estimated. For
this exercise, preliminary values for each of the components of escape time were arrived at through con-
sultation with members of the MSFC Safety and Mission Assurance Office, the NASA Level 2 Program
Office, and the Space Station Engineering and Integration Contractor. 59 These assumed escape time
components are:
(1) Delay time to discover leak and initiate escape. When the crew is awake, this is baselined as
35 s; when the crew is asleep, the baseline is assumed to be 100 s. The longer delay time
during the crew sleep period is due primarily to the extra time required to egress their
sleeping restraints.
(2) Time to move to the hatch and begin closure. This is baselined as 30 s average for each
module for a healthy crew member. For an injured crew that is conscious and capable of
movement, the baselined time for movement to the hatch is increased to 60 s. Likewise,
penetrations taking place between any crew member and the escape hatch is assumed to
increase this crew member's movement time to 60 s (due to "hindrance" caused by possible
equipment strewn into the aisle).
(3) Time to close the hatch. This is baselined at a maximum of 30 s. For the S.S. Freedom, this
was an actual requirement levied against the hatch design, and as such has a higher degree of
confidence associated with it than the other two components of escape time. As a corollary,
the time required for the crew to open a closed hatch is also baselined at 30 s.
Because the baselined values for delay time and movement time are somewhat arbitrary, it is
important to vary them in the sensitivity analyses in order to determine their effect on Ploss/pen. Accord-
ingly, the operator may vary any of these "operational" assumptions by direct input as MSCSurv TM is
initialized. Within the sensitivity analysis, the delay and movement times are cut approximately in half:
the delay time is changed from 100 to 50 s, and the movement time is halved to 15 s (normal status) and
30 s (injured/hindered status).
Alternatively, the operator may input the rate of crew movement (in feet per second) for normal,
injured, and hindered crew members. MSCSurv TM calculates individual crew movement time from these
rates given the distance of each crew member from the hatch and the condition of the crew following
each penetration. A rate of 0.5 ft/s equates roughly to our "nominal" escape time of 30 s for a 30-ft lab
module (15 ft "average" escape distance/0.5 ft/s = 30 s); a rate of 0.25 ft/s equates roughly to 60-s
escape time. These escape rates will be used within the sensitivity analyses to determine the effect of





The time required for the modules to reach a critical depressurization limit is calculated using an
isentropic "blowdown" equation described by Boeing, 46 and is listed in its entirety in line 405 of
MSCSurv TM. This equation assumes as a baseline that the temperature of the module air is 70 °F, the dis-
charge coefficient is 0.9, the initial operating pressure is 14.7 lb/in 2, and the final pressure is 7.5 lb/in2. 53
The discharge coefficient reflects the shape of the hole, and may vary somewhat with hole shape and
petal size. As such, it is varied to a Ca- 0.7 within the sensitivity analyses. As shown in table 10, the
final pressure following blowdown required prior to crew loss due to slow decompression could range as
high as 9.5 lb/in 2 or as low as 3.0 lb/in 2, and is also varied within the following sensitivity analyses.
V. BASELINE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
This section uses the MSCSurv TM simulation tool to compute the baseline probability of (one or
more) crew loss given a spacecraft penetration (Ploss/pen), and determine its sensitivity to choice of input
parameter(s). In "one-way" sensitivity analyses, each assumption and/or design parameter identified in
the previous section will be varied individually to observe its effect on the final Ploss/pen. Following this,
selected parameters will be grouped together to observe their interactions in determining Ploss/pen. Vali-
dation and verification of the developed simulation model and software tool will be discussed. At the
conclusion of this task, those design and operational factors most effective in reducing Ploss/pen will be
identified.
Table 11 summarizes the baseline and alternative assumptions developed in the previous section.
Each alternative assumption has a corresponding <number> highlighted in the table from <1> to <20>.
Note that with a few exceptions, most alternative assumptions are more "optimistic" than the baseline
(that is, can be expected to lower the overall Ploss/pen). Using "conservative" assumptions to form the
baseline safety analysis is in keeping with NASA's general hazard analysis methodology.
The probability of (one or more) crew loss given an orbital debris penetration for the described
eight module cluster is given in table 12 as 0.74. That is, a penetrating orbital debris particle could be
expected to cause loss of at least one crew member in 74 of every 100 debris penetrations of the module
cluster as a whole. Note that the Ploss/pen values for each module vary from the total cluster value. The
U.S. Lab module has the highest incidence of expected crew loss (0.83); the ESA module has a lower
value (0.69); the P-Log and airlock have the lowest Ploss/pen (0.66). This is due primarily to the lack of
crew members in modules 7 and 8, where injury and slow depressurization losses amount to zero.
Because modules 7 and 8 are unoccupied to such a large extent (and are, as such, not representation of
"manned" spacecraft), the Ploss/pen values reported hereafter will include the average of only modules 1
through 6. Given this footnote, the "baseline" Ploss/pen value referred to throughout this study is 0.76
(table 12).
Recalling equation (4), one must multiply the Ploss/pen by the probability of penetration given an
impact (PpetUimpact) and the probability of impact (Pimpact) tO determine the actual probability of crew
loss (Ploss) in a 10-year period. Table 13 reports these Ploss values, using the effective area values
reported in table 8. Note that the Pimpact of particles larger than 3 cm must be added to the/'loss output by
MSCSurv TM to compute the total Ploss. This is because MSCSurv TM simulation is limited to particles
from 0.3 to 3 cm in diameter (see appendix B). While they are scarce, it is clear from examination of the
ballistic limit for this shield design (fig. 5) and the hole size relation (fig. 16) that debris particle impacts
above 3-cm diameter can be reasonably expected to cause "automatic" loss of the crew. Thus, in these
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• Triangular distribution < 10>
• Stationary sleep position <11>
• Hatches normally closed < 12>
• Hatches closed at night <13>
• 0.5 ft/s (normal) 0.25 ft/s <14>
(hindered or injured)
• 15 s (normal), 30 s (hindered
or injured) < 15>
<16>
• 9.5 lb/in 2 (equip. failure)
• 3.0 lb/in 2 (w/O 2 masks)













Table 12. "Baseline" probability of crew loss given a penetration, Ploss/pen, for eight modules.
Module 1 (U.S. Lab)
Module 2 (U.S. Hab)
Module 3 (JEM)
Module 4 (ESA)
Module 5 (Node 2)
Module 6 (Node 1)
Module 7 (P-Log)
Module 8 (Airlock)
Total (1 through 8)













































Table 13. Probability of crew loss due to orbital debris impact for eight module spacecraft,
baseline assumptions (1 year).
< ......... 0.3 to 3 cm diameter ....... _ >3cm
Module Pimpact x P_n/imp x P_ss/_n + Pimpact = Ploss
1 0.012291 x 0.167 x 0.83 + 0.000202 = 0.00190
2 0.012291 x 0.167 x 0.83 + 0.000202 = 0.00190
3 0.006672 x 0.166 x 0.72 + 0.000109 = 0.00090
4 0.011057 x 0.166 x 0.69 + 0.000182 = 0.00150
5 0.003002 x 0.167 x 0.79 + 0.000049 = 0.00044
6 0.003002 X 0.167 X 0.74 + 0.000049 = 0.00044
7 0.015199 X 0.190 x 0.66 + 0.000251 = 0.00215
8 0.007600 x 0.190 x 0.66 + 0.000126 = 0.00107
1-8 0.068966 X 0.174 X 0.74 + 0.001173 = 0.00888
1-6 0.047370 x 0.167 x 0.76 + 0.000796 = 0.00680
A. Single Factor Sensitivity Analyses
Table 11 lists 20 alternative input parameters for the MSCSurv TM simulation of Ploss/pen. This
section details how the Ploss/pen changes with the change in input parameters.
Figure 22 shows how the Ploss/pen changes with critical crack length assumption for module 1
(U.S. Lab), and figure 23 shows this relationship for the six module cluster. As the "inherent"
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Figure 23. Ploss/pen for six module spacecraft cluster versus pressure wall critical crack length.
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decreases, as does the overall Ploss/pen- As the unzipping ratio decreases with larger critical crack
lengths in the module pressure wall, the slow depressurization loss ratio and injury ratio increases
(somewhat), until a lower asymptote is reached in overall Ploss/pen for large critical crack lengths at
around 0.58 for the six module cluster.
For the baseline case (7-in critical crack length), unzipping is the predominant mode of crew
loss, with 0.70 out of a total 0.76 Ploss/pen. Unzipping is reduced considerably for alternate <1>, a
12-in critical crack length, but still predominates the injury and depressurization loss modes. In
alternate <2>, a 24-in critical crack length appears to have little or no unzipping loss, whereas
depressurization has become the predominant loss factor. As stated earlier, increasing the thickness
of the pressure wall and/or adding integral stiffeners to the wall design are both effective methods of
increasing the "inherent" length at which penetration-induced cracks will propagate unstopped
(unzip). Thus, if a 0.188-in pressure wall thickness can increase the critical crack parameter from 7
to 12 in (as theorized in reference 53), figure 23 shows that this increased wall thickness decreases
the overall Ploss/pen by nearly 20 percent (from 0.76 to 0.63).
Unzipping is an independent loss mode from the cases of crew injury or slow depressuriza-
tion, and obviously predominates the other two modes in the baseline (7-in critical crack) case. As
they can only affect 6 percent of the 76-percent total Ploss/pen value for the baseline case, even rela-
tively large changes in the input assumptions affecting depressurization and injury losses will have
little total effect on the overall Ploss/pen ratio. However, for the 12- and 24-in critical crack assump-
tions, injury and depressurization losses grow as a proportion of the total Ploss/pen. AS such, input
assumptions affecting depressurization and injury losses should increasingly affect the Ploss/pen for
these cases. To test this hypothesis, the single parameter sensitivity analyses reported in table 14
for the 7-in critical crack assumption are repeated in tables 15 and 16 using 12- and 24-in critical
crack assumptions, respectively.
Alternate assumption <3> involved using the Burch D9o hole model 11 instead of the baselined
oblique hole model (appendix M). In general, the Burch hole model predicts smaller holes for the
same parameters of diameter and velocity than the oblique model. Tables 14 through 16 show that
the Burch hole model predicts slightly less "unzipping" loss than the baselined model for the 7-in
critical crack length, and considerably less unzipping loss for the 12- and 24-in cases. Note that both
the unzipping loss and the total Ploss/pen falls much more rapidly for increasing critical crack lengths
when using the Burch hole model than when using the baseline model. Note also that the overall
Ploss/pen seems to remain approximately 0.200 lower than the baseline oblique hole model for the 12-
and 24-in critical crack lengths, appearing to parallel the Ploss/pen asymptote shown for the baseline
assumptions in figure 23.
As noted earlier, as the unzipping loss goes down, the slow depressurization and injury
losses rise somewhat. This is because the number of penetrations with sufficient energy to exceed
the 12- and 24-in critical crack lengths are fewer, but are still sufficient in penetration energy to
make large holes (causing depressurization losses) and deep penetrations (causing injury losses).
The baseline assumptions of relatively slow crew escape time and lack of rack protection appear to
couple with the Burch model for the 7-in crack case in the same way as they did with the oblique
hole model for the 12- and 24-in case, lowering the unzipping loss and raising the depressurization/
injury losses. From table 14, one concludes that the overall Ploss/pen is relatively insensitive to the




Table 14. Probability of crew loss given a penetration (Ploss/pen), alternative assumptions with
7-in critical crack, six module cluster.
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis
7-in Critical Crack Length { }= Rank
Unzip In)ury Depress
"Baseline" Assumptions 0.698 0.060 0.003
<3> Burch Hole Model 0.659 0.071 0.029
<4> Energy-Based Crack Size 0.380 0.133 0.093
<5> Narrow Debris Spread 0.698 0.028 0.003
<6> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.698 0.049 0.003
50-percent Lost + 50-
percent Late Loss
<7> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.698 0.013 0.003
10-percent Lost + 10-
percent Late Loss
<8> Internal Equipment with 0.698 0.006 0.003
0.7 g/cm 2 Areal Density
<9> Crew Sleeps in Node 2 0.698 0.038 0.003
< 10> "Triangular" Crew Distance 0.698 0.071 0.003
Within Module
< 11 > Crew Sleeps Near Hatch 0.698 0.060 0.003
< 12> Hatches Closed 0.698 0.060 0.021
<13> Hatches Closed (Night) 0.698 0.060 0.011
<14> Rate-Based Crew 0.698 0.060 0.001
Movement
<15> Fast Crew Movement 0.698 0.060 0.001
<16> Fast Crew Reaction Time 0.698 0.060 0.001
< 17> 9.5 lb/in 2 Crit Depress 0.698 0.060 0.006
< 18> 3.0 lb/in 2 Crit Depress 0.698 0.060 0.001
<19> 95-percent Free Air Ratio 0.698 0.060 0.001























Table 15. Probability of crew loss given a penetration (Ploss/pen), alternative assumptions with
12-in critical crack, six module cluster.
Single Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
12-in Critical Crack Length <1> { }=Rank
Unzip Injury Depress Total
"Baseline" Assumptions 0.438 0.119 0.068 0.625
<3> Burch Hole Model 0.110 0.191 0.122 0.423
<4> Energy-Based Crack Size 0.243 0.163 0.192 0.598
<5> Narrow Debris Spread 0.438 0.055 0.080 0.571
<6> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.438 0.094 0.074 0.609
50-percent Lost + 50-percent
Late Loss
<7> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.438 0.029 0.090
10-percent Lost + 10-percent
Late Loss
<8> Internal Equipment with 0.438 0.013 0.083 0.534
0.7 g/cm 2 Areal Density
<9> Crew Sleeps in Node 2 0.438 0.077 0.075 0.590
< 10> "Triangular" Crew Distance 0.438 0.137 0.062 0.633
Within Module
<11> Crew Sleeps Near Hatch 0.438 0.119 0.069 0.626
< 12> Hatches Closed 0.438 0.119 0.078 0.635
<13> Hatches Closed (Night) 0.438 0.119 0.066 0.623
<14> Rate-Based Crew Movement 0.438 0.119 0.031 0.589
<15> Fast Crew Movement 0.438 0.119 0.050 0.607
<16> Fast Crew Reaction Time 0.438 0.119 0.040 0.597
<17> 9.51b/in 2 Crit Depress 0.438 0.119 0.112 0.669
< 18> 3.0 lb/in 2 Crit Depress 0.438 0.119 0.007 0.562
<19> 95-percent Free Air Ratio 0.438 0.119 0.038 0.595






















Table 16. Probability of crew lossgivena penetration(Ploss/pen), alternative assumptions with
24-in critical crack, six module cluster.
Single Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
24-in Critical Crack Length <2> { } = Rank
Unzip
"Baseline" Assumptions 0.027
<3> Burch Hole Model 0.010
<4> Energy-Based Crack Size 0.158
<5> Narrow Debris Spread 0.027
<6> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.027
50-percent Lost + 50-percent
Late Loss
<7> Crew Exposed to Debris 0.027
10-percent Lost + 10-percent
Late Loss
<8> Internal Equipment with 0.027
0.7 g/cm 2 Areal Density
<9> Crew Sleeps in Node 2 0.027
< 10> "Triangular" Crew Distance 0.027
Within Module
< 11> Crew Sleeps Near Hatch 0.027
<12> Hatches Closed 0.027
<13> Hatches Closed (Night) 0.027
<14> Rate-Based Crew Movement 0.027
<15> Fast Crew Movement 0.027
< 16> Fast Crew Reaction Time 0.027
<17> 9.5 lb/in 2 Crit Depress 0.027
< 18> 3.0 lblin 2 Crit Depress 0.027
<19> 95-percent Free Air Ratio 0.027
<20> Ca = 0.7 0.027
Delta from
Injury Depress Total Baseline
0.210 0.344 0.581 ....
0.212 0.151 0.373 -0.208 {2}
0.182 0.255 0.595 +0.014
0.095 0.408 0.530 -0.051
0.167 0.372 0.566 -0.015
0.048 0.435 0.510 -0.071
0.027 0.428 0.482 -0.099 {4}
0.142 0.380 0.549 -0.032
0.244 0.325 0.596 +0.015
0.210 0.344 0.581 +0.000
0.210 0.166 0.403 -0.178 {3}
0.210 0.277 0.514 -0.067
0.210 0.250 0.487 -0.094 {5}
0.210 0.306 0.543 -0.038
0.210 0.286 0.525 -0.056
0.210 0.417 0.654 +0.073
0.210 0.085 0.322 -0.259 { 1}
0.210 0.268 0.505 -0.076
0.212 0.287 0.526 -0.055
•i
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critical crack level. Theseresultsareconsistentwith the Burchmodel's tendencyto predict fewer large
holes,and thereforefewer large cracksto exceed12-and24-in lengths.





The effect of implementing an energy-based crack formation model is examined as alternative
<4> in tables I4 through 16. As previously discussed, this alternative basis for crack formation is
considered to be conjectural, but within the realm of possibility given the extreme lack of data on the
crack formation process itself. This model uses 48,000 ft-lb as the impact energy required to produce
7-in cracks, 82,000 ft-lb to produce 12-in cracks, and 132,000 ft-lb to produce 24-in cracks (fig. 9).
Table 14 shows that the unzipping loss predicted by this model is less than that predicted by the
baseline model for the 7-in critical crack assumption. For the 12-in case, table 15 shows that this
alternative produces less unzipping than it did in the 7-in case and less than the baseline case for a
12-in critical crack. However, for the 24-in case, while producing still less unzipping loss than the 12-in
case, the energy-based crack size produces more unzipping loss than the baseline oblique hole-based
assumption (table 16). Comparison of the amount of unzipping loss reduction between 7, 12, and 24 in
for the energy-based versus hole-based crack size assumptions shows that the energy-based
assumption is less sensitive to increasing critical crack length than the hole-based assumption.
Assumptions <5> through <10> have an effect on injury and depressurization losses, but do
not affect the proportion of unzipping loss. Close examination of the injury and depressurization losses
in tables 14 through 16 shows that as the injury loss decreases, the depressurization loss shows a
slight increase; as the injury loss increases, the depressurization loss decreases somewhat. The
reason for this is similar to that described earlier for the unzipping/injury relationship: an increase in the
number of penetrations causing injury means that there are fewer large holes "available" that can
additionally cause loss of crew to decompression. Recall that the Ploss/pen denotes the probability of
losing at least one crewmember (that is, one or more) following a penetration. Once a single
crewmember is lost to unzipping, that penetration is "counted" solely as an unzipping-related loss
when calculating the Ploss/pen ratio, and is not "double-booked" by MSCSurv _ as an injury or
depressurization loss (fig. 9). The same is true for injury-inducing penetrations; they cannot
additionally contribute to the depressurization loss ratio, even though the hole size may be sufficiently
large to cause loss of one or more crewmembers in addition to the injury-related loss.
Given this "cascading" fashion of determining overall probability of a single crew loss, it is clear
that assumptions <5> through <10> directly affect the ratio of crew losses due to injury; the change in
the decompression loss ratio is merely a side-effect of the change in the injury loss ratio. Tables 14
through 16 show that the spread of the interior debris cloud (assumption <5>) appears to be important
in its direct effect on crew injury. For any of the three (7-, 12-, or 24-in) critical crack levels, changing
the baselined assumption of a three-rack wide internal debris fragment spread to a one-rack wide
spread of fragments inside the module appears to cut the amount of crew injury roughly in hall This
makes sense in that a smaller proportion of crew would be exposed to the penetrating internal debris
fragment cloud, resulting in fewer injuries. As expected, this effect becomes more important as the
injury loss ratio grows in proportion to the overall Ploss/pen ratio.
In a similar fashion to alternate assumption <5>, the assumptions <6> and <7> on the like-
lihood of crew injury following exposure to the debris cloud directly reduces the overall injury loss ratio.
A 50-percent immediate plus a 50-percent "late" loss reduces the overall injury loss ratio by 25
percent for all critical crack levels; a 10-percent immediate plus a 10-percent "late" loss assumption
similarly reduces the injury loss ratio by 80 percent. The injury loss ratio appears to vary in a roughly
linear fashion with the percentages assumed here.
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Internal equipment has the effect of reducing the injury ratio by reducing the exposure of the
crew to the fragmenting internal debris cloud. As shown under assumption <8> in tables 14 through
16, this factor can be one of the most important in reducing crew injury, though its reduction in overall
Ploss/pen reaches an asymptote with increasing critical crack lengths (above 12 in).
The two final factors that appear to directly affect crew injury appear as alternatives <9> and
<10>. In <9>, all four crew members sleep in node 2 instead of two in the Lab and two in the Hab
(the baseline case). For this alternative, the injury loss seems to decrease only slightly, but
becomes a more measurable effect as the critical crack length increases. In alternative <10>, the
distribution of the crew within the modules is changed from a uniform distribution between all sta-
tions to a triangular distribution, where the individual crew members (if present within a module) are
much more likely to be near the exit than near the opposite bulkhead. This assumption tends to
increase the injury loss ratio somewhat, though the overall effect is very small. From this informa-
tion, one can conclude that the overall Ploss/pen appears to be relatively insensitive to the postulated
changes in crew distribution throughout the modules during awake or asleep periods (when operat-
ing with hatches open).
Alternative input assumptions <11> through <20> appear to solely affect the ratio of crew
loss due to depressurization following a penetration of the six module cluster, as shown in column 3
of tables 14 through 16. All 10 alternatives have an increasing effect on the total Ploss/pen as the criti-
cal crack length increases from 7 to 24 in.
Alternatives <11> through <13> detail three operational modes that may be incorporated
within the three module cluster with little or no cost. In alternative <11>, the four crewmembers
sleep near the hatch for quicker escape during the crew sleep period. However, tables 14 through 16
indicate that this alternative has no effect on the depressurization loss. This is probably because the
crew movement time from the module to the hatch is baselined as constant; that is, no matter how
far away from the hatch a crewmember is, he/she still takes 30 s to move to the hatch. In following
sections, this alternative will be combined with a position-dependent (i.e., rate-based) crew
movement time to see if it is significant when applied in such a fashion.
_Alternatives <12> and <13> apply two different hatch closure conditions to the baseline
model. In alternative <12>, the hatches are closed during normal crew operations and during the
sleep period (except when a crew member is traversing through them when crossing from module to
module). This alternative shows increased depressurization losses at the 7- and 12-in critical crack
levels, but a significantly reduced depressurization loss ratio at the 24-in critical crack level. Note
that as the critical crack length increases, the depressurization loss (and Ploss/pen) appears to
decrease dramatically after a 12-in critical length.
In alternative <13>, the hatches are closed at night only. This operational mode shows
slightly increased decompression loss for the 7-in critical crack length, but decreased decompression
loss for the 12- and 24-in critical crack cases. As with alternative <12>, the depressurization loss
(and Ploss/pen) appears to decrease dramatically after a 12-in critical length.
The Ploss/pen should be considered as relatively sensitive to these hatch position factors, but
may be somewhat dependent upon the baselined hole size model and crew escape time from the
module. In reference 14, a different hole size model and crew escape time was used to determine the
depressurization loss ratio (without unzipping or injury losses included, similar to the 24-in critical
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crack length alternative).It showedthat the openhatchand closedhatchoperationalmodelspro-
vided approximatelythe samelevel of Ploss/pen, but that the "hatches closed at night" model pro-
duced significantly less Ploss/pen than either of these alternatives.
Alternatives <14> through <16> change selected portions of the baselined crew escape
parameters. Alternative <14> changes the crew movement model from a constant time to a rate-
based movement time, based on crew position within the module. This alternative assumes that the
crew moves at 0.5 ft/s when escaping in a healthy condition, at 0.25 ft/s when escaping in a hindered
or injured status. Alternative <15> reduces the baselined constant crew movement from 30 to 15 s
when healthy and from 60 to 30 s when injured. Alternative <16> reduces the baselined crew reac-
tion time (prior to initiating movement) from 35 to 15 s when awake and from 100 to 50 s when
asleep. Each of these three factors (when acting on their own) only appears to become significant at
the 24-in critical crack length. However, it is highly possible that these factors, when combined,
would cause a strong reduction in depressurization loss, since the total escape time would be
reduced by over 75 percent. If the baselined crew injury rate after "immediate" exposure to the
debris cloud were dropped from 100 percent to say 50 percent, the injured crew members would also
benefit from these faster reaction and movement times. As it is, however, the baselined "100 per-
cent loss if injured" assumption limits the benefit of the reduced reaction and movement times to
healthy or hindered crew members.
Alternatives <17> and <18> change the baselined critical (lowest) level of crew depres-
surization resistance prior to unconsciousness and eventual loss from 7.5 to 9.5 lb/in 2 and 3.0 lb/in2,
respectively. The 9.5-1b/in 2 alternative raises the depressurization loss ratio from 0.003 to 0.073
higher than the baseline for increasing critical crack lengths. Conversely, the 3.0-1b/in 2 depres-
surization limit alternative is one of the five most significant factors that reduce Ploss/pen for the 12-in
critical crack length and is the largest single factor in reducing Ploss/pen for the 24-in critical crack
assumption. This alternative corresponds to oxygen masks being immediately available to the crew
following a module penetration. The crew would need to be trained extensively on the correct emer-
gency procedure following a penetration to receive the benefit of this lowered Ploss/pen.
Alternative <19> increases the free air ratio from 70 percent of the total interior volume of the
modules to 95 percent. By increasing the volume of air available to the crew members, the crew has
more time to escape the module prior to losing consciousness. As expected, this alternative
decreases the Ploss/pen (up tO 0.076 for the 24-in critical crack length), but does not appear to be one
of the more significant factors affecting the probability of crew loss following a penetration.
Alternative <20> reduces the coefficient of discharge in the module depressurization equation
(line 407 of MSCSurvm), effectively lowering the rate at which the module depressurizes. This
alternative has much the same effect on Ploss/pen as increasing the free air ratio (alternative <20>),
measurably lowering the depressurization ratio for the 24-in critical crack length (table 16).
To summarize, the probability of crew loss (one or more) following a module penetration can
vary significantly from the baselined ratio of 0.76 Ploss/pen, depending on the input parameters chosen.
The largest factor affecting the total Ploss/pen is the critical crack length causing module "unzipping"
(uncontrolled crack growth) and explosive decompression. Increasing the module wall thickness can
conceivably increase the critical crack length from 7 to 24 in, reducing the Ploss/pen from 0.76 to 0.58.
As the critical crack size increases, the Ploss/pen is made up increasingly of injury-related and slow
depressurization-related losses.
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The otherinput factorsaffecting theoverall Ploss/pen vary in importance, depending on the criti-
cal crack length within the module pressure wall. For the baselined 7-in critical crack length, table 14
shows the Ploss/pen tO be most sensitive to crack size model chosen, but is also affected to a lesser
extent by such injury-related factors as amount and location of internal equipment, spread of the
debris cloud within the modules, and likelihood of crew injury when exposed to the debris cloud. For
the 12-in critical crack length, the same injury-related factors are drivers in reducing Ploss/pen as in
the 7-in case, but the most important factor appears to be choice of the hole size model due to its
effect in further reducing unzipping losses. For the 24-in critical crack length, the most important
factors appear to be those that affect depressurization losses, including crew depressurization limit,
hole size model, hatch position, and speed of the crew's movement following penetration.
So far, this sensitivity analysis includes the effects of altering the critical crack length
assumption in conjunction with other factors, one at a time. The next section examines the sensi-
tivity of the Ploss/pen value to altering multiple selected factors.
B. Multiple Factor Sensitivity Analysis
This section examines the interaction between major factors identified by MSCSurv TM in the
previous section to have measurable effects on the overall probability of crew loss (one or more)
following an orbital debris penetration of a six-manned module cluster. In a second case, a limited
set of "interesting" variables in the 24-in crack case is examined for interactions that might lower
the Ploss/pen further than they otherwise might by acting singly. Within this section, a "Taguchi"
technique (L16 orthogonal array) is employed to determine two-way interactions between five
selected factors for the two cases.
Although it would be desirable to identify the level of Ploss/pen associated with interaction of
all variables (henceforth referred to as factors) and levels identified in table 11, time and space limi-
tations render this impractical here. Therefore, five factors that appear to have large effects on
Ploss/pen are chosen from tables 14 through 16 for further interaction analysis. The five major factors
chosen for interaction analysis are shown in table 17, and include (A) critical crack length, (B) inter-
nal equipment, (C) critical decompression level, (D) injury loss ratio, and (E) hatch position. Table
17 shows that each of these factors is set at two levels--level "1" was generally associated with
"low" Ploss/pen values and level "2" with "high" Ploss/pen values.
The type of Taguchi analysis chosen for this examination of two factor interactions involves
use of the El6 orthogonal array pattern. According to "Hands-On Taguchi, ''6o this analysis allows
the user to rank the significance of up to five single input factors and 10 two-factor combinations in
determining the measurable output of a process or system (in this case, the total Ploss/pen within the
six module cluster). The L16 pattern requires 16 separate experimental "runs" using a specific com-
bination of high and low levels for each of the five factors in order to establish the ranking of which
factors are most important.
Following this, a "level average" analysis is performed using the output of the 16 runs. This
analysis essentially computes the "delta" in average Ploss/pen between all runs where the factor was
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Table 17. Taguchianalysisfor interactionbetweenfive major factors.




















































A A B D A B C C B A
X X x X X x X X X x
B B C C C E D D D E D E E E Result
1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.317
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.150
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0.561
1 1 1 2 2 2• 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0.381
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 0.196
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 0.382
1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0.391
1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 0.659
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0.701
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 0.721
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 0.746
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 0.717
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 0.721
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 0.757
2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 0.725
2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0.782
354 40 15 126 115 2 1 24 4 112 86 4 12 21 4
1 6 2 3 4 5
: ii•. ¸
: : i_i_
.) ,'_ i _
56
_ i • '
, ,•7 ¸
maintained at level 1 and all runs where the factor was maintained at level 2. A higher average
Ploss/pen delta between levels indicates a higher importance of this factor or combinations of factors.
Although sometimes criticized for lacking sufficient statistical strength, this type of Taguchi analysis
is useful because of its ease of applicability and consistent ability to identify the most important fac-
tors and interactions governing a process.
Table 17 confirms the observations shown in figures 22 and 23, that the critical crack length is
by far the most important factor in determining overall Ploss/pen. The second most important factor
appears to be the decompression level, followed by the interaction between the critical crack length
and the decompression level. This is consistent with the information shown in tables 14 through 16:
the decompression level grows in overall effect on Ploss/pen as the critical crack length grows. The
third most important factor is the interaction between the first and second most important factors.
The fourth most important factor is the interaction between internal equipment and injury loss rate.
Notice that both of these factors affect injury, but each are much less effective on overall Ploss/pen
when acting alone. The fifth most important factor is the interaction between decompression level
and hatch position. Note that the hatch position is relatively ineffective when acting alone.
Table 16 lists a number of additional variables that showed promise of interacting to mea-
surably lower the probability of (one or more) crew loss given a penetration, Ploss/pen. The factors
identified for this analysis include (A) the crew movement model, (B) the crew distribution within
each module (awake), (C) the crew sleep position within the cluster, (D) the crew sleep distribution
within each module, and (E) the hatch closure position. Each of these factors has two levels (table
11). The first of these levels produced a lower Ploss/pen, and the second level (in this case, always the
one associated with the baseline) produces a higher Ploss/pen.
Table 18 shows the results of the level average analysis for the L16 Taguchi pattern using the
five selected factors at the 24-in critical crack length. This analysis indicates that of these five fac-
tors and 10 interactions, the three most important are factor E (hatch position), factor A (crew
movement to hatch), and factor C (sleep position within cluster). The fourth most important factor
from the Taguchi analysis appears to be the interaction between factor C and factor E, although it is
not as strong as the action of the main factors.
This result and the magnitude of the delta associated with each of the main factors differs
somewhat from the single factor analysis within table 16, where the more important of the factors
was factor A (rate-based crew movement), not factor E (hatches closed at night). However, one
clue identifying the reason for this difference might lie in the apparent interaction between factor E
and factor C (crew sleep position). Taguchi analysis has the disadvantage of sometimes attributing
interactions between factors to the main factors themselves. The explicitly examined interaction
between factors E and A indicates that factor E may have a "tendency" to reduce Ploss/pen through
interactions with other factors. It is possible that some three-way interactions between these five
factors that include factor E (hatch closure position) have been lumped under the single factor E,
thus increasing its importance beyond what was seen in the single factor analysis (table 16). This
type of clue should be followed up in subsequent analyses to determine the precise interactions of
factor E with other input variables.
Apparently, the rate-based crew movement (level 1, factor A) does not interact significantly
with either the triangular crew distribution (level 1, factor B) or the sleep position near the hatch
(level 1, factor D) to lower the overall Ploss/pen. This result was somewhat unexpected. However, it







rate or reaction time. Further analysis of the interaction between these variables also appears
merited.
Table 18. Taguchi analysis for interaction between multiple input factors,
24qn critical crack assumption,
Factor Level 1 (Low) Level 2 (Hi_h)
A Crew Movement To Rate-Based Crew Constant
Hatch Movement Movement Time
B Crew Position Triangular Uniform
Within Modules Distribution Distribution
(Awake)
C Sleep Position In Node 2 In Hab and Lab
Within Cluster
D Sleep Position Near Hatch Variable
Within Module
E Hatch Position Closed at Night Open
Factor and Level Combinations
Run
A A B D A B C C B A
X X X X X X X X X X
A B B C C C E D D D E D E E E Result
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.353
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0.484
3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0.507
4 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0.444
5 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 0.476
6 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 0.343
7 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0.427
8 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 0.486
9 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0.579
10 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 0.436
11 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 0.529
12 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 0.594
13 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 0.429
14 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 0.564
15 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 0.587
16 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0.520
Delta 90 8 2 58 2 6 8 2 4 4 30 4 6
(x 10 -3)
Rank 2 3 4
2 10
4
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C. Validation and Verification of Results
This section briefly discusses the steps taken to validate the performance of the MSCSurv rM
software tool and to verify the correctness of the model's input assumptions and output for accurate
results.
Verification of a software tool generally requires proving that the tool performs all of its func-
tions as designed. These functions include generating correct distributions for input variables, reading
input files, writing output files, and assuring that the program operates in the proper sequence. In this
case, most of the software verification occurred during the writing and debugging of the MSCSurv TM
program. Many of the verification exercises undertaken are still present within the MSCSurv TM
program as "comment" statements (FORTRAN statements preceded by a "C"), as shown in
appendix A. The verification exercises generally included adding write statements (to the screen and to
a printer) that designated when input, output, and "handoff" functions were performed by MSCSurv TM,
and (by their absence) when these functions did not occur. Through running MSCSurv TM with low
numbers of repetitions (under 100 or so), sufficient data were generated and sent to the printer.
Although time consuming, these data were examined at length and eventually served to verify that the
computer program was functioning as designed.
An important verification exercise included ensuring that the output of MSCSurv TM reached
convergence. As a rule, Monte Carlo analysis results can be considered "well-behaved" if the results
are within 1IN 1/2 of the mean, where N is the number of total runs (or in this case, the total number of
penetrations into the manned module cluster). MSCSurv rM results for overall Ploss/pen using 10,000
penetrations never varied more than 0.01 in value from the mean result (1/10,0001/2). In a similar
fashion, Ploss/pen values derived from 100,000 penetrations varied less than 0.003 in relative difference
from one another. As such, this program can be considered to reach satisfactory convergence for any
total (six module) Ploss/pen value derived from 10,000 total penetrations or more. However, in order to
assure accuracy in the "unzipping," "injury," and "depressurization" suballocations, all Ploss/pen
values reported were derived from runs using 100,000 penetrations or more unless otherwise noted.
Validation of the accuracy of the model output is a more difficult task. As stated earlier, all of the
input assumptions have associated uncertainties. The most important assumptions to the final value of
Ploss/pen appear to be the hole size model, crack size model, and depth of penetration model selected.
Sensitivity analyses (in the previous section) using alternative assumptions were designed to bound
the accuracy of the final results. These analyses showed that the absolute value of Ploss/pen could vary
significantly depending on input assumptions used. True validation of the value of Ploss/pen cannot be
accomplished until the "correctness" of these input assumptions are established. In most cases, this
requires additional test data to be generated (this is discussed in section VI).
Many of the verification exercises for MSCSurv _ also served to validate that the MSCSurv rM
outputs were accurate (that is, as accurate as possible, given the uncertainty in input variables). Many
of these validation exercises are also still included in the MSCSurv rM program as "comment"
statements, and include:
(1) Writing the debris diameter, velocity, and obliquity after their generation, comparing these
distributions to the original environment for correctness
i_•!':•__!ii_
(2) Writing the combinations of debris diameters, obliquities, and velocities (dov) that
penetrate the shields, comparing them to the ballistic limit curve for accuracy
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(3) Writing out the hole and crack sizes following a penetration along with the corresponding
dov input combinations, comparing them with the oblique (or Burch) hole size models and
crack models for accuracy
(4) Writing out the module and element numbers impacted by each simulated debris strike,
comparing this distribution to other locations on comparable modules that should receive
equal numbers of hits
(5) Writing out the location of the injured crewman following a penetration to assure that this
distribution is consistent with the input distribution
(6) Writing out the hour of the debris strike, assuring that this distribution was uniform and
accurate in comparison to crew location following penetration
(7) Writing out the penetration depth with input dov combinations to assure consistency with
penetration depth equation
(8) Writing out the depressurization time corresponding with each hole size, assuring con-
sistency with the isentropic blowdown equation.
Of course, the most convincing validation of program accuracy is from comparable sources of
information. In this case, two resources existed that could independently produce part of the same
information that MSCSurv TM produces, and their outputs were compared to MSCSurv TM to assure
MSCSurv TM accuracy. The BUMPER TM program was used to generate a finite element model similar
in geometry to the MSCSurv TM model, and the exposed area and PNP outputs for each of the eight
modules produced by both models were compared. Table 19 compares the similarities in output data
from each of these completely independent sources.
With the exception of the JEM, MSCSurv TM appears to slightly underpredict the PNP of each
module in comparison to the BUMPER TM results. This is compatible with the slightly larger exposed
area prediction by MSCSurv TM (recall that larger exposed areas lead directly to lower PNP's due to
the corresponding increase in the number of orbital debris impacts). Comparison of the MSCSurv TM
model geometry in figure 10 with the BUMPER TM model geometry in figure 6 yields several insights
into the slight differences in output between the two models. Note that the number of exterior elements
are far fewer within the MSCSurv TM geometry model for any particular manned module; that is, the
element sizes are much larger in the MSCSurv TM modules than in the BUMPER TM modules.
BUMPER TM runs using otherwise identical input models with differing element sizes indicate that
models with larger element sizes consistently show a measurable increase in exposed area and lower
PNP when compared to models with smaller element sizes. 13 If this element size is an important factor
within the BUMPER TM model, it is reasonable to assume that it may account for at least part of the
slight difference between MSCSurv TM and BUMPER TM results.
In addition to the differences in element size, the MSCSurv TM model differs somewhat in exter-
ior dimensions from the BUMPER TM model. For example, the MSCSurv TM model does not include
conical endcones or inter-module tunnels (called berthing mechanisms); the BUMPER TM Lab module
is 174 inches in diameter versus MSCSurvTM's 168-in diameter. These model differences were
f
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Lab Hab Node 2 Node 1 JEM ESA Plog A/L
21.8 21.8 5.3 5.3 11.8 19.6 27.0 13.5
21.2 21.2 5.2 5.2 14.9 18.3 25.3 9.1
MSCSurv _ PNP 0.9975 0.9975 0.9995 0.9995 0.9987 0.9980 0.9969 0.9984





• SSP30000 Rev A1 Debris Environment
• Constant Debris Density
• Exposure Period--Year 2000
• Attitude--Zero Roll, Pitch, and Yaw
• Altitude--398 km
• Inclination--28.5 °
• Constant Solar Flux--70 Janskys
• Boeing Penetration Equations
• Bumper Material--0.050-in 6061T6 Aluminum
• Back Wall Material--0.125-in 2219T87 Aluminum
• Standoff---4 in (All Elements).
driven by the desire to make all MSCSurv rM modules the same diameter, and therefore simplify the
geometry inputs within MSCSurv rM.
Essentially, examination of the MSCSurv rM and BUMPER _ results gives confidence that
the penetration portion of MSCSurv rM appears to be producing accurate results for the input
geometry selected. Although the PNP portion of MSCSurv ru is not the area of greatest interest here
(Ploss/pen is), it nevertheless indicates that the "exterior" variables of debris dov are being input
correctly into MSCSurvrM's Ploss/pen model. Because these inputs are at the very heart of calculating
the magnitude of the hole size, crack size, and interior penetration (and as such, the crew loss





One additional source was used to directly validate MSCSurv ru Ploss/pen results. Recall from
section II that SSEIC was tasked in May 1992 by the Level 2 Space Station Program Office to initi-
ate a similar study on the probability of crew or station loss following penetration of S.S. Freedom
critical elements, including the module cluster. The information in this report (initiated in September
1991) was developed roughly in parallel to the broader SSEIC study, and served as an independent
check on the accuracy of the SSEIC results concerning Ploss/pen of the manned module cluster.
Because the SSEIC program (CREW) models only depressurization and injury losses, unzipping
losses had to be computed separately for the SSEIC results and added in after each model. At the
suggestion of the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office, input conditions of crew
escape time, depressurization limit, and hole size distribution identical to those developed within
this study were eventually baselined within the SSEIC model, and results were compared for
accuracy. Despite the differences in construction, results from the two models were similar. At last
comparison, the MSCSurv TM model was computing approximately 5 percent higher probability of
crew loss for each module than the SSEIC model at the 7-in critical crack length, mostly due to
increased crew injury (9 percent versus approximately 4 percent). Part of the difference in results
may lie in the SSEIC model's inclusion of a rescue algorithm within their baselined model;
MSCSurv TM currently assumes (as a baseline) that all injured crew are lost. Other basic model
differences are detailed in section II.C (S.S. Freedom Orbital Debris Survivability).
To summarize, a considerable effort was undertaken within this study to validate the values
obtained for the probability of (one or more) crew loss following an orbital debris penetration and to
verify the software model that produced them. However, the real value of this type of analysis is not
necessarily the absolute value of the Ploss/pen achieved, but the identification of operational and
design variables that measurably reduce this value. Regardless of the absolute value of Ploss/pen, an
ability to measure the relative decrease in the Ploss/pen value associated with individual improve-
ments in spacecraft design and crew operations allows managers to pursue those safety improve-
ments that offer highest reduction in Ploss/pen for available resources. Only when trading against such
parameters as reduced shielding (and PNP) to avoid exceeding a targeted overall probability of crew
loss does the absolute accuracy of Ploss/pen become critically important.
D. Summary of Design and Operational Alternatives
As stated in the previous section, one of the real values in performing a quantitative analysis
of the probability of (one or more) crew loss following a spacecraft orbital debris penetration
(Ploss/pen) is the opportunity to identify the relative importance of alternative design and operational
factors in reducing overall probability of crew loss. This allows managers to pursue those safety
improvements that offer highest reduction in Ploss/pen for available resources.
Eight design and operational alternatives listed in tables 14 through 16 were shown to mea-
surably increase the safety of astronaut crew members from the hazardous effects of orbital debris
penetration. Each of these alternatives is listed in table 20, along with a brief discussion of its
advantages and possible difficulties in application.
Increasing the critical crack length within the spacecraft pressure wall prior to initiating
unstopped crack propagation (unzipping) was found to be the single most important parameter in
decreasing Ploss/pen from the baseline configuration and assumptions. Raising the critical crack length
within a module pressure wall from 7 to 12 in was shown to decrease the probability of crew loss
following a penetration from an average of 0.76 to 0.62 for a six module cluster; raising the critical
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Table 20. Summaryof designandoperationalalternativesreducing
Ploss/pen of manned modules by orbital debris.
Alternative
Increase Critical Crack Length
in Pressure Wall From 7-in
Baselined Critical Length
Increase Internal Areal
Density in Areas Vulnerable
to Debris Penetration
Crew Sleeps in Module Least
Likely To Be Penetrated
Lower Critical Limit of Crew
Tolerance to Depressurization




Reduce Crew Reaction Time to
Penetration and
Depressurization
Reduce Crew Movement Time
to Hatches (add Rate-Based
Movement Assumption)
Crew Sleeps Near Egress
Location
Advantages
Decreases Ploss/r_n from 0.76
to 0.58 for Increase from 7- to
24-in Critical Crack Length by
Lowering Probability of
Unzipping
Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58
to 0.48 for 24-in Critical
Length by Lowering
Probability of Injury
Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58
to 0.57 for 24-in Critical
Length by Lowering
Probability of Injury
Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58




Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58




Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58




Decreases Ploss/pen from 0.58




No Measurable Decrease in
Ploss/pen
Implementation
Increase Wall Thickness from
0.125 to 0.188 in for 12-in
Critical Length or Add Integral
Wall Stiffeners
Place Internal Equipment or
Additional Spallation Blankets
Along Interior Pressure Walls
Crew Sleeps in Node 1 or
Node 2, Since Both Minimize
Crew Exposure to Debris
Penetration
Add Portable Oxygen System;
Keep Near Crew Members,
Especially During Sleep Period
Close Hatches During Crew
Sleep Period; Assure Crew
Has Egress Plan in Case of
Module Penetration
Train Crew to Egress Work
and Sleep Stations Rapidly;
Install Alarm System for
Penetrations
Train Crew to Move Rapidly in
Zero Gravity, (in KC-135?)
Against Simulated Air Flow
Crew Sleeps Near Hatch;
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crack length to 24 in was shown to almost eliminate the unzipping hazard, lowering the Ploss/pen tO
0.58 from the baselined 0.76 value. A SSEIC study released in March 199353 reported that the 7-in
critical crack length within a 0.125-in 2219T87 aluminum pressure wall could be raised to 12 in by
thickening the pressure wall to 0.188 in. These reported levels require additional testing on the
nature of impact-generated dynamic crack growth in pressurized aluminum skins to increase confi-
dence in their absolute values. However, increasing pressure wall thickness is certainly a "good
investment" in quantitatively increasing crew safety from the explosive decompression hazard that
accompanies penetration-induced rupture of the spacecraft wall. "Unzipping" is the most costly form
of penetration-related hazard to the spacecraft and crew, usually causing loss of the entire space-
craft and crew due to explosive decompression. Therefore, investment in design solutions that
increase the critical crack length should result in a larger "expected value" cost savings (cost of a
penetration hazard times reduction in probable occurrence) to the program over its life than any of
the other hazard-mitigating features discussed here.
Adding internal equipment to those areas where debris is most likely to penetrate (such as
the "sides" of the laboratory module) was found to be the second most important of the "control-
lable" design factors in decreasing Ploss/pen. This factor directly decreased the probability of crew
injury losses due to fragments, and probably also decreases other secondary hazards to the crew
such as light flash, pressure pulse, and temperature rise (although these factors were not explicitly
examined within this study). Any increase in the resistance to "incoming" debris fragments would
serve to decrease this crew hazard. As such, this design solution could be implemented by moving
equipment racks to the "sides" of the modules facing the debris threat, or by adding internal
blankets that reduce the spallation hazard on-orbit to increase crew safety. This type of design
solution would probably be easier to implement than increasing external shielding to prevent orbital
debris penetration. Similarly, sleeping in Node 2 would provide increased injury protection to the
crew during their sleeping period (since the nodes are one of the least likely locations for pene-
tration).
The remaining six identified alternatives describe operational factors that were shown to
reduce the probability of crew loss due to slow depressurization (resulting from smaller penetration-
induced holes). Two of these factors involved crew operations during the crew's sleep period, when
the crew's reaction time to a depressurizing module was most affected. Closing the hatches during
the sleep period appears to increase crew safety from depressurizations that may occur in other
modules if they are penetrated. However, this solution would likely be less attractive if the
MSCSurv _ program included probable "long-term" losses associated with crew being unable to
escape a module if separated from the rest of the station by a vacuum. No significant advantage was
shown for the crew to sleep near the escape hatch, although it may prove marginally effective when
combined with a faster reaction or movement time.
A decrease in the baseiined crew reaction time (time required to discover, locate, and initiate
escape from a penetrated module) provides a measurable reduction in crew loss due to decompres-
sion. This might be brought about by training the crew to egress their workstations, exercise
stations, sleeping restraints, etc., in a faster fashion. The reaction time could also be decreased
through implementing an effective impact-detection and leak-location and warning system aboard
the spacecraft. A faster (position-based) crew movement to the hatches to escape or to close off the





One of the most effective methods in reducing the probability of crew loss due to depressur-
ization following a penetration was to extend the depressurization limit of the crew members from
7.5 lb/in 2 down to 3.0 lb/in 2, primarily by the crew donning oxygen masks immediately following a
penetration. However, several important factors must be considered prior to realizing this possible
increase in crew safety. The system must be completely portable; it must be within reach at all
times; the existing oxygen mask/bottle combination must be capable of functioning at this low pres-
sure level. Perhaps a realistic compromise would be a system that hangs near the crew member
during his/her sleep period for easy access during this critical period, with additional systems stored
in easily accessible locations throughout the modules.
To underline the points made above, these eight "controllable" design and operational alter-
natives were combined together in two analyses to determine the "minimum" Ploss/pen possible if all
eight factors are adopted. In this case, the critical crack length was increased to 12 and 24 in by
increasing the rear wall thickness to 0.188 and 0.250 in, respectively. The results of these analyses
appear in tables 21 and 22. Note that the Ploss/pen has fallen from 0.76 to 0.46 for the 12-in critical
crack length; injury losses due to fragments and slow depressurization have fallen to almost zero.
Table 21. "Improved" probability of crew loss (one or more) given a penetration,
Ploss/pen, for six modules, 12-in critical crack length.
Module 1 (U.S. Lab)
Module 2 (U.S. Hab)
Module 3 (JEM)
Module 4 (ESA)
Module 5 (Node 2)
Module 6 (Node 1)
Module 7 (P-Log)
Module 8 (Airlock)










































"Improved" Controllable Design and Operational Assumptions Employed:
• 12-in Critical Crack Length (0.188-in Rear Wall)
• Internal Equipment (0.7 g/cm 2) Along Inner Pressure Wall
• 3.0 lb/in 2 Critical Depressurization Limit
• Crew Sleeps in Node 2
• Close Hatches During Crew Sleep Period
• Fast Crew Reaction,Time
• Fast (Rate-Based) Crew Movement Assumption
• Crew Sleeps Near Egress Location
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Table 22. "Improved" probability of crew loss(one or more)given a penetration,
Ploss/pen, for six modules, 24-in critical crack length.
Module 1 (U.S. Lab)
Module 2 (U.S. Hab)
Module 3 (JEM)
Module 4 (ESA)
Module 5 (Node 2)
Module 6 (Node 1)
Module 7 (P-Log)
Module 8 (Airlock)










































"Improved" Controllable Design and Operational Assumptions Employed:
• 24-in Critical Crack Length (0.250-in Rear Wall)
• Internal Equipment (0.7 g/cm 2) Along Inner Pressure Wall
• 3.0 lb/in2 Critical Depressurization Limit
• Crew Sleeps in Node 2
• Close Hatches During Crew Sleep Period
• Fast Crew Reaction Time
• Fast (Rate-Based) Crew Movement Assumption
• Crew Sleeps Near Egress Location
Table 22 shows that the Ploss/pen for a 24-in critical length with "improved" controllable design and
operational alternatives has fallen from 0.76 to 0.06. Note that most of these losses occur in nodes 1
and 2, where the crew sleeps. Recall that this analysis includes only three of the seven identified
modes of crew loss (table 4); however, this large drop in expected Ploss/pen highlights the magnitude
of benefit possible from employing improved design and operational alternatives in lowering the like-
lihood of crew loss due to orbital debris penetration in manned spacecraft.
_i •
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
The following objectives were established in section I and met within the body of this report:
(1) Conducted research into methods for estimating quantitative risk that were applicable to




(2) Identified penetration-induced failure modes that induce spacecraft or crew loss and
those internal design and/or operational factors that most affect these failure modes
(section III).
(3) Summarized baseline assumptions from above studies, and developed a detailed proba-
bilistic model and simulation tool (MSCSurv _) for computing loss of crew from three
"significant" orbital debris penetration failure modes considering eight alternative
operational/design variables and twelve alternative hazard input variables (section IV).
(4) Performed baseline research and sensitivity studies on probability of crew loss from
orbital debris penetration for spacecraft manned modules (sections V.A and V.B).
Performed validation and verification of developed simulation tool (section V.C). Identi-
fied operational modes and design alternatives that increase crew safety, and possible
roadblocks to their implementation (section V.D).
This report shows that it is possible to quantify the probability of the loss of one or more crew
members from orbital debris penetration into manned spacecraft. This is due primarily to the unique
nature of the orbital debris threat, which has been shown through NASA studies to possess pre-
dictable probability density functions (PDF's) for debris velocity, direction, and mass. Through a
Monte Carlo simulation, these orbital debris PDF's can be Coupled with knowledge of the hazard
levels generated following hypervelocity orbital debris impact and hazard thresholds associated with
crew loss to derive the expected probability of crew loss following a spacecraft penetration, Ploss/pen.
Section V shows that the absolute Ploss/pen value is highly dependent on the magnitude of the
hazard levels (hole sizes, crack sizes, penetration depth, etc.) associated with the impact process. It
is also quite sensitive to the hazard levels assumed to result in crew loss (fragment energy, crew
depressurization levels, etc.). Tables 14 through 16 describe some of these Ploss/pen sensitivities.
A measurable relative increase in crew safety (decrease in the Ploss/pen) can be achieved
through modifying selected spacecraft design factors and/or crew operations. Comparison of table 13
to table 20 shows that adoption of eight design and operational alternatives can cut the Ploss/pen for
the baselined six module spacecraft cluster almost in half (from 0.76 to 0.46). Adoption of a pressure
wall even more resistant to critical cracking (24-in critical crack length) could reduce this even fur-
ther (table 22).
The clearest benefit in calculating the probability of crew loss from orbital debris penetrations
is an ability to identify highly effective design and operational safety improvements. Quantifying the
relative decrease in Ploss/pen associated with a variety of design/operational alternatives allows the
system engineer to identify and "rank" those alternatives that most measurably reduce the proba-
bility of crew loss. With this information, managers may pursue those safety improvements that offer
highest reduction in Ploss/pen for available resources. Table 19 shows the relative decrease in Ploss/pen
possible from each of eight individual design factors. These results indicate that increasing the criti-
cal crack resistance in the spacecraft pressure wall, the protective capability of the internal equip-
ment, and crew access to oxygen following penetration are most effective in reducing the probability
of crew loss from orbital debris penetration. These solutions are even more effective when combined
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B. Recommendations for Future Work
This study must be expanded in order to completely quantify the probability of crew loss (one
or more) given a spacecraft penetration by orbital debris. As detailed in section III, the Ploss/pen
reported herein was limited to only three manned module failure modes--explosive decompression
due to critical crack propagation ("unzipping"), crew injury due to interior fragments, and "slow"
depressurization. Although these three failure modes are considered by this researcher to be the
largest contributors leading to crew loss following manned spacecraft penetration by orbital debris,
other failure modes leading to crew or spacecraft loss are listed in table 5. These failure modes could
be added to the MSCSurv TM code developed herein, or added through separate analysis, as required.
Briefly, these failure modes include:
(A) Crew Loss from External Atmospheric Outgassing. In this failure mode, the thrust from
air loss through the module pressure wall causes the spacecraft to tumble out of control.
Additional data required here is the control authority of the spacecraft (i.e., the moment-
resisting capability of spacecraft thrusters, gyroscopes, etc.), the mass and center of
gravity of the spacecraft, the location of the strike, the size of the hole, and the volume
of air behind the hole prior to the initiation of module depressurization. Because
MSCSurv TM already calculates the location of the hole and size of the strike, it should
be fairly easy to add a control moment "threshold" and a calculation subroutine to check
if individual penetrations (wherever they occur on the spacecraft) exceed this threshold.
If so, a crew/station loss could be registered.
(B) Crew Loss from Overpressure, Temperature, or Flash. In these failure modes (generally
referred to as "secondary" or "atmospheric" hazards), part of the energy of the debris
cloud impinging into the spacecraft cabin atmosphere causes damaging waves of heat,
light, and pressure to travel through it, injuring crew members if the magnitude exceeds
established limits of human endurance. Unfortunately, the relative amount of penetration
energy that is transformed into each of these damage mechanisms is still unknown,
although it is reasonable to assume that their magnitude is somehow related to the total
amount of penetration energy entering the module. As such, the magnitude of the
atmospheric hazard energy should be able to be related to the familiar impact energy
parameters of debris mass dov. It is also almost assuredly related to the target
parameters of shield type and amount and type of equipment behind the shield. Since
MSCSurv TM already generates and contains inputs for all of these parameters, all that
appears lacking for inclusion of this failure mode is a relationship between impact energy
and its resulting atmospheric hazard magnitudes, considering each target type. It seems
clear that these failure modes will require extensive test data prior to their inclusion.
(c) Crew Loss from Internal Equipment Failure. Internal equipment racks could contain
hazardous materials, utility lines, or other equipment whose failures could cause loss of
station or crew if penetrated. A clearer definition of the design of internal equipment
would allow expansion of MSCSurv TM to include an additional possibility of crew loss to
occur following a penetration in these areas.
ii• • / :/
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In addition to expandingthe typesof failure modes considered within this analysis, a number
of simplifying assumptions used to develop the Ploss/pen values for the three failure modes included
herein require additional verification or expansion to increase the accuracy and confidence in their
results. Some of the more important areas include:
(1) Development of independent models for hole size and crack length created within pres-
sure wall following hypervelocity penetration. The baselined model for crack size con-
tained herein is dependent on hole size; the hole size model in itself remains preliminary
and empirical in nature. While some relationship may exist between hole size and crack
size, both of these output parameters require a better understanding of their dynamic
formation under a variety of test conditions.
(2) Verification of internal penetration model and spacecraft geometry. This study assumed
that the depth of internal spacecraft penetration could be related to the average internal
areal density of interior spacecraft equipment. Other qualities of the interior equipment
(geometry, material strength, shock impedance, etc.) will almost certainly affect both the
depth of penetration and the amount of energy that remains in the debris cloud upon exit.
Both a more sophisticated penetration model and a more defined spacecraft interior
equipment layout are required to enhance our confidence in the existing results for overall
Ploss/pen.
(3) The crew's capability to rescue stricken comrades could significantly lower the probabil-
ity of crew loss due to depressurization or injury. However, this advantage would be off-
set somewhat by the possibility of additional crew loss. In either case, additional data on
the speed of crew reaction and movement while healthy, hindered, or injured in a zero
gravity environment is definitely required.
(4) The effect of advanced shielding should be examined to see if "heavier" shields, when
penetrated, cause more interior damage (and thus a higher Ploss/pen value) than the base-
lined shields. This factor was not included in the study, and must be added if we desire to
examine the tradeoffs in the cost of external shielding versus the "savings" in expected
internal penetration costs resulting from their use.
Finally, although MSCSurv rM addresses the probability of losing one or more crew members
given an orbital debris penetration, MSCSurv rM could be modified slightly to also compute the
average number of crew members lost following a penetration. Although current NASA philosophy
makes no distinction between losing one crew member versus losing more than one crew member,
this information could be valuable if two competing designs produced the same Ploss/pen.
C. Example Using Ploss/pen to Minimize System Costs
In concluding this study, it seems reasonable to include an example illustrating how informa-
tion on the Ploss/pen might be used to minimize the overall system costs associated with meeting
established orbital debris safety requirements. In this example, the manufacturer of a laboratory
module similar in baseline design to module 1 wishes to meet an improved probability of no crew
loss (PNCL) of 0.9995 per year. The current module design (with its 0.125-in pressure wall) main-
tains a 0.9975 PNP, or a 0.0025 probability of penetration per year. Using the results of the baseline
analysis presented here for the manned module cluster (where Ploss/pen = 0.76), the manufacturer
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discoversthat his existing designalreadyoffers a 0.0019Ploss, or a 0.9981 PNCL. Because this value
is far short of the desired safety level of 0.9995 per year, the manufacturer decides that he must up-
grade the meteoroid/debris protection system.
Alternative 1 is to switch out the external bumper for one that offers a 0.99935 PNP. The cost
for this system is $5 million in development costs and 1,800 lb ($18 million in launch costs), for a
subtotal of $23 million. The manufacturer makes the preliminary assumption that the new shield
offers the same Ploss/pen as the baseline shield (0.76). Alternative 1 then offers a P1oss of 0.00049, or a
PNCL of 0.99951, exceeding the stated PNCL requirements.
In alternative 2, by spending an additional $5 million for development and 1,200 lb of weight
(equivalent to $12 million in launch costs at $10,000 per lb), the manufacturer could install a lighter,
redesigned bumper and a 0.188-in rear wall and increase his probability of no penetration to 0.99890.
Using the study results shown in table 15 for the baseline assumptions and a 12-in critical crack
length, the manufacturer computes that the Ploss/pen for alternative 2 is 0.62, and offers a PNCL of
0.99932 for a subtotal of $17 million. Alternative 2 appears to fall short of the stated PNCL require-
ment of 0.9995 per year.
However, if the manufacturer moves several equipment racks to positions that prevent debris
penetration into the aisles, adds oxygen bottles, initiates training of the crew to decrease reaction
time, etc., he can reduce the Ploss/pen of alternative 2 to 0.47 (as shown in table 20). Alternative 2a
would then offer a Ploss of { 1-[(1-0.9989)x(0.47)] } = 0.9995, just reaching the PNCL requirement.
However, alternative 2a would cost an additional $5 million to implement over alternative 2, for a
total of $22 million in "implementation" costs, $1 million less than option 1.
This cost/benefit analysis would indicate option 2a to be the most cost effective solution to
meeting the stated safety requirements, despite the higher cost of equipment relocation and crew
training in option 2a. However, the manufacturer chooses to run one additional tradeoff to include the
expected cost of a penetration for both option 1 and option 2a. Through intensive analysis, the manu-
facturer has determined that any penetration will cause repair costs of $10 million. Penetrations
causing a crew injury will result in at least $100 million in costs to repair the module and to bring the
crewmember home for emergency medical treatment. However, those penetrations causing unzipping
of the module wall will result in loss of the utility of the entire module, at least $10 billion (this figure
also includes the cost of bringing surviving crewmembers back to Earth).
Multiplying the probability of the different types of penetration effects by their expected ratios
of occurrence leads to an expected overall penetration cost of $4.6046 million for alternative 1 and
$4.8026 million for alternative 2a. This is primarily due to the slightly higher overall probability of
unzipping for alternative 2a (despite the fact that alternative 2a has a lower probability of unzipping
following a penetration, offset due to its larger probability of penetration). However, table 23 shows
that the total costs including both expected penetration costs and implementation costs is still
$800,000 lower for alternative 2a than for alternative 1. Given this information, alternative 2a should
be pursued by the manufacturer.
Of course, this analysis neglects a number of indirect and/or incalculable costs that are also
associated with meteoroid and orbital debris penetrations. For example, recall that the overall prob-
ability of unzipping was slightly higher for the alternative 2a than for alternative 1. Not reflected in
the cost analysis is the fact that more crew members can be expected to be lost (on average) during
unzipping failures. Given this, alternative2a can be expected to produce a slightly higher number of
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crew memberslost (on average)for a penetrationthanalternative1. Although NASA doesnot
apparentlydifferentiatebetweenonecrew lossandmore thanonecrew loss, information on the dif-
ferencein averageexpectednumbersof crew lost betweencompetingdesignsthat are otherwiseso
evenly matchedmight bea decidingfactor to programsafetyengineers.Also neglectedhereis the
incalculablecost to an organizationassociatedwith hardwarefailure and loss (or near loss)of a
crew member.Given that alternative2ahasa 40-percenthigherprobability of a penetration,this
might beviewed by someas a 40-percenthigherprobability of "bad press,"thus renderingthe
slightly more expensiveoption 1 asthemorepalatablechoice.
This study highlights the fundamentalutility of quantitativerisk assessment:to pinpoint
thoseareasof a system's designthat drive its overall safety, andto offer solutions that may
increasesystemsafety while lowering its cost. It is likely that future spacecraftdesignerswill
increasinglyrequire the flexibility in designsolutionsofferedby quantitativerisk assessmentif the
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NUMPEN(8,100), NCRIT(8), NUMINJ(8,100), PROBMOD(8,37)
NSTATION(8,100), NSHLDTYP(8,100)
NPENIN(8), NPENAT(8), NPENOUT(8), AREALDEN(8,100)
NPENNOCR(8), NUMHOLEI(8), NUMHOLE2(8)
NUMHOLE4(8), NUMHOLE5(8), NUMHOLE6(8), NUMPENS(8)




NUMHO7(8), NUMHO8(8), NUMHO9(8), NUMHO10(8)
NUMHO11(8), NUMHO12(8), NUMHO20(8)
NUMHOLE3(8), VELPART(37), DIAPART(ll0), NUMIMPS(8)
NPEN1CRW(8), NPEN2CRW(8), NPEN3CRW(8), NPEN4CRW(8)
NUMODULE(24,4), NCREWSTA(4), ESCTIME(4), NINJCRIT(8)
CRITTIME(4), NUMCRIT(8,100), NINJ(8), VOLAVAIL(8)
NPENCRIT(8), NPENCRAC(8), NPENINJ(8), PHOUR(24)
RATTOT(8), RATDEP(8), RATINJ(8), RATCRAC(8)
C PROBDIA = CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF DIAMETER (CM) HITTING STATION (.3 TO 3 CM)
C PROBVEL = CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF VELOCITY (K/S) OF IMPACT (2 TO 14.5 K/S)
C VELPART = ANGLE (1 THROUGH 37) THAT PARTICLE IS COMING FROM
C PROBMOD = CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF MODULE X BEING IMPACTED GIVEN ANGLE Y
C ANGELEM = ANGLE OF IMPACT FOR GIVEN (MODULE, ELEMENT, ANGLE)
C PROBELEM = CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF ELEMENT X BEING IMPACTED
C GIVEN (MODULE, ANGLE)
C PROBSTA = CUMULATVE PROBABILITY THAT CREWMAN IS AT STATION X IN MODULE Y
C NSTATION = CREW "STATION NUMBER" (1 - 12) WITHIN MODULE X FOR ELEMENT Y
C NSHLDTYP = TYPE OF SHIELD FOR MODULE X AND ELEMENT Y
C AREALDEN = AREAL DENSITY OF RACK MATERIAL BEHIND MODULE X AND ELEMENT Y
C NUMPEN = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS AT MODULE X AND ELEMENT Y
C NUMINJ = NUMBER OF INJURY LOSSES OCCURRING DUE TO PENETRATION
C "AT" MODULE I AND STATION J
C NUMCRIT = NUMBER OF DEPRESS LOSSES OCCURRING DUE TO PENETRATION OF MODULE I
C AND STATION J
C NUMPENS = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS IN MODULE I
C NCRIT = NUMBER OF CRITICAL DEPRESS LOSSES OCURRING IN MODULE I
C NINJ = NUMBER OF INJURIES OCCURRING IN MODULE I
C NPENIN = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS FOR MODULE X WHERE PENETRATION WAS NEAR
HATCH
C NPENAT = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS FOR MODULE X WHERE PENETRATION WAS NEAR
CREW
C NPENOUT = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS FOR MODULE X WHERE CREW WAS NEARER
HATCH
C NPENNOCR = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS OCCURRING IN MODULE WITH NO CREW
C NUMHOLE1 = NUMBER OF HOLES IN MODULE I 0 TO 1 INCHES IN DIAMETER
P_8_glK_g_i; _f_
79
















































OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
OF HOLES IN MODULE I
1 TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER
2 TO 3 INCHES IN DIAMETER
3 TO 4 INCHES IN DIAMETER
4 TO 5 INCHES IN DIAMETER
5 TO 6 INCHES IN DIAMETER
6 TO 7 INCHES IN DIAMETER
7 TO 8 INCHES IN DIAMETER
OF HOLES IN MODULE I 8 TO 9 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE I 0 TO 1 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE I 1 TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE 1 2 TO 3 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE 1 3 TO 4 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE 1 4 TO 5 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE 1 5 TO 6 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE I 6 TO 7 INCHES IN DIAMETER
CRACKS IN MODULE I 7 TO 8 INCHES IN DIAMETER
NUMHO9 = NUMBER OF CRACKS IN MODULE I 8 TO 9 INCHES IN DIAMETER
NUMIMPS = NUMBER OF IMPACTS FOR MODULE I
NUMODULE = MODULE THAT CREWMAN J IS IN DURING HOUR I
PHOUR = PROBABILITY THAT DEBRIS HITS DURING HOUR I
NCREWSTA = STATION THAT CREWMAN I IS AT
ESCTIME = REQUIRED ESCAPE TIME FOR CREWMAN I FROM MODULE HE IS IN
CRITTIME = TIME ALLOWABLE BEFORE LOSS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
VOLAVAIL = VOLUME AVAILABLE TO CREW IN MODULE I
C NPENCRAC = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS IN MODULE I WHERE ENERGY EXCEEDS
CRITICAL





















NPENINJ = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WHERE ONE OR MORE INJURIES OCCUR
NINJCRIT = NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WHERE ONE OR MORE INJURIES OR DEPRESSES
OCCUR
RATCRAC = RATIO OF CRITICAL CRACKS WITHIN MODULE TO TOTAL PENETRATIONS
RATINJ = RATIO OF CRITICAL INJURIES WITHIN MODULE TO TOTAL PENETRATIONS
RATDEP = RATIO OF CRITCAL DEPRESSURIZATIONS WITHIN MODULE TO PENETRATIONS
RATI_OT = RATIO OF TOTAL CRITICAL LOSSES WITHIN MODULE TO PENETRATIONS
SET INTEGER VALUES
INTEGER SEEDVAL, ANGLE, ELEMENT
REAL INJTIME
REAL INJRATE
OPEN DATA FILE VELSTA.DAT
WRITE (*,*) 'READING IN VELSTA.DAT
6 OPEN (21, FILE='VELSTA.DAT')
READ DATA FROM VELSTA.DAT
7 DO10I=1,37




. _! (: i_ _



















OPEN DATA FILE PROBDIA.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN PROBDIA.DAT'
11 OPEN (22, FILE='PROBDIA.DAT' )
READ DATA FROM PROBDIA.DAT
12 D020I= 1, 110
13 READ (22, '( 2F9.4)' ) PROBDIA(I), DIAPART(I)
20 CONTINUE
OPEN DATA FILE LAB.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN LAB.DAT'
21 OPEN (23, FILE='LAB.DAT' )
READ DATA FROM LAB.DAT
22 DO40J= 1, 37
23 DO 30I=1,100





C OPEN DATA FILE HAB.DAT
C
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN HAB.DAT'
41 OPEN (24, FILE='HAB.DAT' )
C
C READ DATA FROM HAB.DAT
C
42 DO 60J= 1, 37
43 DO 50I=1,100












OPEN DATA FILE JLAB.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN JLAB.DAT
61 OPEN (25, FILE='JLAB.DAT )
READ DATA FROM JLAB.DAT
62D0 70 J = 1, 18


















READ IN JLAB ANGLES 19 THROUGH 37








OPEN DATA FILE ESA.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN ESA.DAT
81 OPEN (26, FILE='ESA.DAT )








82 DO 100 J = 1, 37
83 DO 90I=1,100





OPEN DATA FILE NODE2.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN NODE2.DAT
101 OPEN (27, FILE='NODE2.DAT )







DO 120 J = 1, 37
DO 110I= 1,39





C OPEN DATA FILE NODE1.DAT
C
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN NODE1.DAT
C
82
, i_ ' .
_i_:i _i_
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121 OPEN (28, FILE='NODE1.DAT' )
C


























DO 140 J = 1, 37
DO 130 1 = 1, 39





OPEN DATA FIlE PLOG.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN PLOG.DAT'
141 OPEN (29, FILE='PLOG.DAT' )
READ IN DATA FROM PLOG.DAT
142 DO 160 J = 1, 37
143 DO 150I= 1, 72





OPEN DATA FIlE ALOCK.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN ALOCK.DAT'
161 OPEN (30, FILE='ALOCK.DAT )
READ IN DATA FROM ALOCK.DAT
162 DO 180 J = 1, 37
163 DO 170I= 1, 36





OPEN DATA FILE PROBMOD.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN PROBMOD.DAT'
181 OPEN (31, FILE='PROBMOD.DAT )
READ DATA FROM FILE PROBMOD.DAT


























184 READ (31, '( F9.4)' ) PROBMOD(I,J)
185 CONTINUE
186 CONTINUE
OPEN DATA FILE SHIELD.DAT
WRITE(*, *)'READING IN SHIELD.DAT
187 OPEN (32, FILE='SHIELD.DAT' )
READ IN CREW STATION-TO-ELEMENT AND SHIELD TYPE-TO-ELEMENT CORRELATION
188 DO 193 I= 1,530





OPEN DATA FILE POSITION.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN POSITION.DAT
194 OPEN (33, FILE='POSITION.DAT )
READ IN PROBABILITY OF CREW BEING AT THIS STATION
195 DO 198 I = 1, 55
196 READ (33, '( 219, F9.4)' ) NMOD, NSTA, STAPROB
197 PROBSTA(NMOD,NSTA)=STAPROB
198 CONTINUE
OPEN DATA FILE PCREWMOD.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN PCREWMOD.DAT
199 OPEN (34, FILE="PCREWMOD.DAT" )









DO 203 1 = 1, 24







ALL NEEDED VARIABLES TO ZERO
WRITE (*,*) 'INITIALIZING'
WRITE (*,*) "










CALL GE'ITIM (IHR, IMIN, ISEC, I100TH)
SEEDVAL=ISEC



































































SET A NEW SEED FOR ALL RANDOM VARIABLES TO BE DRAWN
211 CALL SEED(SEEDVAL)
DRAW RANDOM NUMBER FOR "ANGLE" AND "VELOCITY"
QUERY FOR CRITICAL VALUES
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT CRITICAL LENGTH OF CRACK OR "0." FOR ENERGY MO
CDEL.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(F10.4)') CRITCRAC
IF (CRITCRAC .NE. 0.) THEN
ENERCRIT=0.
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT HOLE SIZE CRACK MULTIPLIER, 0.3 FOR AVERAGE.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') HMULT
END IF
IF (CRITCRAC .EQ. 0.) THEN
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT CRITICAL IMPACT ENERGY.'
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' NOTE: THIS CRITICAL CRACK RELATION IS MORE APPLICACBLE TO '
WRITE (*,*) ' ADVANCED (B2) SHIELD.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(F14.6)') ENERCRIT
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE "1" FOR TOTAL ENERGY MODEL, "2" FOR OBLIQUE.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(14)') NOB
END IF
213 WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT "1." FOR BASELINE SHIELD OR "2." FOR ADVANCED
CSHIELD.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') SHIELD
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT MINIMUM CREW ESCAPE TIME (SECS) OR "0." FOR RA
CTE-BASED ESCAPE RELATION.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(F10.4)') ET
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT DELAY PRIOR TO INITIATING MOVEMENT IF AWAKE.'
WRITE (*,*) "




WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT DELAY TO WAKE AND EXIT RESTRAINTS IF ASLEEP.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') WAKETIME
IF (ET .NE. 0.) THEN
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' "1" TO MODEL HINDERED/INJURED TIMES; "2" FOR NO.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(I10)') INJHIND
IF (INJHIND .EQ. 1) THEN
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT HINDERED CREW ESCAPE TIME FROM MODULE.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(F10.4)') HINDTIME
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT (CONSCIOUS) INJURED CREW ESCAPE TIME FROM MODU
CLE.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') INJTIME
END IF





IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT UNHINDERED CREW ESCAPE RATE IN FT/SEC.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') GOODRATE
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT HINDERED CREW ESCAPE RATE IN FT/SEC.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') HINDRATE
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT (CONSCIOUS) INJURED CREW ESCAPE RATE IN FT/SEC
C.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') INJRATE
END IF
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT PROBABILITY THAT INJURED PERSON IS IMMEDIATELY
C LOST.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') PROBLOST
IF (PROBLOST .NE. 1.0) THEN
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT PROBABILITY THAT INJURED PERSON, IF SAVED, IS
CLATER LOST.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') PBADINJ
END IF










WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE "1" IF CREW SLEEPS NEAR HATCH, "2" IF NO.'
WRITE (*,*) '
READ (*, '(I10)') ISLEEP
WRITE (*,*) '
WRITE (*,*) ' INCLUDE RACK FACTORS? TYPE 1 FOR YES, 2 FOR NO.'
WRITE (*,*) '
READ (*, '(I10)') IPEN
WRITE (*,*) '
WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE 1 FOR WIDE DEBRIS CLOUD, 2 FOR NARROW.'
WRITE (*,*) '
READ (*, '(I10)') IWIDE
WRITE (*,*) '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT CRITICAL DEPRESSURIZATION LIMIT (PSI).'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(F10.4)') CRITPRES
WRITE (*,*) "
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT PERCENTAGE OF MODULE FREE AIR (0. TO 1.0).'
WRITE (*,*) "




WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE "1" FOR OPEN HATCHES, "2" FOR CLOSED HATCHES,'
WRITE (*,*) ' "3" FOR HATCHES CLOSED AT NIGHT.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(I10)') IVOLUME









WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' NOTE: HATCH CLOSURE TIME IS ASSUMED TO BE 30 SECO
CNDS.'
END IF




























WRITE (*,*) ' NOTE: HATCH OPENING AND CLOSURE TIME IS ASSUMED T
CO BE 60 SECONDS (TOTAL).'
END IF









WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' NOTE: HATCH CLOSURE TIME IS ASSUMED TO BE 30 SECO
CNDS DURING DAY,'
WRITE (*,*) ' AND 60 SECONDS AT NIGHT (OPENING AND CLOSUR
CE).'
END IF
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' INPUT CD, 0.9 OR 0.7. '
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*,' (F10.4)') CD
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) 'TYPE "1" FOR OBLIQUE HOLE MODEL, "2" FOR BURCH.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(I10)') IHSM
WRITE (*,*) ' '
ALTERNATE CREW SLEEP AND INTERNAL MODULE POSITION DISTRIBUTION
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE "1" FOR SSEIC CREW MODEL, "2" IF CREW SLEEPS IN
C NODE 2.'
WRITE (*,*) ' '
READ (*, '(I10)') INODE
IF (INODE .EQ. 2) THEN
OPEN DATA FILE PCREWMO2.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN PCREWMO2.DAT
OPEN (35, FILE="PCREWMO2.DAT" )
READ IN PROBABILITY OF HOUR I AND NUMBER OF CREW IN MODULE J AT HOUR I
DO 703 1 = 1, 24



















WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) 'TYPE "1" FOR UNIFORM CREW DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN MODUL
CE STATIONS, '
WRITE (*,*) ' TYPE "2" FOR TRIANGULAR DISTRIBUTION.'
WRITE (*,*) "
READ (*, '(I10)') ITRI
IF (ITRI .EQ. 2) THEN
OPEN DATA FILE POSIT2.DAT
WRITE(*, *) 'READING IN POSIT2.DAT
OPEN (36, FILE='POSIT2.DAT )
READ IN PROBABILITY OF CREW BEING AT THIS STATION
DO 798I=1,55





WRITE (*,*) ' '
C
C












222 IF (RANVAL .LT. PROBVEL(ANGLE)) GO TO 225
223 ANGLE=ANGLE+ 1
224 GO TO 222
225 VELOCITY=VELPART(ANGLE) -
DRAW RANDOM NUMBER FOR "DIAMETER"
230 CALL RANDOM(RANVAL)
231 NDIA=I
232 IF (RANVAL .LT. PROBDIA(NDIA)) GO TO 235
233 NDIA=NDIA+ 1
234 GO TO 232
235 DIAMETER=DIAPART(NDIA)
NOW COMPARE TO LOWEST BLC IN HIGH VELOCITY REGIME FOR A FIRST SCREEN
240 IF (DIAMETER .LE. 0.55) THEN
IF (VELOCITY .GE. 7.0) THEN
WRITE (*,241) NTRY
90

























IF (NPEN .EQ. NNN) THEN
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,431) NPEN
FORMAT (I10, ' PENETRATIONS')
NNN=NNN+20000
END IF
NOW SELECT "MODULE" TI-!AT IS IMPACTED
250 CALL RANDOM(RANVAL)
251 MODULE=I
252 IF (RANVAL .LT. PROBMOD(MODULE,ANGLE)) GO TO 259
253 MODULE=MODULE+I
254 GO TO 252
259 NUMIMPS(MODULE)=NUMIMPS(MODULE)+ 1
SELECT "ELEMENT" IMPACTED WITHIN MODULE AND "OBLIQITY"
260 CALL RANDOM(RANVAL)
261 ELEMENT=I
262 IF (RANVAL .LT. PROBELEM(MODULE,ELEMENT,ANGLE)) GO TO 265
263 ELEMENT=ELEMENT+ 1
264 GO TO 262
265 OBLIQITY=ANGELEM(MODULE,ELEMENT,ANGLE)











WRITE (*,271) OBLIQITY, MODULE, ELEMENT, ANGLE
FORMAT (' OBLIQUITY = ', F9.4, 18, 18, 18)
C NOW SEE IF THE CHOSEN OBLIQITY, VELOCITY, AND DIAMETER PENETRATE THE MODULE
C




C BOEING INTERPOLATION VALUES FOR VELOCITIES LESS THAN 7.0 KM/SEC
C NOTE: ONLY WORKS WITH 60 DEGREE CUTOFF ASSUMPTION!
C
IF (VELOCITY .EQ. 2.67) THEN























IF (VELOCITY .EQ. 4.00) THEN
IF (OBLIQITY .LE. 45.) THEN
DCRIT=.452+(.563-.452)*((1-COS(OBL))/(1-.7071))
END IF




IF (VELOCITY .EQ. 5.25) THEN
IF (OBLIQITY .LE. 45.) THEN
DCRIT=.491+(.563-.491)*((1-COS(OBL))/(1-.7071))
END IF




IF (VELOCITY .EQ. 6.5) THEN
IF (OBLIQITY .LE. 45.) THEN
DCRIT=.593+(.584-.593)*((1-COS(OBL))/(1-.7071))
END IF




THE ORIGINAL INTERPOLATION EQUATION I USED FOR VELOCITIES < 7 KM/SEC.
DCRIT=0.6729+(.03494*VELOCITY)-.359*COS(OBL)
FOR B2 SHIELDS, THE BALLISTIC LIMIT IS APPROXIMATELY TWICE AS HIGH
DCRIT=DCRIT* SHIELD
CHECK TO SEE IF DIAMETER EXCEEDS DCRIT
272 IF (DIAMETER .LE. DCRIT) THEN
285 NTRY=NTRY+I
C WRITE (*,286) NTRY
C 286 FORMAT (' NO PENETRATION HAS OCCURRED ON DRAW ', 18)













































































THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5






























THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF
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THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF





























THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5






























THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE--HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF

















THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
C
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*+5.56624705 *DIA* * 10.
HOLEMAJ=HOLE/COS (OBL)
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF






















THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF
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* -6.29038429" DIA ** 12.
*-1.11772779*DIA** 13.




THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF






















THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLFdCOS(OBL)
END IF
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THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE EFFECTIVE HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=((HOLE/COS(OBL))*HOLE)**.5
THIS EQUATION CALCULATES THE MAJOR HOLE DIAMETER
HOLE=HOLE/COS(OBL)
END IF
IF THE PENETRATION OCCURS AT THE CUPOLA, THERE IS A 20 INCH HOLE
C
305 IF (MODULE .EQ. 5) THEN







C ALTERNATE HOLE SIZE EQUATION (BURCH)
C




307 HOLE=((.127/DIAMETER)**.25)*((10"668/DIAMETER)**'5)*DIAMETER*_5-___ ,_ t 155
**VELOCITY/5.076-2.53)/2.54
END IF






C IF THE PENETRATION OCCURS AT THE CUPOLA, THERE IS A 20 INCH HOLE
C
C
309 IF (MODULE .EQ. 5) THEN











C IF (HOL .LT. 1.0) THEN
C NUMHOLE 1(MODULE)=NUMHOLE1 (MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C IF (HOL .GE. 1.0) THEN




C IF (HOL .GE. 2.0) THEN




C IF (HOL .GE. 3.0) THEN




C IF (HOL .GE. 4.0) THEN
C IF (HOL .LT. 5.0) THEN
C NUMHOLE5 (MODULE)=NUMHOLE5 (MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF
C IF (HOL .GE. 5.0) THEN














C IF (HOL .GE. 7.0) THEN




C IF (HOL .GE. 8.0) THEN




C IF (HOL .GE. 9.0) THEN
C IF (HOL .LT. 10.) THEN
C NUMHOL 10(MODULE)=NUMHOL 10(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF
C IF (HOL .GE. 10.) THEN
C IF (HOL .LT. 11.) THEN
C NUMHOL 11(MODULE)=NUMHOL 11 (MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF
C IF (HOL .GE. 11.) THEN
C IF (HOL .LT. 12.) THEN
C NUMHOL 12(MODULE)=NUMHOL12(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF







IF ENERGY OR CRACK EXCEEDS CRITICAL LEVEL, COUNT AS NPENCRAC
ENERGY=540.* (DIAMETER** 3.)*(VELOCITY**2.)
IF (NOB .EQ. 2) THEN
ENERGY=COS(OB L)**2. *ENERGY
END IF
IF (ENERCRIT .GT. 0.) THEN
IF (ENERGY .GT. ENERCRIT) THEN
NPENCRAC(MODULE)=NPENCRAC(MODULE)+ 1






C CALCULATE SIZE OF CRACK FOR THIS PENETRATION
C
CRACK=HOLEMAJ*HMULT
















C IF (HO .LT. 1.0) THEN
C NUMHO 1(MODULE)=NUMHO 1(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C IF (HO .GE. 1.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 2.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 3.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 4.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 5.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 6.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 7.0) THEN




C IF (HO .GE. 8.0) THEN









C IF (HO .GE. 9.0) THEN
C IF (HO .LT. 10.) THEN
C NUMHO 10(MODULE)=NUMHO 10(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF
C IF (HO .GE. 10.) THEN
C IF (HO .LT. 11.) THEN
C NUMHO 11(MODULE)=NUMHO 11(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
C END IF
C IF (HO .GE. 11.) THEN
C IF (HO .LT. 12.) THEN
C NUMHO 12(MODULE)=NUMHO 12(MODULE)+ 1
C END IF
END IF











COMPARE CRACK SIZE TO CRITICAL CRACK SIZE
IF (CRITCRAC .GT. 0.) THEN
IF (CRACK .GT. CRITCRAC) THEN
NPENCRAC(MODULE)=NPENCRAC(MODULE)+ 1






C COMPUTE THE DEPTH OF PENETRATION (NUMBER OF .125" EQUIVALENT PLATES)
C
IF (IPEN .EQ. 1) THEN
CHI=(TAN(OBL)-.5)
F1=(0.5-1.87* .05*2.54/DIAMETER)+(5 *.05 *2.54/DIAMETER)*CHI**3.
F2=( 1.7-12* .05 *2.54/DIAMETER)*CHI
F=FI+F2
EFF=2.42*(2.54* .05/DIAMETER)** (-.333)
EFF=EFF+ (4.26" (2.54". 05/D IAMETER)* *. 333 )-4.18
P=(EFF+0.63"F)* (VELOC ITY/5.076)** (- 1.333)
PENDEPTH--P* (2.54 *. 125/D IAMETER)** (-.583)* (11.43/D IAMETER)** ( -.416 )
END IF
C








392 IF (RANVAL .LT. PHOUR(NHOUR)) GO TO 395
393 NHOUR=NHOUR+I
104
394 GO TO 392
C





IF (NHOUR .GE. 17) THEN
WAKETIM=WAKETIME
C
C NODE 2 ALTERNATIVE CREW MODEL
C














IF (NHOUR .LT. 17) THEN































'SLEEP NEAR HATCH' MODEL:
IF (ISLEEP .EQ. 1) THEN
















IF(NMOD .EQ. MODULE) THEN
NH=NSTA+ 1
NL=NSTA-1




THIS SECTION INVOLVES CREW BEYOND THE IMPACT REGION
IF (NL .GT. NSTATION(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
NPENIN(MODULE)=NPENIN(MODULE)+ 1
IF (PENDEPTH .GE. AREALDEN(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(HINDRATE*REAL(NSTA))
END IF




IF(PENDEPTH .LT. AREALDEN(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(GOODRATE*REAL(NSTA))
END IF





IF(NH .LT. NSTATION(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
NPENOUT(MODULE)=NPENOUT(MODULE)+ 1
IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(GOODRATE*REAL(NSTA))
END IF












DO 9882 III = NL, NH
IF(III .EQ. NSTATION(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
NPENAT(MODULE)=NPENAT(MODULE)+ 1
IF(PENDEPTH .GE. AREALDEN(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
CALL RANDOM(RANVAL)






IF(RANVAL .GE. PROBLOST) THEN
CALL RANDOM(RAN)






IF (RAN .GT. PBADINJ) THEN
IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(INJRATE* REAL(NSTA))
END IF






IF(PENDEPTH .LT. AREALDEN(MODULE,ELEMENT)) THEN
IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN /
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(GOODRATE* REAL(NSTA))
END IF








C THIS SECTION CALCULATES CREW ESCAPE TIME IN NON-PENETRATED MODULES
C
IF (NMOD .NE. MODULE) THEN
IF (IVOLUME .EQ. 2) THEN
GO TO 410
END IF
IF (IVOLUME .EQ. 3) THEN










IF (ET .EQ. 0.) THEN
ESCTIME(I)=WAITTIME+WAKETIM+HACHTIME+(GOODRATE*REAL(NSTA))
END IF






C CALCULATE CRITICAL DEPRESSURIZATION LIMIT
C
ELAMB DA= (( (C RITPRE S! 14.7)* *( -. 143)) - 1)* 1_/5.676
407 CRITTIME(I)=ELAMBDA*VOLAVAIL(NMOD)I(CD*HOLE*HOLE*3.14159*.25*23.)
C
C CALCULATE CREW DEPRESSURIZATION LOSSES
C
IF(ESCTIME(I) .GT. CRITrIME(I)) THEN
NUMCRIT(NMOD,NSTA)--NUMCRIT(NMOD,NSTA)+ 1
IF (NMOD .NE. MODULE) THEN
NCRIT(NMOD)=NCRIT(NMOD)+ 1
END IF
IF (NMOD .EQ. MODULE) THEN














IF (NCR .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (NIN .EQ. 0) THEN
GO TO 430
WRITE (*,*) ' NONE '
END IF
END IF
IF (NCR .EQ. 1) THEN
NPENCRIT(MODULE)=NPENCRIT(MODULE)+ 1
NINJCRIT(MODULE)=NINJCRIT(MODULE)+ 1
WRITE (*,*) ' CR'
IF (NIN .EQ. 1) THEN
NPENINJ(MODULE)=NPENINJ(MODULE)+ 1




IF (NCR .EQ. 0) THEN














C WRITE (*, 440) DIAMETER, VELOCITY, OBLIQITY, HOLE, NPEN, MODULE, E
C *LEMENT, ANGLE
C 440 FORMAT (' DIAMETER = ', F7.4,' VELOCITY = ', F7.4, ' OBLIQUITY ='
C *, F7.4, ' HOLE SIZE = ', F7.4, ' FOR PENETRATION NUMBER ', 18,
C * ' MODULE =', I3,' ELEMENT =', I3,' ANGLE =', 13)
C WRITE (*,*) ' '














DO 485 I= 1, 8
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES RATIO FOR TOTAL OF SIX MODULES
C














WRITE (*,*) ' '
C
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*, 466) I, NUMPENS(I)
466 FORMAT (' FOR MODULE ', I8,' PENS = ', I8)
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*, 467) NUMIMPS(I)




WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,468) NINJ(I),NCRIT(I),NPENCRAC(I)
468 FORMAT (' INJURIES = ', I8,' DEPRESS = ', I8,' CRACKS = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,469) NPENINJ(I), NPENCRIT(I)
469 FORMAT (' PENS WITH INJURIES = ', 18, ' PENS WITH DEPRESS = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,1470) NINJCRIT(I)
1470 FORMAT (' PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*) ' '
C 470 WRITE (*, 471) NPENIN(I)
C 471 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS NEARER TO HATCH THAN CREW = ', 18
C *)
C WRITE(*,*) "
C WRITE (*, 472) NPENOUT(I)
C 472 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS FARTHER FROM HATCH THAN CREW = ',
C * I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 473) NPENAT(I)
C 473 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS AT CREW LOCATION = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 474) NPENNOCR(I)
C 474 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WITH NO CREW IN MODULE = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 475) NPEN1CRW(I)
C 475 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WITH ONE CREW IN MODULE = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1475) NPEN2CRW(I)
C1475 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WITH TWO CREW IN MODULE = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1476) NPEN3CRW(I)
C1476 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS WITH 3 CREW IN MODULE = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1477) NPEN4CRW(I)





















476 WRITE (*, 477) NUMHOLEI(I)
477 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 0 TO 1 INCH IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*)
WRITE (*, 478) NUMHOLE2(I)
478 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 1 TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*)
WRITE (*, 479) NUMHOLE3(I)
479 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 2 TO 3 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*)
WRITE (*, 480) NUMHOLE4(I)
480 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 3 TO 4 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*)
WRITE (*, 481) NUMHOLE5(I)
481 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 4 TO 5 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
WRITE (*,*)
WRITE (*, 482) NUMHOLE6(I)
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C WRITE (*, 483) NUMHOLE7(I)
C 483 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 6 TO 7 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 484) NUMHOLE8(I)
C 484 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 7 TO 8 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1484) NUMHOLE9(I)
C1484 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 8 TO 9 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1483) NUMHOL10(I)
C1483 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 9 TO 10 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 2484) NUMHOL1 l(I)
C2484 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 10 TO 11 INCHES IN DIAMETER - ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 3484) NUMHOL12(I)
C3484 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES 11 TO 12 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1485) NUMHOL20(I)
C1485 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF HOLES > 20 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*) '
C 676 WRITE (*, 677) NUMHOI(I)
C 677 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 0 TO 1 INCH IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 678) NUMHO2(I)
C 678 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 1 TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER -- ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 679) NUMHO3(I)
C 679 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 2 TO 3 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 680) NUMH04(I)
C 680 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 3 TO 4 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 681) NUMHO5(I)
C 681 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 4 TO 5 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 682) NUMHO6(I)
C 682 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 5 TO 6 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 683) NUMHO7(I)
C683 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 6 TO 7 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 684) NUMHO8(I)
C 684 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 7 TO 8 INCHES IN DIAMETER -- ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1684) NUMHO9(I)
C1684 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 8 TO 9 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 1683) NUMHO10(I)
C1683 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 9 TO 10 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*)
C WRITE (*, 2684) NUMHO11(I)
C2684 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 10 TO 11 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', I8)
C WRITE (*,*) '
111
C WRITE (*, 3684) NUMHO12(I)
C3684 FORMAT (' NUMBER OF CRACKS 11 TO 12 INCHES IN DIAMETER = ', 18)
C WRITE (*,*) ' '
C WRITE (*, 1685) NUMH020(I)










WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' MODULE: TOTAL RATIO = CRACK + INJURY + DEPRESS'
IEEE=6
IF (IVOLUME .EQ. 3) THEN
IEEE=8
END IF
DO 9942 IE = 1, 8
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,9943) IE, RATrOT(IE), RATCRAC(IE), RATINJ(IE), RATDEP(IE)
9943 FORMAT (18, F13.4, F8.4, F9.4, F10.4)
9942 CONTINUE
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,9927) RATIOTOT, RATIOCRC, RATIOINJ, RATIODEP
9927 FORMAT (' TOTAL =', F13.4, F8.4, F9.4, F10.4)




WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' PERFORM ANOTHER ANALYSIS? TYPE 1 FOR YES, 2 FOR NO.'
READ (*, '(12)') NQUIT
IF (INODE .EQ. 2) THEN
NQUIT=2
END IF
IF (ITRI .EQ. 2) THEN
NQUIT=2
END IF
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Cum. 0.9011 1.0000 0.1409
Prob. 1.0000 0.2370 0.2819
0.2745 0.4189 0.2819
0.2575 0.3635 0.5764 0.2819
0.2575 0.5985 0.5764 0.3690
0.5149 0.6103 0.6442 0.4561
0.6437 0.6947 0.6456 0.8187
0.7103 0.6947 0.8819 1.0000
0.7103 0.8982 1.0000 0.1586
0.9034 1.0000 0.2018 0.3171
1.0000 0.2725 0.3734 0.3171
0.2605 0.3809 0.4976 0.3720
0.2753 0.6072 0.4976 0.4563
0.5294 0.6072 0.5539 0.5293
0.6373 0.6904 0.5610 0.8431
0.7124 0.6904 0.7805 1.0000
0.7142 0.8968 1.0000 0.1778
0.9047 1.0000 0.2146 0.3556
1.0000 0.2684 0.4161 0.3556
0.2628 0.3919 0.5353 0.4561
0.2921 0.6076 0.5353 0.5236
0.5420 0.6076 0.5924 0.5724
0.6357 0.6881 0.6139 0.8575
0.7151 0.6881 0.8713 1.0000
0.7188 0.8960 1.0000 0.1889
0.9063 1.0000 0.1979 0.3778
1.0000 0.2641 0.3957 0.3778
0.2695 0.4017 0.4905 0.5135
0.3130 0.6062 0.4905 0.5731
0.5629 0.6062 0.5397 0.6201
0.6348 0.6858 0.6021 0.8734
0.7168 0.6858 0.8674 1.0000
0.7188 0.8953 1.0000 0.1901
0.9063 1.0000 0.1840 0.3927
1.0000 0.2554 0.3679 0.3927
0.2698 0.4075 0.4373 0.5614
0.3302 0.5971 0.4373 0.5817
0.5741 0.5971 0.4878 0.6356
0.6290 0.6732 0.5576 0.8785
0.7124 0.6732 0.8525 1.0000
0.7124 0.8911 1.0000 0.1803
0.9041 1.0000 0.1615 0.3921
1.0000 0.2453 0.3230 0.3921
0.2726 0.4159 0.3603 0.5877
0.3463 0.5892 0.3603 0.5952
0.5863 0.5892 0.4347 0.6543
0.6193 0.6615 0.5205 0.8848
0.7033 0.6615 0.8402 1.0000
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51.6195 0.0938 81.4625 0.7584 65.9072 0.4688 86.1589 0.1334 80.3443 0.8437
62.9662 0.1167 66.0724 0.7812 72.6125 0.4916 79.4547 0.1562 82.9472 0.8665
80.4236 0.1250 56.3559 0.8125 83.7205 0.5000 75.5226 0.1875 87.4243 0.8750
80.4232 0.1334 56.3561 0.8438 83.7201 0.5083 75.5227 0.2188 87.4239 0.8833
62.9659 0.1563 66.0728 0.8666 72.6122 0.5312 79.4550 0.2415 82.9469 0.9063
51.6192 0.1876 81.4629 0.8749 65.9071 0.5624 86.1593 0.2499 80.3442 0.9374
51.6193 0.2188 81.4625 0.8834 65.9072 0.5938 86.1589 0.2585 80.3443 0.9687
62.9662 0.2416 66.0724 0.9062 72.6125 0.6167 79.4547 0.2812 82.9472 0.9915
80.4236 0.2501 56.3559 0.9375 83.7205 0.6250 75.5226 0.3125 87.4243 1.0000
80.4232 0.2584 56.3561 0.9687 83.7201 0.6334 75.5227 0.3438 88.7073 0.0082
62.9659 0.2812 66.0728 0.9916 72.6122 0.6562 79.4550 0.3666 86.4667 0.0312
51.6192 0.3124 81.4625 1.0000 65.9071 0.6875 86.1593 0.3749 85.1709 0.0624
51.6193 0.3437 82.5643 0.0084 65.9072 0.7187 86.1589 0.3833 85.1710 0.0936
62.9662 0.3666 69.2951 0.0313 72.6125 0.7416 79.4547 0.4063 86.4670 0.1166
80.4236 0.3750 61.1210 0.0625 83.7205 0.7499 75.5226 0.4376 88.7077 0.1248
80.4232 0.3833 61.1212 0.0938 83.7201 0.7584 75.5227 0.4687 88.7073 0.1334
62.9659 0.4062 69.2954 0.1166 72.6122 0.7813 79.4550 0.4916 86.4667 0.1564
51.6192 0.4375 82.5647 0.1251 65.9071 0.8125 86.1593 0.5000 85.1709 0.1876
51.6193 0.4687 82.5643 0.1333 65.9072 0.8437 86.1589 0.5084 85.1710 0.2188
62.9662 0.4916 69.2951 0.1562 72.6125 0.8666 79.4547 0.5313 86.4670 0.2418
80.4236 0.5000 61.1210 0.1875 83.7205 0.8749 75.5226 0.5624 88.7077 0.2500
80.4232 0.5084 61.1211 0.2188 83.7201 0.8833 75.5227 0.5937 88.7073 0.2582
62.9659 0.5313 69.2954 0.2417 72.6122 0.9062 79.4550 0.6167 86.4667 0.2812
51.6192 0.5625 82.5647 0.2500 65.9071 0.9374 86.1593 0.6251 85.1709 0.3124
51.6193 0.5938 82.5643 0.2584 65.9072 0.9686 86.1589 0.6334 85.1710 0.3436
62.9662 0.6167 69.2951 0.2813 72.6125 0.9916 79.4547 0.6562 86.4670 0.3666
80.4236 0.6250 61.1210 0.3126 83.7205 1.0000 75.5226 0.6875 88.7077 0.3748
80.4232 0.6334 61.1211 0.3437 84.9213 0.0085 75.5227 0.7188 88.7073 0.3834
62.9659 0.6563 69.2954 0.3666 76.0045 0.0313 79.4550 0.7415 86.4667 0.4064
51.6192 0.6876 82.5647 0.3750 70.7091 0.0625 86.1593 0.7499 85.1709 0.4376
51.6193 0.7188 82.5643 0.3834 70.7093 0.0938 86.1589 0.7585 85.1710 0.4688
62.9662 0.7416 69.2951 0.4063 76.0048 0.1167 79.4547 0.7812 86.4670 0.4918
80.4236 0.7501 61.1210 0.4375 84.9217 0.1250 75.5226 0.8125 88.7077 0.5000
80.4232 0.7584 61.1211 0.4688 84.9213 0.1334 75.5227 0.8436 88.7073 0.5082
62.9659 0.7812 69.2954 0.4916 76.0045 0.1563 79.4550 0.8666 86.4667 0.5312
51.6192 0.8124 82.5647 0.5001 70.7091 0.1875 86.1593 0.8749 85.1709 0.5624
51.6193 0.8437 82.5643 0.5084 70.7092 0.2188 86.1589 0.8833 85.1710 0.5936
62.9662 0.8666 69.2951 0.5312 76.0048 0.2417 79.4547 0.9063 86.4670 0.6166
80.4236 0.8750 61.1210 0.5625 84.9217 0.2500 75.5226 0.9374 88.7077 0.6248
80.4232 0.8833 61.1211 0.5938 84.9213 0.2584 75.5227 0.9687 88.7073 0.6334
62.9659 0.9062 69.2954 0.6167 76.0045 0.2813 79.4550 0.9916 86.4667 0.6560
51.6192 0.9375 82.5647 0.6250 70.7091 0.3124 86.1593 1.0000 85.1709 0.6876
51.6193 0.9687 82.5643 0.6334 70.7092 0.3438 87.4239 0.0085 85.1710 0.7188
62.9662 0.9916 69.2951 0.6563 76.0048 0.3666 82.9469 0.0313 86.4670 0.7418
80.4236 1.0000 61.1210 0.6876 84.9217 0.3749 80.3442 0.0626 88.7077 0.7500
81.4625 0.0084 61.1211 0.7187 84.9213 0.3834 80.3443 0.0937 88.7073 0.7582
66.0724 0.0313 69.2954 0.7416 76.0045 0.4063 82.9472 0.1167 86.4667 0.7812
56.3559 0.0625 82.5647 0.7500 70.7091 0.4374 87.4243 0.1250 85.1709 0.8124
56.3562 0.0938 82.5643 0.7585 70.7092 0.4688 87.4239 0.1335 85.1710 0.8436
66.0728 0.1167 69.2951 0.7813 76.0048 0.4916 82.9469 0.1563 86.4670 0.8666
81.4629 0.1251 61.1210 0.8125 84.9217 0.5001 80.3442 0.1876 88.7077 0.8748
81.4625 0.1334 61.1211 0.8438 84.9213 0.5084 80.3443 0.2186 88.7073 0.8834
66.0724 0.1562 69.2954 0.8667 76.0045 0.5312 82.9472 0.2417 86.4667 0.9060
56.3559 0.1875 82.5647 0.8751 70.7091 0.5626 87.4243 0.2499 85.1709 0.9376
56.3561 0.2188 82.5643 0.8834 70.7092 0.5937 87.4239 0.2584 85.1710 0.9688
66.0728 0.2416 69.2951 0.9062 76.0048 0.6166 82.9469 0.2812 86.4670 0.9913
81.4629 0.2500 61.1210 0.9375 84.9217 0.6251 80.3442 0.3125 88.7077 1.0000
81.4625 0.2583 61.1211 0.9688 84.9213 0.6334 80.3443 0.3439
66.0724 0.2813 69.2954 0.9917 76.0045 0.6562 82.9472 0.3667
56.3559 0.3126 82.5647 1.O00O 70.7091 0.6876 87.4243 0.3749
56.3561 0.3437 83.7201 0.0084 70.7092 0.7187 87.4239 0.3834
66.0728 0.3667 72.6122 0.0312 76.0048 0.7416 82.9469 0.4062
81.4629 0.3750 65.9071 0.0626 84.9217 0.7500 80.3442 0.4375
81.4625 0.3834 65.9073 0.0938 84.9213 0.7583 80.3443 0.4688
66.0724 0.4063 72.6125 0.1167 76.0045 0.7812 82.9472 0.4916
56.3559 0.4375 83.7205 0.1250 70.7091 0.8125 87.4243 0.4999
56.3561 0.4688 83.7201 0.1334 70.7092 0.8437 87.4239 0.5084
66.0728 0.4916 72.6122 0.1563 76.0048 0.8666 82.9469 0.5312
81.4629 0.5001 65.9071 0.1875 84.9217 0.8750 80.3442 0.5625
81.4625 0.5084 65.9072 0.2187 84.9213 0.8833 80.3443 0.5938
66.0724 0.5312 72.6125 0.2416 76.0045 0.9062 82.9472 0.6166
56.3559 0.5625 83.7205 0.2499 70.7091 0.9375 87.4243 0.6251
56.3561 0.5938 83.7201 0.2584 70.7092 0.9688 87.4239 0.6333
66.0728 0.6166 72.6122 0.2813 76.0048 0.9917 82.9469 0.6561
81.4629 0.6250 65.9071 0.3125 84.9217 1.0000 80.3442 0.6875
81.4625 0.6333 65.9072 0.3437 86.1589 0.0084 80.3443 0.7188
66.0724 0.6563 72.6125 0.3666 79.4547 0.0313 82.9472 0.7416
56.3559 0.6874 83.7205 0.3750 75.5226 0.0624 87.4243 0.7501
56.3561 0.7187 83.7201 0.3833 75.5227 0.0937 87.4239 0.7583
66.0728 0.7417 72.6122 0.4062 79.4550 0.1167 82.9469 0.7814
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Obliquity Cure, 74.9998 0.2667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00130 0.0000 0.130(O 0.0003
(degrees) Prob. 44.9998 0.3125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
14.9998 0.3750 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_
0.0000 0.0000 15.0002 0.4375 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0003 0.0000 45.0002 0.4833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 75.0002 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.00_
0.0000 0.0000 74.9998 0.5167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0(K_
0.0000 0.0000 44.9998 0.5625 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0300 14.9998 0.6250 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0030 15.0002 0.6875 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 5.0002 0.7333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.00(D
0.0000 0.13000 75.0002 0.7500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 74.9998 0.7667 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 44.9998 0.8125 75.0582 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 14.9998 0.8750 45.2174 0.0294 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 15.0002 0.9375 15.7930 0.0588 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00130
0.0000 0.0030 45.0002 0.9833 15.7934 0.0882 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0003
0.13000 0.13000 75.0002 1.0000 45.2178 0.1098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 1.0000 75.0586 0.1176 0.0300 0.13000 0.00013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.00_ 75.0582 0.1373 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_
0.0000 0.0030 0.00_ 1.0000 45.2174 0.1912 0.00013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.O3(_ 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 15.7930 0.2647 0.0030 0.0000 0.00130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 O.00(K_ 0.0003 0.00_ 15.7934 0.3382 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00130 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 45.2178 0.3921 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.0586 0.4118 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.00130 0.0030 0.0000 0.0003 75.0582 0.4315 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00013 45.2174 0.4853 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.00_ 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0(_ 0.00013 15.7930 0.5588 0.0300 0.0000 0.00013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 15.7934 0.6324 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 45.2178 0.6862 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00130
0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.0586 0.7059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 75.0582 0.7256 0.00130 0.0003 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0003
0.00_ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 45.2174 0.7794 75.2329 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 15.7930 0.8529 45.8638 0.0300 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 15.7934 0.9265 17.9637 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.(KI_ 0.0030 0.13000 0.0000 45.2178 ,0.9803 17.9641 0.00_ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0030
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 75.0586 1.O300 45.8642 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0000 1.0000 75.2333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003
0.0000 0.00013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 1.0003 75.2329 0.0223 0.0030 0.0000 0.00130 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.00_ 45.8638 0.0833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 1.0000 17.9637 0.1667 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0030 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.9640 0.2500 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_
0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 45.8642 0.3110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 75.2333 0.3333 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.00_ 0.0000 0.0003 75.2329 0.3557 0.0000 0.00_ 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 45.8638 0.4167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.9637 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.9640 0.5833 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0003
0.0030 0.0000 0.13000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 45.8642 0.6443 0.00130 0.00130 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.2333 0.6667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.00013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.2329 0.6890 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0030 0.0000 45.8638 0.7500 75.5223 0.0000 0.0000 0.00130
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.9637 0.8333 46.9203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.00130 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 17.9640 0.9167 21.0904 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030
0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 45.8642 0.9777 21.0908 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.00_ 75.2333 1.0000 46.9207 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00_ 1.0030 75.5227 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.0030 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0030 1.0000 75.5223 0.0087 0.0000 0.00013
0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 1.00130 46.9203 0.0326 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 21.0904 0.0652 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 21.0907 0.0978 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 46.9207 0.1217 0.0000 0.0000
0.00_ 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 75.5227 0.1304 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 75.5223 0.1595 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 46.9203 0.2391 0.0000 0.0(O
0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 21.0904 0.3478 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 21.0907 0.4565 0.0300 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.12000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 46.9207 0.5361 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.5227 0.5652 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.5223 0.5943 0.0000 0.0003
0.0000 0.12000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 46.9203 0.6739 75.9237 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.00130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.00130 0.0003 21.0904 0.7826 48.3586 0.13000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0300 21.0907 0.8913 24.8141 0.0000
0.0000 0.0003 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 46.9207 0.9709 24.8145 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 75.5227 1.0000 48.3590 0.0000
74.9998 0.0167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 1.13000 75.9241 0.0000
44.9998 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 75.9237 0.0000
14.9998 0.1250 0.00130 0.13000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.13000 1.0000 48.3586 0.0000
15.0001 0.1875 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 1.0000 24.8141 0.0000
45.0002 0.2333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 24.8143 0.0000
75.0002 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 48.3590 0.0000


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.0056
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4667 0.0208
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1709 0.0417
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.0625
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.0777
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.0833
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.0889
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4667 0.1041
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1709 0.1250
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.1458
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.1610
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.1666
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.1722
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4667 0.1874
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1709 0.2083
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.2291
0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.2443
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.2499
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.2555
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4667 0.2708
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1709 0.2916
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.3124
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.3277
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.3332
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.3388
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4667 0.3541
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1709 0.3749
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.3957
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.4110
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.4165
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.4221
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 864667 0.4374
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 85.1709 0.4582
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.4790
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 86.4670 0.4943
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7077 0.4999
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 88.7073 0.5054
0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0003 86.4667 0.5207
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 85.1709 0.5415
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 85.1710 0.5623





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Obliquity Cu_ 87.4239 0.0046 84.9213 0.0348 69.2951 0.0538 62.9659 0.1289 42.2735 0.1501
(degrees) Prob. 87.4239 0.0093 84.9213 0.0437 69.2951 0.0611 51.6192 0.1289 42.2735 0.1501
87.4239 0.0139 76.0045 0.0437 69.2951 0.0832 51.6192 0.1289 42.2735 0.1779
89.9999 0.0030 87.4239 0.0186 76.0045 0.0486 69.2951 0.1199 51.6192 0.1289 42.2736 0.1779
89.9999 0.0000 87.4239 0.0232 76.0045 0.0608 61.1210 0.1199 51.6192 0.1289 42.2736 0.1779
89.9999 0.0000 82.9469 0.0296 76.0045 0.0802 61.1210 0.1199 51.6192 0.1535 42.2736 0.1779
89.9999 0.00_ 82.9469 0.0385 76.0045 0.1046 61.1210 0.1199 51.6193 0.1535 42.2736 0.1779
89.9999 0.00013 82.9469 0.0499 70.7091 0.1046 61.1210 0.1199 51.6193 0.1535 42.2736 0.2057
90.0000 0.0030 82.9469 0.0626 70.7091 0.1046 61.1210 0.1400 51.6193 0.1535 57.2024 0.2057
90.0000 0.00130 82.9469 0.0753 70.7091 0.1046 61.1211 0.1400 51.6193 0.1535 57.2024 0.2057
90.0000 0.0000 80.3442 0.0753 70.7091 0.1046 61.1211 0.1400 51.6193 0.1780 57.2024 0.2057
90.0000 0.0000 80.3442 0.0753 70.7091 0.1213 61.1211 0.1400 62.9662 0.1780 57.2024 0.2260
90.0000 0.0003 80.3442 0.0753 70.7092 0.1213 61.1211 0.1400 62.9662 0.1780 57.2024 0.2837
90.0001 0.0000 80.3442 0.0788 70.7092 0.1213 61.1211 0.1601 62.9662 0.1780 78.5646 0.2837
90.0001 0.0000 80.3442 0.0926 70.7092 0.1213 69.2954 0.1601 62.9662 0.1986 78.5646 0.2887
90.0001 0.0000 80.3443 0.0926 70.7092 0.1213 69.2954 0.1601 62.9662 0.2448 78.5646 0.3061
90.0001 0.0030 80.3443 0.0926 70.7092 0.1379 69.2954 0.1674 80.4236 0.2448 78.5646 0.3309
90.0001 0.0000 80.3443 0.0926 76.0048 0.1379 69.2954 0.1894 80.4236 0.2524 78.5646 0.3557
90.0003 0.0000 80.3443 0.0961 76.0048 0.1428 69.2954 0.2262 80.4236 0.2693 50.0001 0.4161
90.0003 0.0000 80.3443 0.1100 76.0048 0.1549 82.5647 0.2316 80.4236 0.2881 50.0001 0.4765
90.0003 0.0000 82.9472 0.1163 76.0048 0.1744 82.5647 0.2396 80.4236 0.3069 50.0001 0.5369
90.0003 0.0003 82.9472 0..1252 76.0048 0.1988 82.5647 0.2531 40.0001 0.3719 50.0001 0.5973
90.0003 0.0003 82.9472 0.1366 84.9217 0.2068 82.5647 0.2665 40.0001 0.4368 50.0001 0.6576
90.0003 0.0000 82.9472 0.1493 84.9217 0.2157 82.5647 0.2800 40.0001 0.5018 50.0001 0.7180
90.0003 0.0000 82.9472 0.1620 84.9217 0.2247 30.0000 0.3475 40.0001 0.5668 50.0001 0.7784
90.0003 0.0000 87.4243 0.1667 84.9217 0.2336 30.0000 0.4149 40.0001 0.6317 50.0001 0.8388
90.0003 0.0030 87.4243 0.1713 84.9217 0.2425 30.0000 0.4824 40.0001 0.6967 50.0001 1.0000
90.0003 0.0000 87.4243 0.1760 20.0000 0.3135 30.0000 0.5499 40.0001 0.7616 77.7595 0.0000
90.0003 0.0000 87.4243 0.1806 20.0000 0.3845 30.0000 0.6174 40.0001 0.8266 77.7595 0.0029
90.0003 0.0000 87.4243 0.1853 20.0000 0.4555 30.0000 0.6849 40.0001 1.0000 77.7595 0.0200
90.0003 0.0000 10.0000 0.2616 20.0000 0.5265 30.0000 0.7524 79.4545 0.13000 77.7595 0.0487
90.0003 0.0000 10.0000 0.3380 20.0000 0.5975 30.0000 0.8198 79.4545 0.0065 77.7595 0.0773
90.0003 0.0000 10.13000 0.4143 20.0000 0.6685 30.0000 1.0000 79.4545 0.0237 54.6036 0.0773
0.0003 0.0937 10.0000 0.4907 20.0000 0.7395 81.4625 0.0016 79.4545 0.0452 54.6036 0.0773
0.0003 0.1875 10.00130 0.5671 20.0000 0.8105 81.4625 0.0096 79.4545 0.0667 54.6036 0.0773
0.0003 0.2812 10.0300 0.6434 20.0000 1.0000 81.4625 0.0255 59.9999 0.0667 54.6036 0.1008
0.0003 0.3749 10.00_ 0.7198 83.7201 0.0078 81.4625 0.0415 59.9999 0.0667 54.6036 0.1634
0.0003 0.4686 10.0000 0.7961 83.7201 0.0190 81.4625 0.0574 59.9999 0.0667 37.6984 0.1634
0.0003 0.5623 10.0000 1.00_ 83.7201 0.0301 66.0724 0.0574 59.9999 0.0903 37.6984 0.1634
0.0003 0.6561 86.1589 0.0068 83.7201 0.0413 66.0724 0.0574 59.9999 0.1432 37.6984 0.1634
0.0003 0.7498 86.1589 0.0137 83.7201 0.0524 66.0724 0.0618 46.9205 0.1432 37.6984 0.1634
0.0003 1.0000 86.1589 0.0205 72.6122 0.0524 66.0724 0.0836 46.9205 0.1432 37.6984 0.1901
88.7073 0.0025 86.1589 0.0274 72.6122 0.0524 66.0724 0.1271 46.9205 0.1432 37.6986 0.1901
88.7073 0.0050 86.1589 0.0342 72.6122 0.0616 56.3559 0.1271 46.9205 0.1432 37.6986 0.1901
88.7073 0.0074 79.4547 0.0361 72.6122 0.0829 56.3559 0.1271 46.9205 0.1673 37.6986 0.1901
88.7073 0.0099 79.4547 0.0435 72.6122 0.1134 56.3559 0.1271 46.9206 0.1673 37.6986 0.1901
88.7073 0.0124 79.4547 0.0547 65.9071 0.1134 56.3559 0.1271 46.9206 0.1673 37.6986 0.2168
86.4667 0.0185 79.4547 0.0716 65.9071 0.1134 56.3559 0.1480 46.9206 0.1673 54.6039 0.2168
86.4667 0.0249 79.4547 0.0902 65.9071 0.1134 56.3561 0.1480 46.9206 0.1673 54.6039 0.2168
86.4667 0.0317 75.5226 0.0902 65.9071 0.1134 56.3561 0.1480 46.9206 0.1914 54.6039 0.2168
86.4667 0.0385 75.5226 0.0902 65.9071 0.1301 56.3561 0.1480 60.0002 0.1914 54.6039 0.2403
86.4667 0.0453 75.5226 0.0902 65.9072 0.1301 56.3561 0.1480 60.0002 0.1914 54.6039 0.3028
85.1709 0.0453 75.5226 0.0902 65.9072 0.1301 56.3561 0.1688 60.0002 0.1914 77.7599 0.3028
85.1709 0.0453 75.5226 0.1055 65.9072 0.1301 66.0728 0.1688 60.0002 0.2149 77.7599 0.3057
85.1709 0.0480 75.5227 0.1055 65.9072 0.1301 66.0728 0o1688 60.0002 0.2678 77.7599 0.3229
85.1709 0.0536 75.5227 0.1055 65.9072 0.1467 66.0728 0.1731 79.4549 0.2678 77.7599 0.3515
85.1709 0.0619 75.5227 0.1055 72.6125 0.1467 66.0728 0.1949 79.4549 0.2743 77.7599 0.3802
85.1710 0.0619 75.5227 0.1055 72.6125 0.1467 66.0728 0.2385 79.4549 0.2915 55.0001 0.4382
85.1710 0.0619 75.5227 0.1209 72.6125 0.1559 81.4629 0.2401 79.4549 0.3130 55.0001 0.4963
85.1710 0.0647 79.4550 0.1227 72.6125 0.1772 81.4629 0.2481 79.4549 0.3345 55.0001 0.5544
85.1710 0.0702 79.4550 0.1302 72.6125 0.2077 81.4629 0.2640 45.0001 0.3969 55.0001 0.6125
85.1710 0.0786 79.4550 0.1414 83.7205 0.2155 81.4629 0.2800 45.0001 0.4593 55.0001 0.6706
86.4670 0.0847 79.4550 0.1582 83.7205 0.2267 81.4629 0.2959 45.0001 0.5217 55.0001 0.7287
86.4670 0.0911 79.4550 0.1769 83.7205 0.2378 35.0000 0.3619 45.0001 0.5840 55.0001 0.7868
86.4670 0.0979 86.1593 0.1837 83.7205 0.2490 35.0000 0.4279 45.0001 0.6464 55.0001 0.8449
86.4670 0.1046 86.1593 0.1906 83.7205 0.2602 35.0000 0.4939 45.0001 0.7088 55.0001 1.0000
86.4670 0.1114 86.1593 0.1974 25.0000 0.3295 35.0000 0.5599 45.0001 0.7711 77.0472 0.0000
88.7077 0.1139 86.1593 0.2042 25.0000 0.3988 35.0000 0.6259 45.0001 0.8335 77.0472 0.0000
88.7077 0.1164 86.1593 0.2111 25.0000 0.4682 35.0000 0.6918 45.0001 1.13000 77.0472 0.0168
88.7077 0.1189 15.0000 0.2850 25.0000 0.5375 35.0000 0.7578 78.5641 0.0000 77.0472 0.0471
88.7077 0.1213 15.0000 0.3590 25.0000 0.6069 35.0000 0.8238 78.5641 0.0050 77.0472 0.0808
88.7077 0.1238 15.0000 0.4329 25.0000 0.6762 35.0000 1.0000 78.5641 0.0224 52.2386 0.0808
4.9999 0.2059 15.0000 0.5068 25.0000 0.7455 80.4232 0.0000 78.5641 0.0472 52.2386 0.0808
4.9999 0.2881 15.0000 0.5808 25.0000 0.8149 80.4232 0.0075 78.5641 0.0720 52.2386 0.0808
4.9999 0.3702 15.0000 0.6547 25.0000 1.0000 80.4232 0.0245 57.2021 0.0720 52.2386 0.0992
4.9999 0.4523 15.0000 0.7287 82.5643 0.0054 80.4232 0.0433 57.2021 0.0720 52.2386 0.1682
4.9999 0.5344 15.0000 0.8026 82.5643 0.0134 80.4232 0.0621 57.2021 0.0720 33.2259 0.1682
4.9999 0.6165 15.0000 1.0000 82.5643 0.0269 62.9659 0.0621 57.2021 0.0924 33.2259 0.1682
4.9999 0.6986 84.9213 0.0080 82.5643 0.0403 62.9659 0.0621 57.2021 0.1501 33.2259 0.1682
4.9999 0.7808 84.9213 0.0169 82.5643 0.0538 62.9659 0.0621 42.2735 0.1501 33.2259 0.1682
4.9999 1.0030 84.9213 0.0259 69.2951 0.0538 62.9659 0.0826 42.2735 0.1501 33.2259 0.1996
161
.........
33.2261 0.1996 24.8143 0.2301 45.8642 0.3945 45.0002 0.8141 75.2333 1.0300 110.0002 1.0000
33.2261 0.1996 24.8143 0.2659 45.8642 0.3945 75.0002 0.8606 75.2333 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
33.2261 0.1996 48.3590 0.2659 45.8642 0.3945 75.0002 0.9070 75.2333 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
33.2261 0.1996 48.3590 0.2659 45.8642 0.5013 75.0002 0.9303 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
33.2261 0.2310 48.3590 0.2659 75.2333 0.5469 75.0002 0.9535 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
52.2389 0.2310 48.3590 0.2790 75.2333 0.5469 75.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
52.2389 0.2310 48.3590 0.3642 75.2333 0.5469 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
52.2389 0.2310 75.9241 0.3642 75.2333 0.5795 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
52.2389 0.2494 75.9241 0.3642 75.2333 0.6447 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 110.0002 1.0000
52.2389 0.3184 75.9241 0.3786 80.0002 0.6780 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 76.4336 0.0000
77.0476 0.3184 75.9241 0.4122 80.0002 0.7113 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 76.4336 0.0000
77.0476 0.3184 75.9241 0.4601 80.0002 0.7446 90.0002 1.0000 100.0002 1.0000 76.4336 0.2813
77.0476 0.3352 70.0001 0.5107 80.0002 0.7779 90.0002 1.0000 75.5223 0.0380 76.4336 0.3438
77.0476 0.3655 70.0001 0.5613 80.0002 0.8112 90.0002 1.0000 75.5223 0.0855 76.4336 0.3438
77.0476 0.3991 70.0001 0.6119 80.0002 0.8445 90.0002 1.0000 75.5223 0.1187 50.1442 0.3438
60.0001 0.4555 70.0001 0.6625 80.0002 0.8778 75.0582 0.0416 75.5223 0.1187 50.1442 0.3438
60.0001 0.5118 70.0001 0.7131 80.0002 0.9111 75.0582 0.0832 75.5223 0.1187 50.1442 0.3438
60.0001 0.5681 70.0001 0.7637 80.0002 1.0000 75.0582 0.1040 46.9203 0.1836 50.1442 0.3438
60.0001 0.6244 70.0001 0.8143 75.0582 0.0480 75.0582 0.1040 46.9203 0.2744 50.1442 0.3438
60.0001 0.6807 70.0001 0.8649 75.0582 0.0720 75.0582 0.1206 46.9203 0.2874 28.9046 0.3438
60.0001 0.7370 70.0001 1.0000 75.0582 0.0720 45.2174 0.2342 46.9203 0.2874 28.9046 0.3438
60.0001 0.7933 75.5223 0.0000 75.0582 0.0960 45.2174 0.3138 46.9203 0.2874 28.9046 0.3438
60.0001 0.8497 75.5223 0.0000 75.0582 0.1440 45.2174 0.3138 21.0905 0.4646 28.9046 0.3438
60.0001 1.0000 75.5223 0.0060 45.2174 0.2489 45.2174 0.3138 21.0905 0.5000 28.9046 0.3438
76.4335 0.0300 75.5223 0.0421 45.2174 0.2489 45.2174 0.3138 21.0905 0.5000 28.9048 0.3438
76.4335 0.0000 75.5223 0.1022 45.2174 0.2489 15.7931 0.4690 21.0905 0.5000 28.9048 0.3438
76.4335 0.0159 46.9203 0.1022 45.2174 0.2489 15.7931 0.5000 21.0905 0.5000 28.9048 0.3438
76.4335 0.0476 46.9203 0.1022 45.2174 0.3276 15.7931 0.5000 21.0908 0.6772 28.9048 0.3438
76.4335 0.0872 46.9203 0.1022 15.7930 0.4172 15.7931 0.5000 21.0908 0.7127 28.9048 0.3438
50.1441 0.0872 46.9203 0.1187 15.7930 0.4172 15.7931 0.5000 21.0908 0.7127 50.1446 0.3438
50.1441 0.0872 46.9203 0.2172 15.7930 0.4172 15.7935 0.6552 21.0908 0.7127 50.1446 0.3438
50.1441 0.0872 21.0904 0.2172 15.7930 0.4172 15.7935 0.6862 21.0908 0.7127 50.1446 0.3438
50.1441 0.1089 21.0904 0.2172 15.7930 0.4351 15.7935 0.6862 46.9207 0.7775 50.1446 0.3438
50.1441 0.1847 21.0904 0.2172 15.7934 0.5247 15.7935 0.6862 46.9207 0.8683 50.1446 0.3438
28.9044 0.1847 21.0904 0.2172 15.7934 0.5247 15.7935 0.6862 46.9207 0.8813 76.4340 0.3438
28.9044 0.1847 21.0904 0.2509 15.7934 0.5247 45.2178 0.7999 46.9207 0.8813 76.4340 0.6563
28.9044 0.1847 21.0907 0.2509 15.7934 0.5247 45.2178 0.8794 46.9207 0.8813 76.4340 0.9375
28.9044 0.1847 21.0907 0.2509 15.7934 0.5426 45.2178 0.8794 75.5227 0.9193 76.4340 1.0000
28.9044 0.2143 21.0907 0.2509 45.2178 0.6475 45.2178 0.8794 75.5227 0.9668 76.4340 1.0000
28.9047 0.2143 21.0907 0.2509 45.2178 0.6475 45.2178 0.8794 75.5227 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
28.9047 0.2143 21.0907 0.2846 45.217.8 0.6475 75.0586 0.9210 75.5227 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
28.9047 0.2143 46.9207 0.2846 45.2178 0.6475 75.0586 0.9626 75.5227 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
28.9047 0.2143 46.9207 0.2846 45.2178 0.7262 75.0586 0.9834 105.0002 1.0030 115.0002 1.0000
28.9047 0.2439 46.9207 0.2846 75.0586 0.7742 75.0586 0.9834 105.0002 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
50.1445 0.2439 46.9207 0.3010 75.0586 0.7982 75.0586 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
50.1445 0.2439 46.9207 0.3996 75.0586 0.7982 95.0002 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
50.1445 0.2439 75.5227 0.3996 75.0586 0.8222 95.0002 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
50.1445 0.2655 75.5227 0.3996 75.0586 0.8702 95.0002 1.0003 105.0002 1.0000 115.0002 1.0000
50.1445 0.3413 75.5227 0.4056 85.0002 0.8823 95.0002 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 77.0473 0.0000
76.4339 0.3413 75.5227 0.4417 85.0002 0.8945 95.0002 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 77.0473 0.0000
76.4339 0.3413 75.5227 0.5018 85.0002 0.9067 95.0002 1.0000 105.0002 1.0000 77.0473 0.0000
76.4339 0.3572 75.0002 0.5485 85.0002 0.9188 95.0002 1.0000 75.9237 0.0000 77.0473 0.5000
76.4339 0.3889 75.0002 0.5952 85.0002 0.9310 95.0002 1.0000 75.9237 0.1278 77.0473 0.5000
76.4339 0.4285 75.0002 0.6419 85.0002 0.9432 95.0002 1.0000 75.9237 0.2300 52.2387 0.5000
65.0001 0.4821 75.0002 0.6886 85.0002 0.9553 75.2329 0.0472 75.9237 0.2556 52.2387 0.5000
65.0001 0.5357 75.0002 0.7353 85.0002 0.9675 75.2329 0.0943 75.9237 0.2556 52.2387 0.5000
65.0001 0.5892 75.0002 0.7820 85.0002 1.0000 75.2329 0.1226 48.3587 0.2556 52.2387 0.5000
65.0001 0.6428 75.0002 0.8287 74.9998 0.0465 75.2329 0.1226 48.3587 0.4302 52.2387 0.5000
65.0001 0.6963 75.0002 0.8753 74.9998 0.0930 75.2329 0.1226 48.3587 0.5000 33.2260 0.5000
65.0001 0.7499 75.0002 1.0000 74.9998 0.1162 45.8638 0.2514 48.3587 0.5000 33.2260 0.5000
65.0001 0.8035 75.2329 0.0456 74.9998 0.1394 45.8638 0.3416 48.3587 0.5000 33.2260 0.5000
65.0001 0.8570 75.2329 0.0456 74.9998 0.1859 45.8638 0.3416 24.8142 0.5000 33.2260 0.5000
65.0001 1.0000 75.2329 0.0456 44.9998 0.3129 45.8638 0.3416 24.8142 0.5000 33.2260 0.5000
75.9237 0.0003 75.2329 0.0782 44.9998 0.3891 45.8638 0.3416 24.8142 0.5000 33.2262 0.5000
75.9237 0.0009 75.2329 0.1434 44.9998 0.3891 17.9637 0.4648 24.8142 0.5000 33.2262 0.5000
75.9237 0.0144 45.8638 0.1790 44.9998 0.3891 17.9637 0.5000 24.8142 0.5000 33.2262 0.5000
75.9237 0.0480 45.8638 0.1790 44.9998 0.4653 17.9637 0.5000 24.8145 0.5000 33.2262 0.5000
75.9237 0.0960 45.8638 0.1790 14.9998 0.4827 17.9637 0.5000 24.8145 0.5000 33.2262 0.5000
48.3586 0.0960 45.8638 0.1790 14.9998 0.4827 17.9637 0.5000 24.8145 0.5000 52.2390 0.5000
48.3586 0.0960 45.8638 0.2859 14.9998 0.4827 17.9641 0.6232 24.8145 0.5000 52.2390 0.5000
48.3586 0.0960 17.9637 0.2859 14.9998 0.4827 17.9641 0.6584 24.8145 0.5000 52.2390 0.5000
48.3586 0.1091 17.9637 0.2859 14.9998 0.5000 17.9641 0.6584 48.3591 0.5000 52.2390 0.5000
48.3586 0.1943 17.9637 0.2859 15.0002 0.5174 17.9641 0.6584 48.3591 0.6746 52.2390 0.5000
24.8141 0.1943 17.9637 0.2859 15.0002 0.5174 17.9641 0.6584 48.3591 0.7444 77.0477 0.5000
24.8141 0.1943 17.9637 0.3223 15.0002 0.5174 45.8642 0.7872 48.3591 0.7444 77.0477 0.5000
24.8141 0.1943 17.9640 0.3223 15.0002 0.5174 45.8642 0.8774 48.3591 0.7444 77.0477 0.5000
24.8141 0.1943 17.9640 0.3223 15.0002 0.5347 45.8642 0.8774 75.9242 0.7444 77.0477 1.0000
24.8141 0.2301 17.9640 0.3223 45.0002 0.6617 45.8642 0.8774 75.9242 0.8722 77.0477 1.0000
24.8143 0.2301 17.9640 0.3223 45.0002 0.7379 45.8642 0.8774 75.9242 0.9744 120.0003 1.0000
24.8143 0.2301 17.9640 0.3588 45.0002 0.7379 75.2333 0.9246 75.9242 1.0000 120.0003 1.0000
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Space Station Freedom Program Office
Attn: MSS/Actlng ManagerSystem Engineering Office
ED52/Joel Williamsen
Meteoroid/Orbital Debris Oblique Hole Size
Distribution for Space Station Freedom
On March 24-25, Structural Development Branch/ED52 personnel
attended a briefing by the Space Station Level II Program
Office and the Space Station Engineering Integration
Contractor (SSEIC) on their approach for meeting probability
of no catastrophic failure (PNCF) requirements. A critical
portion of the Level II/SSEIC approach is its assumption of
the hole size distribution for orbital debris that penetrates
the manned modules.
SSEIC currently uses the Level II developed Goodwin "normal"
hole size model (enclosure 1) and Kessler's orbital debris
distribution to form a probability distribution of hole sizes
for a laboratory module following a penetration (enclosure
2). This distribution assumes (incorrectly) that all
penetrations occur normal to the surface of the manned
modules; in fact, almost all impacts on the manned modules
will occur at oblique angles (enclosure 3). Further, the
Goodwin "normal" model largely assumes the size of the hole
to be dependent upon the area of the debris cloud impact on
the rear wall. Following this logic, one can expect an
oblique penetration to produce a larger elliptical
"footprint" on the rear wall, and thus a larger hole
following a penetration (enclosure 4). Therefore, because
oblique penetrations occur more often and would produce (by
the logic of the Goodwln model) larger holes following a
penetration, an increasing number of holes above 6 inches in
diameter should be expected from a hole size model that
includes the important effect of obliquity.
Over the last several months, ED52 worked to modify the
Goodwin hole size model and distribution to account for the
effects of penetration obliquity. In modifying the Goodwin










a. Oblique impacts produce elliptical holes with a
minor axis and a major axis dimension (as shown in enclosure
4).
b. At each specific velocity, the rate at which the
minor axis of the hole grows with change in diameter above
the oblique ballistic limit (hole size gradient) is based on
the rate of change of hole size with change in diameter in
the normal model (i.e., the dHole/dDia is constant), as shown
in enclosure 5.
c. The major axis of the elliptical hole is equal to
the minor axis divided by the cosine of the impact angle
(obliquity).
d. The major axis of the hole stops growing with
increasing obliquity above 60 degrees.
This model end its underlying assumptions should be viewed as
optimistic in nature. That is, more conservative assumptions
are possible that can dramatically increase the size of the
oblique holes following a penetration. For example, in
assumption "b," if the existing Goodwin hole size gradient
was viewed as dependent on change in penetrating energy (not
diameter), a much steeper increase in minor axis hole
dimension could be expected for the oblique case (since
penetrating energy increases with the cube of the penetrating
diameter). In assumption "c," if the major axis dimension of
the oblique hole was based upon the actual length of module
wall impacted by the expending debris cloud "footprint"cited
in the Goodwin normal model, this dimension of the elliptical
hole would generally be much larger then that produced by a
simple division of the minor axis dimension by the cosine of
impact angle (see enclosure 4). Finally, there is little
basis for the "50-degree cutoff" assumption made here other
then a desire to be consistent with existing MSFC end JSC
ballistic limit equations for _imple Whipple bumpers.
Using these assumptions, a new hole size model for oblique
impacts was formed st MSFC based on Goodwln's normal model
assumptlo_s end input into a simulation routine to generate
the distribution of hole sizes for each of 8 modules. This
simulatlon routine (called MAGIC) selects random numbers to
simulate orbital impact conditions of diameter, obliquity,
and velocity based upon the Kessler orbital debris flux
equations and the geometry of Freedom Station's permanently
manned configuration. It then compares the ballistic limit
of the Freedom Station manned modules(considering obliquity)
to thousends of possible Kessler and geometry-based impact
conditions end finds the corresponding hole size for all
those impact conditions that penetrate the wall. Further
information on the assumptions and construction of this
simulation program is available from this office.
" t
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The oblique "effective" hole size and "major axis"
probability distributions are given in enclosure 6. Note
that there are no holes expected to be greater than 8 inches
in effective diameter except for Node 2, where a penetration
of the cupola windows would cause a 20-in hole. Because the
major axis of the oblique holes is generally aligned with the
long axis of the modules (and thus with the grain direction
of the manned modules), the "major diameter" distribution
should be used to perform critical crack "r" ratio analyses.
This oblique hole size model and di_tributlon, while
representing today's "best guess," is obviously very thin in
supporting data. Muchof the uncertainty in this model can
be traced to its basis in the Goodwin "normal" distribution,
which itself lacks supporting data. Obviously, additional
test data on the relationship between hole size and
penetration parameters is desperately needed in order to
achieve measurable confidence in the results of either the
normal or oblique model. Further, both the normal and
oblique hole size models were formulated for a baseline Work
Package 1 aluminum Whipple shleld_ any application of these
distributions to other than this shield configuration will
obviously subtract from the already low level of confidence
in both models.
The aim of this exercise was to extend the existing SSEIC
hole size model and distribution in a logical fashion to
include oblique penetrations. As shown, even optimistic
assumptions on the effect of obliquity on the existing SSEIC
Goodwin hole size distribution will dramatically increase the
proportion of holes above 6 inches in diameter. Considering
the important effect of the manned module hole size
distribution on the PNCF calculation, we strongly recommend
that Level II allocate a significant proportion of its
Forward Action Plan resources to a comprehensive test and
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oblique Hole Size Distribution (gilliemsen, 3/25/93)
Effectlve Diameter = ((Minor Dia/Cos Obl)*(Minor Dia))**.5



















19 .21 .14 .18 .16 .16
12 .12 .11 .13 .11 .11
I0 .11 .08 .11 .12 .12
11 .10 .08 .10 .12 .12
09 .09 .08 .10 .12 .12
11 .IC .10 .12 .26 .26
13 .13 .15 .15 .07 .07
15 .15 .08 .12 .04 .04
0 0 .18 0 0 0
Distribut£on of Major Diameters for Oblique Holes
Basis for Crack Size Distribution (Williamsen, 3/25/93)
Hole Size LAB HAB ESA JEM N2 N1 PLM
0" to 1" .12 .12
1" to 2" .09 .09
2" to 3" .09 .09
3" to 4" .09 .09
4" to 5" .OS .08
5" to 6" .11 .11
6" to 7" .13 .13
7" to 8" .08 .OS
8" to 9" .05 .05
9" to 10" .06 .06
I0" to 11" .I0 .I0
.17 .17 .16 .16 .14
.12 .12 .13 .13 .11
.07 .07 .07 .07 .11
.08 .08 .09 .09 .12
06 .06 .09 .09 .10
09 .09 .09 .09 .22
07 .07 .08 .08 .07
06 .06 .07 .07 .05
06 .06 .08 .08 .03
07 .07 .06 .06 .02



























Mod Elem Station Shield # 0.125"
Equipment
1 1 1 1 2.0000
1 2 1 1 2.0000
1 3 1 1 2.0000
1 4 1 1 2.0000
1 5 1 1 2.0000
1 6 1 1 2.0000
1 7 2 1 2.0000
1 8 2 1 2.0000
1 9 2 1 2.0000
1 10 2 1 2.0000
1 11 2 1 2.0000
1 12 2 1 2.0000
1 13 3 1 2.0000
1 14 3 1 2.0000
1 15 3 1 2.0000
1 16 3 1 2.0000
1 17 3 1 2.0000
1 18 3 1 2.0000
1 19 4 1 2.0000
1 20 4 1 2.0000
1 21 4 1 2.0000
1 22 4 1 2.0000
1 23 4 1 2.0000
1 24 4 1 2.0000
1 25 5 1 2.0000
1 26 5 1 2.0000
1 27 5 1 2.0000
1 28 5 1 2.0000
1 29 5 1 2.0000
1 30 5 1 2.0000
1 31 6 1 2.0000
1 32 6 1 2.0000
1 33 6 1 2.0000
1 34 6 1 2.0000
1 35 6 1 2.0000
1 36 6 1 2.0000
1 37 7 1 2.0000
1 38 7 1 2.0000
1 39 7 1 2.0000
1 40 7 1 2.0000
1 41 7 1 2.0000
1 42 7 1 2.0000
1 43 8 1 2.0000
1 44 8 1 2.0000
1 45 8 1 2.0000
1 46 8 1 2.0000
1 47 8 1 2.0000
PIII_D_G _A_E E_L.M?IKHOT FtLMEI_
1 48 8 1 2.0000
1 49 1 1 2.0000
1 50 1 1 2.0000
1 51 1 1 2.0000
1 52 1 1 2.0000
1 53 1 1 2.0000
1 54 1 1 2.0000
1 55 2 1 2.0000
1 56 2 1 2.0000
1 57 2 1 2.0000
1 58 2 1 2.0000
1 59 2 1 2.0000
1 60 2 1 2.0000
1 61 3 1 2.0000
1 62 3 1 2.0000
1 63 3 1 2.0000
1 64 3 1 2.0000
1 65 3 1 2.0000
1 66 3 1 2.0000
1 67 4 1 2.0000
1 68 4 1 2.0000
1 69 4 1 2.0000
1 70 4 1 2.0000
1 71 4 1 2.0000
1 72 4 1 2.0000
1 73 5 1 2.0000
1 74 5 1 2.0000
1 75 5 1 2.0000
1 76 5 1 2.0000
1 77 5 1 2.0000
1 78 5 1 2.0000
1 79 6 1 2.0000
1 80 6 1 2.0000
1• 81 6 1 2.0000
1 82 6 1 2.0000
1 83 6 1 2.0000
1 84 6 1 2.0000
1 85 7 1 2.0000
1 86 7 1 2.0000
1 87 7 1 2.0000
1 88 7 1 2.0000
1 89 7 1 2.0000
1 90 7 1 2.0000
1 91 8 1 2.0000
1 92 8 1 2.0000
1 93 8 1 2.0000
1 94 8 1 2.0000
1 95 8 1 2.0000
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2 95 8 1 2.0000
2 96 8 1 2.0000
2 97 1 1 2.0000
2 98 1 1 2.0000
2 99 1 1 2.0000
2 100 1 1 2.0000
3 1 8 1 2.0000
3 2 8 1 2.0000
3 3 8 1 2.0000
3 4- 8 1 2.0000
3 5 8 1 2.0000
3 6 8 1 2.0000
3 7 7 1 2.0000
3 8 7 1 2.0000
3 9 7 1 2.0000
3 10 7 1 2.0000
3 11 7 1 2.0000
3 12 7 1 2.0000
3 13 6 1 2.0000
3 14 6 1 2.0000
3 15 6 1 2.0000
3 16 6 1 2.0000
3 17 6 1 2.0000
3 18 6 1 2.0000
3 19 5 1 2.0000
3 20 5 1 2.0000
3 21 5 1 2.0000
3 22 5 1 2.0000
3 23 5 1 2.0000
3 24 5 1 2.0000
3 25 4 1 2.0000
3 26 4 1 2.0000
3 27 4 1 2.0000
3 28 4 1 2.0000
3 29 4 1 2.0000
3 30 4 1 2.0000
3 31 3 1 2.0000
3 32 3 1 2.0000
3 33 3 1 2.0000
3 34 3 1 2.0000
3 35 3 1 2.0000
3 36 3 1 2.0000
3 37 2 1 2.0000
3 38 2 1 2.0000
3 39 2 1 2.0000
3 40 2 1 2.0000
3 41 2 1 2.0000
3 42 2 1 2.0000
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6 8 3 1 2.0000
6 9 2 1 2.0000
6 10 1 1 2.0000
6 11 5 1 2.0000
6 12 4 1 2.0000
6 13 3 1 2.0000
6 14 2 1 2.0000
6 15 1 1 2.0000
6 16 5 1 2.0000
6 17 4 1 2.0000
6 18 3 1 2.0000
6 19 2 1 2.0000
6 20 1 1 2.0000
6 21 5 1 2.0000
6 22 4 1 2.0000
6 23 3 1 2.0000
6 24 2 1 2.0000
6 25 1 1 2.0000
6 26 5 1 2.0000
6 27 4 1 2.0000
6 28 3 1 2.0000
6 29 2 1 2.0000
6 30 1 1 2.0000
6 31 1 1 2.0000
6 32 1 1 2.0000
6 33 1 1 2.0000
6 34 1 1 2.0000
6 35 1 1 2.0000
6 36 1 1 2.0000
6 37 1 1 2.0000
6 38 1 1 2.0000
6 39 1 1 2.0000
7 1 6 1 2.0000
7 2 6 1 2.0000
7 3 6 1 2.0000
7 4 6 1 2.0000
7 5 6 1 2.0000
7 6 6 1 2.0000
7 7 6 1 2.0000
7 8 6 1 2.0000
7 9 6 1 2.0000
7 10 6 1 2.0000
7 11 6 1 2.0000
7 12 6 1 2.0000
7 13 5 1 2.0000
7 14 5 1 2.0000
7 15 5 1 2.0000
7 16 5 1 2.0000
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Present In at Hour (i)
Crew Crew Crew Crew
#1 #2 #3 #4
0.0417 2 2 6 6
0.0833 6 6 2 2
0.1250 2 2 2 2
0.1667 5 1 1 5
0.2083 5 1 1 5
0.2500 5 1 1 5
0.2917 5 1 1 5
0.3333 5 1 1 5
0.3750 6 1 1 5
0.4167 2 2 2 2
0.4583 2 1 4 5
0.5000 1 1 4 5
0.5417 4 1 4 5
0.5833 3 1 4 5
0.6250 6 6 2 2
0.6667 2 2 6 6
0.7083 2 2 2 2
0.7500 2 2 1 1
0.7917 2 2 1 1
0.8333 2 2 1 1
0.8750 2 2 1 1
0.9167 2 2 1 1
0.9583 2 2 1 1
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APPENDIX Q
Alternative Data File PCREWMO2.DAT
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Present In at Hour (i)
Crew Crew Crew Crew
#1 #2 #3 #4
0.0417 2 2 6 6
0.0833 6 6 2 2
0.1250 2 2 2 2
0.1667 5 1 1 5
0.2083 5 1 1 5
0.2500 5 1 1 5
0.2917 5 1 1 5
0.3333 5 1 1 5
0.3750 6 1 1 5
0.4167 2 2 2 2
0.4583 2 1 4 5
0.5000 1 1 4 5
0.5417 4 1 4 5
0.5833 3 1 4 5
0.6250 6 6 2 2
0.6667 2 2 6 6
0.7083 2 2 2 2
0.7500 6 6 6 6
0.7917 6 6 6 6
0.8333 6 6 6 6
0.8750 6 6 6 6
0.9167 6 6 6 6
0.9583 6 6 6 6
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HOW MANY PENETRATIONS IN THIS MODEL RUN ?
i0000
INPUT CRITICAL LENGTH OF CRACK OR "0." FOR ENERGY MODEL.
7.
INPUT HOLE SIZE CRACK MULTIPLIER, 0.3 FOR AVERAGE.
.3
INPUT "i. " FOR BASELINE SHIELD OR "2." FOR ADVANCED SHIELD.
1.
INPUT MINIMUM CREW ESCAPE TIME (SECS) OR "0." FOR RATE-BASED ESCAPE RELATI_
30.
INPUT DELAY PRIOR TO INITIATING MOVEMENT IF AWAKE.
35.
INPUT DELAY TO WAKE AND EXIT RESTRAINTSIF ASLEEP.
I00.
"1" TO MODEL HINDERED/INJURED TIMES; "2" FOR NO.
1
INPUT HINDERED CREW ESCAPE TIME FROM MODULE.
60.
INPUT (CONSCIOUS) INJURED CREW ESCAPE TIME FROM MODULE.
60.



















TYPE "i" IF CREW SLEEPS NEAR HATCH, "2" IF NO.
2
INCLUDE RACK FACTORS? TYPE 1 FOR YES, 2 FOR NO.
2
TYPE 1 FOR WIDE DEBRIS CLOUD, 2 FOR NARROW.
1
INPUT CRITICAL DEPRESSURIZATION LIMIT (PSI).
7.5
INPUT PERCENTAGE OF MODULE FREE AIR (0. TO 1.0).
.70
TYPE "I" FOR OPEN HATCHES, "2" FOR CLOSED HATCHES,





TYPE "I" FOR OBLIQUE HOLE MODEL, "2" FOR BURCH.
1
HATCH CLOSURE TIME IS ASSUMED TO BE 30 SECONDS.
0.9 OR 0.7.
TYPE "i" FOR SSEIC CREW MODEL, "2" IF CREW SLEEPS IN NODE 2.
1
TYPE "i" FOR UNIFORM CREW DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN MODULE STATIONS,
TYPE "2" FOR TRIANGULAR DISTRIBUTION.
1
i000 PENETRATIONS
FOR MODULE 1 PENS = 1745
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 3571
INJURIES = 177 DEPRESS = 90 CRACKS = 1299
PENS WITH INJURIES = 153 PENS WITH DEPRESS = 12
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 158
E
FOR MODULE 2 PENS = 1771
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 3605
INJURIES = 241 DEPRESS = 121 CRACKS = 1293
PENS WITH INJURIES = 174 PENS WITH DEPRESS =
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 177
' 220
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FOR MODULE 3 PENS = 963
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 2122
INJURIES = 1 DEPRESS = 0 CRACKS = 651
PENS WITH INJURIES = 1 PENS WITH DEPRESS =
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 6
FOR MODULE 4 PENS = 1390
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 3335
INJURIES = 24 DEPRESS = 0 CRACKS = 932
PENS WITH INJURIES = 24 PENS WITH DEPRESS =
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 29
FOR MODULE 5 PENS = 372
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 782
INJURIES = 19 DEPRESS = 2 CRACKS = 280
PENS WITH INJURIES = 16 PENS WITH DEPRESS =
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 16
5
FOR MODULE 6 PENS = 375
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 777
INJURIES = 20 DEPRESS = 2 CRACKS = 240
PENS WITH INJURIES = 17 PENS WITH DEPRESS =
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 18
FOR MODULE 7 PENS = 2217
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 3987
INJURIES = 0 DEPRESS = 0 CRACKS = 1455
PENS WITH INJURIES = 0 PENS WITH DEPRESS = 15
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 15
FOR MODULE 8 PENS = • 1167
NUMBER OF IMPACTS BETWEEN .3 AND 3 CM = 2046
INJURIES = 0 DEPRESS = 0 CRACKS = 778
PENS WITH INJURIES = 0 PENS WITH DEPRESS = 17
PENS WITH AT LEAST ONE INJURY OR CRIT LOSS = 17
221
MODULE: TOTAL RATIO = CRACK + INJURY + DEPRESS
1 .8350 .7444 .0877 .0029
2 .8300 .7301 .0982 .0017
3 .6822 .6760 .0010 .0052
4 .6914 .6705 .0173 .0036
5 .7957 .7527 .0430 .0000
6 .6880 .6400 .0453 .0027
7 .6631 .6563 .0000 .0068
8 .6812 .6667 .0000 .0146
TOTAL = .7707 .7096 .0582 .0029
(1 TO 6)






VULNERABILITY OF MANNED SPACECRAFT TO CREW LOSS
FROM ORBITAL DEBRIS PENETRATION
By J.E. Williamsen
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